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In the 21st century, consumers have an increasingly vast number of choices, yielding progressively less 
satisfaction, and fi rms have an ever expanding list of strategic choices, yielding progressively less value. 
Firms are forced to turn to innovative ways of doing business in order to satisfy customers and remain 
competitive. 
When one speaks of innovation; images of new, technologically advanced or novel solutions for everyday 
needs are summoned. While this is entirely valid, it does not wholly encompass the concept of innovation. 
Having the most technologically advanced and up-to-date product o erings no longer su  ces to satisfy 
growing consumer desires. Organizations have to split their focus to include business model innovation 
in the new business sphere and the crux of their success lies in recognizing the totality of business model 
innovation. It is as much about the end-state business model as it is about the path to implementation, 
and that in a holistic sense: the model, the people, and the environment. 
This dissertation mirrors this perspective, attempting to pull apart the process and look through the 
keyhole at the inner workings of business model innovation. Each chapter is another step closer to 
capturing the totality mentioned but also further away from the business model itself. Starting close to 
current thinking - with a theoretical exploration of the business model innovation process - and ending 
with a new perspective, in an empirical investigation of the e ect of the process on arguably the most 
fundamental part of an organisation, its people.
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expertises, the ERIM community is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of creating 
new business knowledge.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 A different perspective on business model innovation 
The modern mobile phone has more processing power than the super-computer which 
put Apollo 11 on the moon (Kaksu, 2014). A staggering fact about the information age in which 
we are firmly embedded. In the current reality, consumers have an increasingly vast number of 
choices, yielding progressively less satisfaction, and firms are overwhelmed with an ever 
expanding list of strategic choices, yielding progressively less value (Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 
2004). Ever more, firms are forced to turn to innovative ways of doing business in order to 
satisfy customers and remain competitive. Consistent innovation is rapidly turning into an 
essential factor in every successful business; in fact, it has been developing toward this for quite 
some time (Magretta, 2002; Coles & Mitchell, 2003; Chapman, 2006). Companies need to 
innovate to stay current and remain competitive.  
When one speaks of innovation; images of new, technologically advanced or novel 
solutions for everyday needs are conjured up. While this is an entirely valid representation, it 
does not encompass the concept of innovation as a whole. Commercial focus thus far has been 
primarily on technological innovation, hence the association (Chesbrough, 2007; Moss Kanter, 
2006). However, in the new age, having the most technologically advanced and up-to-date 
product offerings no longer suffices to satisfy growing consumer desires. Organizations have 
to split their focus to include business model innovation in the new business sphere 
(Chesbrough, 2007; Moser et al., 2007; Chapman, 2006; Chapman & Pohle, 2006; Boulton et 
al., 2000).  
A conglomeration of related events; globalization, the internet and ICT advancement, 
shortening product life cycles, increasingly intense competition, and shrinking profit margins 
(Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004; Krishnan & Prahalad, 2008; Moser et al., 2007; Chapman & 
Pohle, 2006), have caused some major shifts in the nature of the business environment and the 
factors needed for success. The increase in information availability and accessibility, 
particularly to the average consumer, has made differentiation and unique value offerings an 
essential determinant of success (Krishnan & Prahalad, 2008), but simultaneously all the more 
difficult to achieve. Gone are the days that organisations could compete on the basis of the 
‘traditional’ differentiation factors such as price, variety, quality and the like. These have 
become part of the license to operate. As consumers can gain access to millions of sellers of 
similar or often identical products or services online or read reviews of a store, an organisation, 
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or a service provider, the importance of how business is done has taken a front seat. The 
business model has become the value driver, not the product.  
One of the great successes in the technology industry today (in part due its role in the 
company turnaround) is the Apple iPod. The first iPod was not necessarily the most 
technologically advanced or the most attractively priced mobile music player on the market at 
the time. The business model however, which included the launch of iTunes (an online music 
store where consumers could purchase their favourite songs), presented each individual with 
the opportunity to easily customize the product (by loading their own desired music), and buy 
single songs (as opposed to whole albums, which was the norm at the time) to express their 
personality. The iPod alone could have been just another mobile music player, but the 
combination with a service (iTunes), the value proposition (instant customization) and an image 
created by clever marketing, all elements of the business model, it became a global hit.  
The realization that business models are the next differentiating factor is slowly dawning 
among the managerial ranks; a study by the Economist Intelligence Unit reported that more 
than 50% of the executives surveyed believe that business model innovation will eventually 
surpass product and service innovations in importance (Johnson et al., 2008). As we move 
further into the technology age, the possibility and likelihood that products and services are 
copied, and that consumers are aware of the substitutes, is increasingly likely. How a firm does 
business is becoming the differentiating factor (Bell et al., 2007; Gassman, 2006).  
The prevalence of business model innovation in practice is being mirrored in research, 
a growing cache of literature on the topic is being generated. The concept, and naturally the 
first research, stems from the domain of e-business models. This literature revolves around the 
characterization of different types of e-business models, identifying online revenue streams, 
and the description of e-commerce business model elements (Timmers, 1998; Mahadevan, 
2000; Gordijn & Akkermans, 2001; Pertovic et al., 2001). More recent literature focuses on the 
description of model elements and composition (for examples see Chesbrough, 2007; Johnson 
et al., 2008). The lack of clarity in what exactly a business model was resulted in there being 
more than 20 different perspectives on which elements a business model was composed of by 
the end of 2008 (Morris et al. 2005; Tikkanen et a., 2005; Chesbrough, 2007; Bell et al., 2007; 
Johnson et al., 2008). The result being that the majority of research still revolves around 
investigating the elements of a business model; what a business model consists of; and what 
exactly is implied by the term business model innovation (Morris et al., 2005; Coles & Mitchell, 
2004; Tikkanen et al., 2005; Chesbrough, 2007). Research up to this point gave the dynamism 
of business model innovation relatively little consideration and essentially examined a rather 
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static end-state, as opposed to the process leading to business model innovation, in focusing on 
its elemental composition.  
Research of late is moving more in the direction of process orientation (e.g. Sosna, 
Trevinyo-Rodriguez & Velamuri, 2010), starting to explicate the complexities involved in 
making business model innovation happen. Being in the early stages, this research is still quite 
practical in nature and lacks a certain degree of theoretical depth (Sosna et al., 2010; Rasmussen 
& Foss, 2014). The call for more research into the drivers and mechanisms of business model 
innovation still rings out (Morris et al., 2005; Chesbrough, 2007; Amit & Zott, 2008; Sosna et 
al. 2010; Rasmussen & Foss, 2014).  
In the domain of business models, it is my opinion that the crux of success lies in the 
totality of business model innovation. It is as much about the end-state business model as it is 
about the path to implementation, and that in the most holistic sense: the model, the people, and 
the environment. I tried to mirror this perspective in the choices made in writing this 
dissertation, attempting to pull apart the process and look through the keyhole at the inner 
workings of business model innovation. Each chapter is another step closer to capturing the 
totality mentioned but also further away from the business model itself. Starting close to current 
thinking with a theoretical exploration of the business model innovation process, and ending 
with a new perspective, in an empirical investigation of the effect of the process on arguably 
the most fundamental part of an organisation, its people.     
1.2 Dissertation overview 
This dissertation consists of four chapters; the current chapter, as well as three 
independent research articles. I have placed them in chronological order of completion, 
although coincidentally this order also adheres to the logical journey on which I aim to take the 
reader. The first article is conceptual, followed by two empirical articles which, in part, explore 
some of the theoretical elements of the conceptual article. As the chapters which follow were a 
product of collaboration with other authors, I will henceforth use ‘we’ in reference to the 
author(s). 
In the first article we respond to the call for more process-oriented research, taking a 
team-based approach and viewing business model innovation though a behavioural lens. We 
present a process model, stipulating the part teams (and more specifically, their networks) and 
leadership play in business model innovation performance. Additionally, we explore the 
interactions between and changes in said aspects at different stages of the business model 
innovation process. The eventual result being a behavioural theory on business model 
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innovation in the form of a path dependent multi-stage model anchored in social network, 
leadership, and innovation management theory.  
In the second article we decided to take a step back from the theoretical and explore an 
intriguing case of business model innovation. The aim being to make in-roads into which 
organizational factors contribute to successful business model innovation and why. We 
conducted a longitudinal, qualitative study of an offspring of Tata in the IT industry in India, 
which was initiated in 2001 right after the dot.com bubble burst: MJunction. Our findings 
suggests new multi-stage, multi-level organizational process theory for developing business 
models in resource-constrained settings. 
Having looked at the process of business model innovation both theoretically and 
empirically; the third and final article explores a behavioural side of business model innovation. 
Moving away from the organizational processes and more toward the human dynamics involved 
in the process of business model innovation. We used a prototypical example of business model 
innovation, both in organizational and behavioural terms, to investigate the role business model 
innovation plays in the larger fabric of the organization, specifically during change. We shed 
light on the perpetuation of identity change in organizations across different social levels, i.e. 
individual, group, and organization. Furthermore, we find business model innovation to be a 
vehicle for a much larger shift in the organization, the shift in identity. 
Overall, this dissertation aims to push business model innovation research into the next 
phase of development, beyond a strict focus on composition or organizational processes and 
toward organizational antecedents and behavioural aspects, the how and the why of successful 
business model innovation.   
1.3 Declaration of contribution 
This dissertation is the culmination of the hard work of many individuals. As the saying 
goes, ‘it takes a village’ and I hereby declare my own contribution to the pieces shown here as 
well as acknowledge the contributions of others involved. Chapter 1 is the sole work of the 
author of this dissertation (incorporating the feedback of the promotor). Chapter 2 is a co-
operation between five co-authors (named in Chapter 2), two of which are the promotor and the 
author, names are listed alphabetically as each co-author contributed significantly in writing or 
expertise. Chapter 3 is based on a paper written with three co-authors (named in Chapter 3), 
two of which are the promotor and author. The part played by the author included data 
collection, coding and analysis, expertise and a significant part of the text writing. Chapter 4 is 
co-authored by the author and an ERIM member (named in Chapter 4), the author formulated 
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the research question, conducted data collection and analysis, and contributed the bulk of the 
text writing under the guidance and expertise of the co-author.    
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CHAPTER 2 
BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATION: TEAM NETWORKS AND LEADERSHIP 1 
2.1 Introduction 
Strategic change and competitive advantage, driven by more dynamic global 
competitive conditions, rapidly advancing technology, and increasingly knowledgeable 
customers are increasingly associated with developing new business models (Boston 
Consulting Group, 2009, IBM, 2013). However, currently we have very little theory on how to 
effectively manage such developments, or on how to manage business model innovation.  
The rise of a new management practice, such as earlier Total Quality Management, 
Business Process Outsourcing, or Six Sigma, is often marked by enthusiastic contributions 
aimed at practitioners, after which more neutral, research-oriented publications emerge 
(Abrahamson, 1996; Abrahamson & Fairchild, 1999). Business model innovation (BMI) is no 
exception. Initial contributions typically focused on the design of successful new business 
models: on which components or activity systems contribute to success; for instance, a customer 
value proposition, a revenue model, resources, assets, distribution channels, and partners 
(Magretta, 2002; Morris et al., 2005; Tikkanen et al., 2005; Chesbrough, 2007, 2010; Fiet & 
Patel, 2008; Johnson et al., 2008; Zott et al., 2011; Baden-Fuller & Morgan, 2010; Casadesus-
Masanell & Ricart, 2010; Teece, 2010; George & Bock, 2011; for an exception, see Amit & 
Zott, 2001 exploring drivers of BMI). More recently, research has started to explore the process 
of BMI (Sosna et al., 2010; Svejenova et al., 2010; Yunus et al., 2010; Sabatier et al., 2010; 
Matzler et al., 2013). However, this emerging research is relatively a theoretical, and typically 
does not conceptualise the mechanisms driving BMI success. Our paper seeks to fill this 
theoretical gap. We present new behavioural theory on the process through which new business 
models are (successfully) developed, from initial idea to launch. In short, we present a new 
behavioural theory of business model innovation (BMI). 
We examine the setting of an established organization, such as a multinational 
corporation, or an established social enterprise or NGO, developing a new business model. 
While BMI presumably implies less uncertainty, complexity and interdependence than 
changing the entire organisation, it arguably implies more so than more conventional types of 
innovation, such as product innovation or process innovation. BMI is distinctive in that 
innovation occurs at the system level, characterized by complex interdependence among 
                                                 
1 This chapter was written as a paper and is co-authored with H. G. Barkema, C. Coleridge, F. Qin, and D. A. 
Stam. 
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multiple components in a business model (Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010; Chesbrough; 
2010; Teece, 2010; Zott et al., 2011; George & Bock, 2011; Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu, 2013), 
implying much uncertainty. When interlocking components of an entire business model or 
system are reconfigured, agents undertaking the initiative need to constantly engage in 
dialogues with multiple stakeholders, both inside and outside the organisation, and seek inputs 
and support from them throughout the BMI process. Hence, BMI has distinctive characteristics 
compared to other types of innovation: relatively high levels of interdependence, complexity 
and uncertainty.  
We take the team level of analysis. Teams are the building blocks of modern 
organizations (Marks et al., 2001). A team-level is low enough to explain processes underlying 
BMI development and implementation, but teams are better equipped to deal with complex 
problems than are individuals. We model the networks through which teams source 
informational and political resources from multiple stakeholders to move the BMI forward. For 
this, we use network theory, which is particularly suited to model complex constellations of 
relationships (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Oh et al., 2004, 2006; Zhou & Li, 2012; Lipparini et 
al, 2013; Patel et al., 2014) and is therefore particularly appropriate in the context of BMI. We 
also use leadership theory, as leadership is significant in uncertain environments (Shamir et al., 
1993). Leaders may reduce uncertainty by providing direction and purpose to a team, including 
how the team may realise its potential performance by using its networks to acquire resources. 
Moreover, we explicitly model how required resources depend on the stage of the BMI, and 
that appropriate leadership changes in interaction with team composition and networks, as the 
BMI goes from one stage to the next.  
We believe our paper contributes in several ways. As mentioned, many papers have 
explored BMI design and components of activity systems and, more recently, the process of 
BMI. This literature has provided much insight into what contributes to BMI success, and how; 
however, it’s now time to provide more insight into the why (i.e., new theoretical logics), 
necessary for offering a theoretical contribution (Whetten, 1989). We believe we offer a novel 
theoretical approach by conceptualizing BMI as a behavioural process: a team-based, path-
dependent process emphasizing the roles of team networks, leadership, and how these interact 
at various stages to influence performance. We hope our theory will serve as a ‘theoretical 
platform’ to inspire both new theory and empirical research in this emerging and currently 
somewhat fragmented domain.  
Moreover, we engage in ‘multidisciplinary theory building’ by integrating two major 
contemporary theoretical lenses, social networks and leadership, to explain a currently “under-
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theorized” strategic issue. We offer new theory on the links between social network theory and 
social psychology, to conceptualise how a team’s internal processes interact with its external 
processes to affect BMI outcomes. We believe we are also filling a theoretical gap about the 
motivational aspect of network use. Social network scholars earlier examined which types of 
networks facilitate innovation (Uzzi & Spiro, 2005; Reagans & McEvily 2003; Reagans et al., 
2004). However, as Kilduff and Brass (2010) recently emphasized, social network theory tends 
to ignore “human agency.” Our paper develops new theory on ‘agency’ in network analysis, 
with new propositions about team members’ motivation to use their external networks for 
collective tasks. We hope our theory, on how specific leadership styles motivate team members 
to better use their networks, is one promising avenue to close this theoretical gap.  
This paper is structured as follows. First we describe the key building blocks of our 
model, by defining BMI, discussing BMI teams, and why and how team social networks and 
leadership are important for BMI. We also discuss BMI stages and the dynamic nature of the 
BMI process. Next, we develop propositions on how different types of social networks and 
leadership influence BMI performance, how they interact, and how these relationships change 
as the BMI moves from the concept stage to the development stage. We end with a discussion 
and suggestions for further research.  
2.2 Setting the Stage 
Defining Business Model Innovation 
Zott et al.’s review (2010) of 103 business model publications reveals that despite a lack 
of definitional consistency, the literature converges on an activity system perspective. A 
business model is viewed as a system, comprised of interconnected and interdependent 
activities that enable value creation and capture. A great variety of components are identified 
as important for success: these include a value proposition, a revenue or profit model, key 
processes and resources, a distribution channel, and partners. Each component needs to be put 
in place with its combined functioning in mind (Morris et al., 2005; Mitchell & Coles, 2004; 
Tikkanen et al., 2005; Chesbrough, 2007, 2010; Fiet & Patel, 2008; Johnson et al., 2008; Zott 
et al., 2011; Baden-Fuller & Morgan, 2010; Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010; Teece, 2010; 
George & Bock, 2011; Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu, 2013).  
The components tie together in influencing business performance, and each is 
connected, in different ways, with different parts of the organization. Some activities are 
executed within various functional areas within the organization, while others are related to 
customers, partners, and suppliers, external to the organization. Thus a business model is 
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characterized by a system that spans boundaries within the company and the boundaries of the 
company itself.  
Business model innovation is the process through which a new business model is 
designed and implemented. Although BMI shares some common characteristics with corporate 
venturing, or new product development, which have been extensively examined in the strategy 
literature (e.g. Ancona and Caldwell, 1992; Burgelman, 1983a, b; Garud & Van De Ven, 1992; 
Danneels, 2002), BMI is a distinctive process because the innovation occurs at the system level. 
The output of the BMI process is a novel activity system to create, deliver, and capture value 
that is new to the market and also to the firm. Since a business model spans boundaries, creating 
such a system involves developing, or exploiting, exchange relationships between the core BMI 
team and multiple stakeholders who participate in the various activities in the system. As the 
components within a business model are often interlocked (Johnson et al., 2008), the innovation 
of a business model entails changes of multiple components and sometimes reconfiguration of 
the entire system.  
BMI is complex (Levinthal, 1997) in the sense that the effect of one component (e.g., a 
value proposition, or revenue model, or alliance with partners, or distribution channels) on the 
performance of the new business depends on other components. The contribution of one team 
member to BMI success depends on those of others, and the contribution of internal team 
members depends on external team members. Accordingly, BMI impacts a wide variety of 
stakeholders, internal and external to the firm. In order to be successful, those responsible for 
the BMI need to frequently engage in dialogue with multiple stakeholders and seek inputs and 
support from them throughout the BMI process. The interdependence among multiple 
components, and the wide range and variety of stakeholders, set BMI apart from other types of 
innovation, such as process or product innovations, which usually centres on the activity of 
discovering new products or services, and are typically more bounded by roots within existing 
firm capacities and existing patterns of connections among stakeholders.  
In addition, BMI is different from new product development in that it does not 
necessarily involve the discovery of new products or services. Instead, it often occurs through 
redefinition of an existing product or service and the way through which such product or service 
is provided to customers (Markides, 2006). Going beyond a company’s current activities 
implies substantial uncertainty (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Garud & Van de Ven, 1992; Stone & 
Brush, 1996; Forbes, 1999). It may be unknown which parts might be affected and whether the 
process will lead to success (March & Olsen, 1976; Mintzberg et al., 1976; Weick, 1979; 
Ghemawat, 1991). There will be uncertainty about what the value proposition will be, which 
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technology should be used, whether there will be demand for the new product or service, and 
with whom to partner. There may also be uncertainty about what the tasks and roles of 
individuals involved in the BMI will be, and whether they will be willing to work for each other, 
or whether conflict or, more subtly, giving priority to other, day-to-day activities is more likely. 
Finally, there may be uncertainty about whether the necessary resources (e.g. information, 
money, people, and technology) from the organization to develop the new business model will 
be available. Thus it appears that BMI, compared to more traditional innovation, is more 
interdependent, more complex, and more uncertain.  
BMI teams 
Many of the typical structures and tools to manage innovation, such as stage gate 
models, portfolio management, or project management techniques, are not well suited to the 
combination of complexity, interdependence and uncertainty involved in BMI. One exception 
is teams. Teams are flexible and organic entities that are able to cope with complex problems, 
that are well suited for interdependent processes, and that are helpful in reducing uncertainty. 
Moreover, in practice companies tend to put the fate of BMI in the hands of a dedicated team. 
We therefore focus on such a dedicated team as a basis for our analysis of the BMI process.  
As became clear earlier, BMI requires the help and support of many formal and informal 
organizational members from different business units or functions within (and outside of) the 
organization. One job of a BMI team, then, is to find the right stakeholders from whom to get 
the right resources to move the BMI forward. This provides BMI teams with some crucial 
questions. What are the right resources? Which stakeholders can provide these resources and 
how can a team reach them? How can a team be directed towards these stakeholders and be 
motivated to get the necessary resources from them? How can these stakeholders be motivated 
to support the team? We believe that the answers to these questions lie in the team’s social 
network and leadership.  
Critical BMI resources and team social networks. BMI, as it takes place at the system 
level (Zott et al., 2010), will include financial, operational, technological, and marketing and 
sales aspects (Chesbrough, 2007). This multi-functional, boundary spanning character of BMI 
requires that the team not only have substantial knowledge of the functioning of multiple 
aspects of the business at the earlier phase of the innovation, but also that it is able to work with 
various parties, within and outside the organization, to implement the innovation. The 
requirement for cross-functional knowledge and successful boundary spanning makes the 
team’s network critical to the success of such a process, and more relevant than in other types 
of innovation. In order to succeed, team members need to source, share and combine 
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information and other resources from outside the team, in interaction with others inside and 
outside the organization (e.g., partners, suppliers, distributors). Typically, a variety of 
intangible and tangible resources are needed, for which the team’s social networks are vital 
(Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Oh et al., 2004, 2006).  
Important intangible resources for innovators include information about new customers 
and markets (Slater & Narver, 1995; Von Hippel, 1986; Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004); 
organizational and partner capabilities, technology and resource availability (Leonard-Barton, 
1995; Prahalad & Krishnan, 2008); ‘know how’ or process information (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995; Van de Ven et al., 1999); ‘know who’ or contact knowledge for experts, influencers, 
brokers and decision-makers inside and outside the organization (Nadler & Tushman, 1997), as 
well as information about their priorities, allegiances and preferences (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). 
Substantial tangible resources are needed as well, especially at the implementation stage: 
money, staff and access to technology. These intangible and tangible resources may be obtained 
from a broad variety of parties within the organization (R&D, the marketing department, other 
business units), and from outside (e.g., partners or lead clients).  
Tangible resources are typically not speculatively provided to the team in advance, but, 
like intangible resources, need to be sourced through the team’s networks – whether formal or 
informal, strong or weak. Thus, having the right connections with the right stakeholders is 
essential to the team’s innovation performance.  
The team’s networks are important not only because of the need to source intangible 
and tangible resources. BMI often goes against the dominant logic of an organization’s leading 
coalition (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986; Covin & Miles, 2007). In such a case, political support – 
obtained through connections with higher-ups in the organization—is necessary to anchor the 
innovation in the organization: to develop a legitimate place within the firm’s portfolio of 
activities (Anand et al., 2007), to open doors to its capabilities and tangible resources, and to 
withstand pressure from elements within the organization that are challenged by the change the 
BMI represents.  
Team leadership. However, while the team’s network can provide potential pathways 
to source the resources and support necessary to move the BMI forward, this potential is not 
harnessed unless the team is motivated to use its network, and the stakeholders are motivated 
to aid the BMI team. Team leaders, and especially their communications, can influence the 
likelihood that networks live up to their potential by affecting these motivational factors – 
inspiring the support of stakeholders, engendering members’ willingness to use their networks 
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and to provide access to their networks to others within the team, and aligning the use of the 
networks with the team’s goal. For this, we argue that leadership is crucial.  
Moreover, multifunctional or diverse teams are known to be conflict-prone (Jehn, 
1995), yet due to the interdependency of tasks, success depends on team members’ individual 
motivation and cooperation, for sourcing, sharing and combining information and other 
resources. Leadership is particularly effective when a task is challenging and if conditions or 
directions are uncertain, if short-term results cannot be measured and monetized through 
financial rewards, or when the faith or moral convictions of team members can be mobilized 
(Shamir et al., 1993). These are precisely the conditions that are present in the case of BMI. 
Leadership is a core function in innovation teams, and also in BMI teams. For instance, 
Clark and Wheelwright (1992) in their classical taxonomy of innovation team structures argued 
that in structures most suitable for radical innovation – heavyweight team structures and 
autonomous team structures – leaders have a central role. Several scholars have argued that the 
responsibility for innovation lies squarely on the shoulders of leaders (Jansen et al., 2009; Smith 
& Tushman, 2005). Considering the complex, interdependent and uncertain nature of BMI, we 
believe that leadership is vital to the BMI process.  
Leaders may influence followers by what they say (e.g., vision or goal communication) 
and by what they do (e.g., role modelling or rewarding; Bass, 1985; Shamir et al., 1993; Howell 
& Higgins, 1990). Both types of behaviours may reduce uncertainty by giving direction and 
cues about what is acceptable or desirable behaviour from followers. By clarifying (long-term 
and short-term) directions, leaders may help participants in the BMI process choose which 
network ties to use, with whom, for what; and what sort of information and other resources 
need to be sourced, shared and combined within the team to design and implement the business 
model. What leaders communicate and what they do may also strengthen the identity of the 
group (van Knippenberg et al., 2004; van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003), motivating team 
members to contribute to the BMI process and its success.  
The dynamic BMI process 
Complexity, uncertainty and interdependence in turn lead to a highly path dependent 
process. The success of developing a system with multiple interlocked components depends on 
frequent interactions and exchanges between the focal team and the stakeholders who are 
connected to these components. The tasks are different across various phases in BMI (Sosna et 
al., 2010), so the priority and nature of these interactions and exchanges also change across the 
BMI process, and such interactions and exchanges, in turn, feed back into the focal team and 
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shape its dynamics. Accordingly, the role of social networks and leadership will vary across the 
successive stages of the BMI process.  
To explain these changes, we first need to characterize the successive stages of BMI. 
Although it appears that scholars in related literatures agree that innovation and venture 
processes go through various stages of development, there is little agreement on what these 
stages actually are. Burgelman (1983a, b), for instance, itemizes four stages of venture 
development: conceptual, pre-venture, entrepreneurial, and organizational. Garud and van de 
Ven (1992) describe the agenda setting period, expansion period, and contraction period. Bhave 
(1994) outlines three stages as well: the opportunity stage, the technology step and the 
organizational creation phase. Kazanjian and Drazin (1990) viewed the progression of stages 
as reflections of the problems faced by an innovation project at a particular point in its 
development. In fact, stages, depending on the organization, can be more discrete (Zaltman et 
al., 1973) or more fluid (Schroeder et al., 1989). The labels and delineation of stages of BMI 
differ from one organization to the next (Ruhnka & Young, 1987) and even from project to 
project. However, although there is no consensus about the number and delineation of stages, 
what is clear from this literature is that stages do exist, each with a different set of tasks, 
activities and challenges. Hence, below we will assume that two fundamental stages exist in 
BMI, which we will label the concept stage and the development stage. Identifying these stages 
will enable us to conceptualize BMI as a path-dependent trajectory, where team variables in the 
concept stage influence the same variables, and ultimately BMI performance, in the 
development stage.  
BMI teams start in the first period with an initial team configuration – composition and 
size, tasks (e.g., business model design) and roles (e.g., leadership behaviours such as 
charismatic or transformational leadership), and in-built access to social networks 
(characterized by individual and team network range, ties with whom, and with what tie 
characteristics). These factors facilitate the flow of intangible and tangible resources into the 
team. These resource inputs cue mediational factors – in the form of team processes (such as 
sharing of resources, building of networks), behavioural processes (such as conflict and internal 
politics), and the emergence of identity and motivation (Marks et al., 2001). This leads to team 
outputs, which depend on the specific task of the team but may be some form of resource 
utilization, e.g., a business plan (Galbraith, 1982; Ruhnka & Young, 1987; Kazanjian, 1988; 
Kazanjian & Drazin, 1990). In established organizations, these outputs are typically subjected 
to higher-level decision-making, e.g., reject, hold, or fund the initiative for the next stage. These 
outcomes, in turn, influence the starting conditions or inputs for the development stage, together 
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with additional resources implied by a positive decision in terms of funding and staff. Most 
importantly, the team itself changes (in terms of team composition, tasks and roles, team 
identity, etc.) when moving from one stage to the next. These starting conditions (in terms of 
team composition, tasks and roles, team identity, etc.), together with mediating factors in the 
form of team processes (such as conflicts and internal politics), will again influence team 
motivation, and so on.  
These then provide the building blocks of our model: BMI and its stages and a dedicated 
team with its network and leadership, based on which, in the balance of this paper, we develop 
a new model integrating a BMI team’s internal processes involving leadership, and its external 
processes, both related to its networks at the above-defined two stages. Our dynamic model also 
accounts for the change in the team itself when it moves from the concept stage to the 
development stage. Our model is novel in that it bridges network and leadership theories by 
explaining how a team’s internal processes interact with its external processes to affect BMI 
outcomes. We show that the ‘right’ leadership can steer the direction and enhance the incentives 
of a team’s sourcing activities through its networks, and thus enhance BMI performance.  
In the following section, we outline our new model. We focus on the stages of BMI in 
chronological order: first, we discuss the necessary resources, critical stakeholders, important 
network features and effective leadership processes for the concept stage. Second, we do the 
same for the development stage.  
2.3 Theory and Propositions 
The Concept Stage 
In the concept stage, the initiative is newly formed. The key concern is whether an 
identified opportunity can be realistically and successfully pursued. The team’s objectives are 
to generate innovative ideas, and to screen and combine these ideas to design a business model. 
The targeted output may be a business plan or similar, (Galbraith, 1982; Ruhnka & Young, 
1987; Kazanjian & Drazin, 1990), i.e. an object of judgment upon which the decision to 
continue, kill the initiative, or go back to the drawing board is based. If successful, the project 
will move forward to the development phase.  
Team characteristics. The size of the team responsible for BMI is usually small at this 
stage; in extreme cases it could be a single individual. Status as a formal project may be tentative 
if at all granted (Kazanjian, 1988). Within the team, the division of labour may not be clear-cut. 
Team members may be generalists rather than specialists (Galbraith, 1982) and work closely 
together across multiple tasks.  
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At the early phase of the project, team members are typically building the BMI concept 
through a process characterized by effectuation (Wiltbank et al., 2006), or bricolage (Baker & 
Nelson, 2005; Miner et al., 2001), combining resources at hand to exploit new opportunities. 
Such activities take place in a highly uncertain environment. The uncertainty lies eventually in 
the value of the concept itself, someday to be validated in an external market, and more 
immediately in internal processes, as the BMI concept may or may not win the innovating 
organization’s approval or be allocated resources for development.  
Networks and informational resources. Intangible resources play the central role during 
the concept stage. As BMI is impelled by an organization’s need to reshape the basis of 
competition (Almeida et al, 2009), the team needs to gain good understanding of the potential 
competition, partners, value chain and customers. This requires access to diverse and rich 
information from external parties. Meanwhile, the system-level nature of the desired innovation 
implies a need for broad knowledge about internal functions (sales, R&D, marketing, etc.), 
processes, resources, and competencies. The BMI team’s access and ability to source such 
information and knowledge from a diverse range of its members’ connections, and to recombine 
these in fruitful ways, is an important reason for bringing the group into existence, and the 
effectiveness of this search plays an important role in their chances of success (Ancona & 
Caldwell, 1992; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001).  
Search effectiveness depends in part on the group’s network “range”: the extent to 
which network connections span institutional, organizational, or social boundaries (Burt, 1992: 
148-149). The highly uncertain nature of the task requires access to non-redundant sources of 
information (March, 1991; Taylor & Greve, 2006); non-redundancy also derives from high 
network diversity and range (Granovetter, 1973.) The team’s collective network range is 
determined both by the number of ties possessed by individual team members and by the degree 
of overlaps among members’ connections. When team members’ ties overlap, the group can 
access less non-redundant information than if their ties are mutually exclusive.  
In BMI, heterogeneous sources of information are more likely to provide conflicting 
information (leading to generative examination of the areas in doubt), various information 
(leading to a greater range of ideas and perspectives), and disparate information (leading to 
access to the ‘long tail’ of people with unusual skill sets or backgrounds in an organization, 
who know both about the organization’s working and about some domain of knowledge) 
(Harrison & Klein 2007). While actors with homogenous networks are likely to view issues in 
a similar way, those with heterogeneous networks are more likely to see things from multiple 
perspectives, and hence are more able to understand and combine diverse information (Burt, 
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2005) to contribute to the creation of (radically) new business models. This leads to the 
following proposition, which, along with others, is depicted in Figure 2.1.   
 
Proposition 1a: During the concept stage, teams with wider collective network range, 
and thus more access to non-redundant sources of information both inside and outside the 
organization, are more effective in sourcing informational resources, which positively 
influences performance at this stage.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Concept Stage 
Networks and external connections. As well as novel information from diverse sources, 
the BMI team needs to obtain in-depth knowledge and understanding of the needs, aspirations 
and dreams, habits and routines, and the economic and social context of a new client group 
(London, 2010), and the contextual intricacies of working with new types of suppliers or 
partners. Also, to navigate BMI’s complexity, the team needs to engage in exchange of rich, 
nuanced information, and joint problem-solving, with such external parties.  
Thus, the team requires strong, boundary spanning ties, directly into the environment to 
which the organization is adapting (for example, with a member of the client group the new 
business model intends to serve). Boundary spanning ties may be formally constituted— as in 
a contractual or hierarchical relationship—or they may be ties embedded in a BMI team 
member’s network of connections. The chance of success in creating a new business model 
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concept can be significantly improved when the internal initiative is combined with an early 
stage external partnership, even in an informal way, (Zhou and Li, 2012). The boundary 
spanning connection with the external party must be strong enough to allow for high frequency 
of interactions and rich information flows, in order to support the BMI team in its efforts to 
craft a coherent new business model.  
Successful collaborations in uncertain contexts—in this case, exploration and the 
creation of new solutions—require closer than arm’s length relationships. The development of 
such cohesive relationships with external parties may have taken place on past projects and 
therefore may already exist at the start of the focal BMI. Alternatively, if a team does not have 
such relationships, it may develop them. Collaborators will need to plan and enact episodes of 
social interaction, information sharing, and listening, encouraging participation and trust (Raes 
et al., 2011), creating an environment where it is attractive for parties to propose and “sell” 
ideas.  
In sum, we propose that having strong relationships with at least one key external party 
is important to the success of the BMI team in the concept stage. While a broad range of 
informational sources may be sufficient in more traditional innovation settings for creativity 
and innovation (Hansen, 1999), we propose that in BMI settings, the need for access to fine-
grained information from new contexts requires a strong connection with at least one key 
information holder external to the organization.  
 
Proposition 1b: During the concept stage, teams with strong relationships with at least 
one external party in the context to which the BMI is addressed, are more effective in sourcing 
informational resources and increasing performance at this stage.  
 
Networks and political support. Sources of information are found both internal to the 
organization and external, but political supporters (March, 1962; Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; 
Van de Ven et al., 1999; Kanter, 2000) are usually from inside the organization (Barden & 
Mitchell, 2007). Possessing ties to precisely those people who have the power to influence and 
support the BMI team is vital for sourcing political support (Oh et al., 2006). We expect strong 
connections to powerful actors in the organization’s dominant coalition (Thompson, 1967) to 
enable the team to obtain timely political support for its initiatives.  
Political support anchors the innovation in the organization: it helps open doors to its 
capabilities and tangible resources, develop a legitimate place within the firm’s portfolio of 
activities (Anand et al., 2007), and withstand pressure from elements within the organization 
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that are disrupted by the change the BMI might represent. This anchoring is especially 
important if the BMI goes against the dominant logic of an organization’s leading coalition 
(Prahalad & Bettis, 1986, Covin & Miles, 2007). In fact, all four of Prahalad and Bettis’ original 
dimensions of dominant logic may be challenged by (successful) BMI: the firm’s competitive 
strategy and its measures of performance, the values/expectations and the reinforced behaviour 
of its managers. Critical to the effort to innovate without being constrained by these aspects of 
the organization’s dominant logic, is the strong support of one or a limited number of advocates 
(Markham, 2000), who are in a position to promote the BMI, are willing to put their reputation 
on the line to endorse the initiative and to give the BMI team the space to further develop the 
initial idea.  
For political support at the concept stage, diversity and its concomitant, high network 
range, are less relevant, and may even be detrimental. When the idea of a new business model 
has yet to come into shape, exposure to a wider and more diverse audience may invite 
challenges or provide a conduit for requests (or demands) for the new idea to conform to various 
aspects of the existing business model(s), hampering the improvement of the idea at the concept 
stage and reducing the chance for its further development.  
In the initial stage when the concept has not emerged, there is high uncertainty around 
the shape the BMI will ultimately take, and the future success of the project. Political support 
will have to be based in part on trust in the team’s ability to succeed. Unlike information, which 
may travel through weak-but-diverse ties, political support is often offered on the basis of direct 
knowledge of past performance (Parise & Rollag, 2010), or with an expectation of future 
reciprocity (Coleman, 1988)—and thus is offered through direct and strong ties.  
Whatever the origin of the tie, we propose that it is important to have a connection with 
a limited number of powerful or resource-holding (or influencing) figures in the organization. 
Where such a tie exists, the likelihood of a BMI team member being able to call in favours or 
even credibly to promise future favours in exchange for support is significantly enhanced 
(Moran, 2005; Uzzi & Lancaster, 2003)  
 
Propositions 1c: At the concept stage, teams with strong connections with a limited 
number of higher ranking individuals inside the organization are more effective in the sourcing 
of political support than teams lacking such connections, increasing performance at this stage. 
 
Vision Communication. The above suggests that social networks of the development 
team members are crucial for BMI to be successful. However, the mere existence of such ties 
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is not enough for them to contribute to success. That is, appropriate ties only indicate that there 
is a potential for sourcing required resources. Whether these resources are sourced, however, 
depends on (at least) three factors: whether the external stakeholders are willing to support the 
BMI team, whether team members are willing to use their networks for the BMI team, and the 
extent to which the team members utilize their networks in accordance with the goals of the 
BMI team. We argue that leaders and especially their communication can influence the 
likelihood that networks live up to their potential by affecting the factors above.  
Directing the team. The team’s main focus in the concept stage of BMI is addressing 
uncertainty by sourcing information. In order to allow teams to deal with uncertainty and not 
be inundated by it, leaders should intervene, and provide direction and a sense of purpose. 
Without such direction, it will be hard for team members to contribute to the team’s success: 
when team members do not understand the purpose of the team, they cannot take the initiative 
in working towards achieving it. At the same time, leaders should not limit search activities or 
narrow the scope of team members’ focus. Hence, in this phase of BMI, leaders should guide 
the team, but not limit it.  
Transformational and charismatic leadership theories (Bass, 1985; Beyer & Browning, 
1999; Burns, 1978; Conger & Kanungo, 1987) may inform leaders how to do this. 
Transformational and charismatic leaders aim to inspire and motivate employees to perform 
beyond even their own expectations (Bass, 1985). They do so by tapping into or transforming 
employees’ needs, values, and norms, providing long-term guidance for employees’ daily work. 
By displaying charismatic leadership behaviour, leaders may increase the intrinsic value of 
effort, accomplishment expectations, and the intrinsic value of goal accomplishment as well as 
instilling faith in a better future and creating personal commitment to a vision (Howell & 
Shamir, 2005; Mio et al., 2005; Emrich et al., 2001; Shamir et al., 1993, 1994). Although the 
specific behaviours that make up transformational leadership are heavily critiqued (van 
Knippenberg & Sitkin, 2014) the notion that communicating visions is at the heart of charisma 
is widely acknowledged (van Knippenberg & Stam, 2014).  
Vision communication refers to communicating images of the future of a collective with 
the aim of convincing others of the merit of the images (Stam et al., 2010a, b). Visions are 
similar to (task) goals, but they are more abstract and long term and need not be accomplishable 
to be inspiring (Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1996). By communicating a long-term vision, leaders 
provide team members, and others internal and external to the organization, with an idea of the 
purpose and long-term task for the BMI process, creating a sense of purpose and direction for 
those involved (Berson et al., 2001). Hence, vision communication can improve performance 
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(Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1996; Stam et al., 2010a, b) and even lead to venture growth (Baum et 
al., 1998) and more (positive) media attention (Bligh et al., 2005).  
Vision communication may also reduce uncertainty about the BMI and motivate the 
BMI team to perform better. By providing an image of what to aim for, team members are 
provided with a common purpose for their work. Although such an image is abstract and vague 
enough to not restrict team members from exercising discretion in choosing and carrying out 
their activities, it does provide some direction and therefore reduces the uncertainty that team 
members may experience (cf. Stam et al., 2014). In sum, a sense of common purpose is 
important because it reduces uncertainty and problems of complexity.  
Because of the above, leadership may promote a better use of a team’s social networks 
by giving a common purpose to the participants in the BMI process for the use of these 
networks. As visioning by leaders specifies direction and purpose (Stam et al., 2014), it can 
enhance the effectiveness of sourcing activities via team members’ networks. Such leadership 
behaviours may guide a team members’ sourcing activities (suggesting ideas for where to go 
and what to do), without limiting them. Indeed, it has been suggested that visioning is especially 
important in uncertain and complex contexts, when the leader cannot guide all activities of 
subordinates for these very reasons, as is the case in BMI (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007; Shamir & 
Howell, 1999). 
 
Proposition 2a: In the concept stage, vision communication by leaders strengthens the 
influence of the range of networks, of the strong ties to external information holders, and of the 
strong ties to higher-ranking individuals on performance at this stage.  
 
Motivating team members. Furthermore, in the early stages of BMI individuals are not 
only uncertain about the project and their common and individual tasks, but also about 
themselves and the group in which they have to work. Potentially beneficial exchange relations 
within the team, needed for successfully designing and implementing a new business model, 
may break down due to internal conflict and the high uncertainty and complexity associated 
with BMI teams. Thus, team members may not readily understand why they should commit 
their resources (i.e., their networks) to the team’s ends.  
Leaders may address these issues of complexity (and implied need for cooperation of 
people around a common task) and uncertainty (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Pratt, 1998) by creating 
a shared identity and feelings of cohesion (Van Knippenberg et al., 2004). Research shows that 
identifying with a group or organization may indeed enhance performance (Millward & 
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Postmes, 2010; Van Knippenberg, 2000), organizational citizenship behaviour (Barreto & 
Ellemers, 2002; Dukerich et al., 2002; O’Reilly & Chatman, 1986), and boost self-esteem 
(Hogg & Terry, 2000).  
Vision communication may be critical to such identity work. Many studies have found 
that leaders may create a common social identity (Lord and Brown, 2004; van Knippenberg et 
al., 2004), leading Reicher, Haslam and Hopkins (2005) to call (charismatic/transformational) 
leaders “entrepreneurs of identity”. Vision communication may be an important tool to 
influence identities of followers (Lord & Brown, 2004; Stam et al., 2010a). For instance, Jansen 
and colleagues (2009) and Smith and Tushman (2005) argued that visions are crucial for 
innovation projects, because they create a common identity amongst employees. Shamir, 
Arthur, and House (1993) state that a way to strengthen the engagement of employees is 
discussing the collective identity of the company, and to address the common history of the 
company, to spell out company norms and values, and to emphasize that both employees and 
management are members of the same team, through vision communication. These effects have 
been confirmed by both qualitative (Shamir et al., 1994) and quantitative research (Kark et al., 
2003). Stam and colleagues (2014) recently even suggested that emphasizing the collective and 
its values is necessary to create a sharedness of the vision because it activates the social self of 
followers. In sum, emphasizing the collective of those involved in the BMI process (team 
members, other participants inside and outside the organization) in vision communication will 
reduce uncertainty and problems of complexity, and motivate those involved in the BMI 
process, increasing performance at the concept stage.  
Importantly, we expect that leaders can motivate team members to use their social 
networks through this communication as well. As team members identify with the team, they 
are motivated to cooperate and to contribute to the team (Ashforth et al., 2008; Riketta, 2005) 
for instance through using their networks for the benefit of the team. Vision communication, as 
an antecedent of identification, can therefore improve the effectiveness of sourcing and sharing 
activities. For instance, Beyer and Browning (1999) discuss how Robert Noyce, through vision 
communication, was able to create cohesion in the American semi-conductor industry and lead 
different American companies to cooperate and unite against an invasion of Japanese 
companies in their home market. 
 
Proposition 2b: In the concept stage, emphasizing the collective in vision 
communication strengthens the influence of the range of networks, the existence of strong ties 
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to external information holders, and of strong ties to higher-ranking individuals on 
performance at this stage. 
 
Motivating external stakeholders. However, even if leaders can motivate team members 
to use their networks for the team, and direct their effort towards the team’s goals, these efforts 
are in vain if the network partners (key decision makers in the company, those that hold crucial 
information etc.) do not respond. How can leaders legitimate the BMI to such an extent that 
these partners are more likely to support the project?  
Charismatic and transformational leadership theories suggest that emphasizing a crisis, 
as a component of vision communication, may be important to open individuals up to the ideas 
of a charismatic leader (Beyer & Browning, 1999; Conger and Kanungo, 1987; Shamir & 
Howell, 1999). Crises come with distress, negative emotions, and feelings of uncertainty and 
negativity (Dutton, 1986; Madera & Smith, 2009; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Pearson & Mittroff, 
1993; Stubbart, 1987). As a result, followers are particularly open to leadership (Shamir & 
Howell, 1999), and especially to those leaders who are able to provide motivation, inspiration 
and a purpose (Bass, 1985; Conger & Kanungo, 1988). Hence vision communication calling 
attention to problems of the status quo, how a new business model might be different from the 
current situation (discrepancy), and how it can help mitigate the problems of the entire 
organization, can help to establish the needed BMI. In doing so, the potential new business 
model (or the vision for it) can be contrasted with current practices and be presented as a much-
preferable alternative to the problematic current practices.  
Such urgency and discrepancy can be a major influence for team members and others, 
both inside and outside the organization. Indeed, Schilling (2000) argues that urgency is 
necessary for companies to take action and Stam and colleagues (2014) argue that visions that 
emphasize crisis may get more attention. In addition to the team leader, a small number of 
power holders in the company may be crucially important for the BMI team to access tangible 
and political resources in the concept stage. It helps if these people are utterly convinced of the 
usefulness of a new and different business model. By emphasizing in their vision 
communication how a new business model might be different from current practices, and thus 
why it is urgently needed, leaders can give those involved in the BMI process both a better 
sense of direction and motivate them to contribute to it.  
 
Proposition 2c: In the concept stage, leadership emphasizing discrepancies between the 
BMI and current practices in vision communication strengthens the influence of the range of 
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networks, the existence of strong ties to external information holders, and of strong ties to 
higher ranking individuals on performance at this stage. 
 
Thus, we argue that leader communication that focuses on communicating a vision, that 
emphasizes the collective and that focuses on the discrepancies between the BMI and the 
current business, is most likely to lead to optimal use of a team’s social networks. We note here 
that, although we specified the distinct processes underlying the effects of vision, collective 
identification and discrepancies, these communication elements are inherently related. First, 
effects of these elements may overlap. For instance, emphasizing the discrepancies between the 
BMI and current practices may not only affect external stakeholders, but also motivate internal 
team members to contribute to the team. Second, one element may strengthen the effects of 
another. For instance, emphasizing discrepancies may be a tool for leaders to create more clarity 
on the vision and direction of the BMI itself and thus strengthen the effects of visioning. In 
other words, the three communication elements discussed above form an integrative whole that 
serves as a basis for optimal communication by BMI leaders in the concept stage. 
Transition from Concept to Development Stage 
In BMI, the outputs or endowments of the project at the concept stage (e.g. information, 
funding, more or different human resources, technologies) provide inputs for the next stage (cf 
Ilgen et al, 2005). For at least four reasons, the BMI team will change over time and itself 
constitute an input to the next stage: the number and type of its members, their roles and tasks, 
the type of networks of the team, with whom and for what. First, as the project develops, a 
broadening scope and size may create a need for more tangible and human resources, requiring 
a change in the composition and size of the team. Second, as more human resources need to be 
managed, team members are likely to experience a shift from conducting search to more 
managerial tasks. Third, members may develop new ties inside or outside the organization, or 
weak ties can ‘thicken’ into strong ties, or new team members may add ties to the team’s 
network. Finally, team members may leave due to illness, shifting priorities, or differences of 
opinion. For all these reasons, we believe that for an adequate delineation of the dynamic and 
path-dependent BMI process it is necessary to take into account the changes in the team itself. 
The Development Stage 
At the development stage, the direction of the initiative is now clearer (Ruhnka & 
Young, 1987) and the project has likely been formalized (Bhave, 1994). The outline of the 
project has been approved (for instance, in the form of a business plan) (Ruhnka & Young, 
1987) and the team’s task is to execute and launch the initiative successfully. Performance at 
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this stage is likely to be subjective, at least from the organization’s perspective. Ultimately, 
performance is based on the value created and captured by the new business model.  
Team characteristics. With the project moving to the development stage, the size of the 
BMI team increases, with hierarchy and formalization of tasks introduced (Galbraith, 1982; 
Ruhnka & Young, 1987). Tasks at this stage may include the development of an IT platform (if 
part of the business model), or an in-depth market study to gauge potential demand, developing 
or testing a prototype for the new product or service, or one or more pilots, together with internal 
or external partners. With the overall direction now clearer, the roles of team members in the 
project now are often more defined and discrete.  
Coming out of the concept stage, the team’s network has also grown larger, with more 
connections developed by existing team members and additional connections brought in by new 
team members. BMI teams that have successfully moved onto the development stage may well 
feature a network with a wide range of connections with groups and actors inside and outside 
the organization, combined with cohesive relationships with at least one external party, and 
strong connections with a small number of higher-ups in the organizational hierarchy. Although 
such a network is, as we have argued, effective in sourcing the necessary inputs in the concept 
stage and hence enhancing the team’s performance in that early phase, it may not be optimal 
when the team moves to the next stage, as the team faces a new set of challenges, and the critical 
inputs required in order to succeed have changed.  
Networks and informational resources. When BMI moves to the development stage, the 
kind of information needed for BMI success changes as well. A diversity of sources of 
information becomes less important than depth of knowledge in selected domains. Where at the 
first stage the focus is on what may be possible, now the emphasis shifts to how the innovation 
may be created (Ruhnka & Young, 1987). The focus of the project shifts from sourcing and 
trying out a wide variety of information, to the effective fine-grained transfer of complex and 
tacit knowledge in order to collaboratively solve emerging issues (e.g., marketing, technical, 
financial, possible supply and distribution issues) (Galbraith, 1982), problems, and constraints 
in the project’s development (Bhave, 1994).  
Not all ties that were developed in the concept stage are equally relevant to the further 
development of the business model. Hence, the team is likely to engage in a selection process 
to identify which ties are important, followed by investment into strengthening these ties, 
increasing their “bandwidth”, and converting them to stronger relationships. Whilst in the 
concept stage, strong relationships between the team and one or a very small number of external 
parties may be sufficient for high performance; in the development stage, more cohesive 
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relationships need to emerge around a larger number of selected partners, both within and 
external to the organization.  
Depending on the specific business model, these strong ties may connect with various 
functional units, departments, or business units within the organization. The same holds true 
for external parties and recent studies have shown such strong external ties are conducive to 
innovation success (Foss et al, 2013, Love et al, 2014).  
While such ties take more time and effort for team members to develop or to maintain, 
they also enable the transfer of complex knowledge, to identify and jointly work on emerging 
problems and constraints, and to co-innovate new solutions (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; 
Capaldo, 2007), all of which is important at this stage. This proposition, and others about the 
development stage, are also depicted in Figure 2.2.  
 
Proposition 3a: During the development stage, teams with strong relationships with a 
number of internal and external contacts are more effective in the sourcing of informational 
resources, which improves performance at this stage. 
  
 
Figure 2.2: Development Stage 
Networks and political support. Ancona and Caldwell (1992) noted that less effective 
product development teams got ‘stuck’ on the activity of scanning for and discussing possible 
variations to its idea, lacking support from political higher-ups— similarly, successful BMI 
teams, when moving from the concept stage to the development stage, need to change their 
focus from being influenced by their environment to influencing it. The degree and nature of 
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required political support to obtain the needed tangible resources also shifts at this stage; instead 
of simply giving permission or encouragement for the team to exist, higher-ups are needed to 
approve typically substantially larger investments in terms of people and funding. Where the 
support of a single champion may have been sufficient during the concept stage, the 
development stage requires a broader range of support (Burgelman, 1983a, b), including 
possibly from senior levels of the organization, especially if the BMI is going to sit at the ‘top 
table’ of the organization’s activities (Anand, et al., 2007). Accordingly, the network features 
required to source intangible and tangible resources and to develop political support must also 
change.  
As a BMI project develops, one of the main threats to its existence or eventual success 
is over-reliance on a single source of tangible or political support. A single sponsor or financial 
supporter may be working under exogenous deadlines or resource restraints that do not 
necessarily accord with the development needs or life cycle of the project (Van de Ven et al., 
1999). Even if a project survives the concept stage under the protective guard of a single 
sponsor, when it reaches the development stage it will require assistance from departments or 
divisions of the company beyond the sponsor’s direct control. Projects that are overly identified 
as coming from a particular organizational context may meet resistance from other areas of the 
company. A project that goes on too long without attracting the patronage of others besides its 
founding sponsor may be seen as a “pet project”, rather than a broadly supported initiative. The 
development of a cohort of patrons or sponsors may lead to helpful consensus about the 
prospects for and importance of the particular innovation as well. 
 
Proposition 3b: During the development stage, teams connected with a wider range of 
higher-up individuals in the organization are more effective in sourcing political support, which 
enhances performance at this stage.  
 
Leadership and directing the team. As in the concept stage, we argue that leadership 
can help to optimally leverage networks in the development stage. However, in this stage, we 
propose, leaders should display different behaviours to accomplish this, because the team and 
its environment have changed. For instance, as the BMI project moves from the conceptual 
stage to the development stage, BMI teams are likely to become bigger and change in 
composition over time and across phases of development (Galbraith, 1982; Ruhnka & Young, 
1987; Kazanjian, 1988; Kazanjian & Drazin, 1990). As more people get involved, the overall 
complexity of the BMI project increases; as more parties get involved and need to coordinate 
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roles, the project itself becomes more fine-grained and is divided into smaller constituent 
pieces. A more formal hierarchy needs to be put in place and the leader may have to start 
managing people more formally and directly. All of this has an influence on leader behaviours 
as well.  
As tasks become more formalized and the purpose of the team becomes clearer, leaders 
should display more individually-oriented behaviours (House, 1971). As the project has become 
clearer, direction becomes more definite and freedom to deviate smaller. Moreover, as more 
members join the team and individual tasks are more detailed and structured, uncertainty 
diminishes. Hence, the need for high-level abstract leadership behaviours (like charismatic 
behaviours) becomes less pronounced (although not completely disappearing). Leaders have 
more leeway to individually direct members’ efforts, and the same applies to (sub-) projects 
with other parties, inside or outside the organization. We use path-goal theory and transactional 
leadership theory to provide insight into how BMI leaders can offer such more direct guidance.  
Path-goal leadership theory promotes leadership behaviours such as directive path-goal 
clarification, supportiveness, participation, and achievement orientation (House, 1971, 1996). 
These behaviours provide structure for followers, clarifying expectations, guiding work, and 
creating a supportive and friendly work environment. Path-goal leadership behaviours empower 
followers and encourage them to strive for performance excellence (House, 1996). Clear goals 
that are hard to reach, yet not impossible to attain, are most likely to lead to goal 
accomplishment (Locke & Latham, 1994, 2006).  
Transactional leadership is oriented to rewarding (or punishing) members based on their 
accomplishment of tasks and task goals (Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978). Similarly to path goal 
theory, transactional leadership emphasizes that leaders should carefully explain task goals to 
BMI team members and those they cooperate with, both within the organization and externally, 
guiding them to accomplish these goals. By providing specific individual and (sub-)group task 
goals and helping team members to reach these goals, task uncertainty is reduced, while 
complexity (e.g., how to cooperate with others in the BMI process) is explicitly dealt with.   
Through transactional leadership and path-goal leadership, specifying which goals to 
reach and how, leaders can also enhance the incentives for and effectiveness of sourcing 
activities through team networks. Leaders who help team members formulate clear task goals 
and specify a path for attainment can help team members to optimally source information.  
Proposition 4a: In the development stage, leadership that provides concrete task goals 
and paths to accomplish these goals strengthens the influence of members’ networks on 
performance at this stage.  
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Motivating team members. As the team grows and its structure and tasks become more 
formalized (Bhave, 1994, Ruhnka & Young, 1987), motivating people becomes more of an 
individual issue. As the group’s identity becomes clearer and leaders manage members more 
directly, leaders have the opportunity to motivate team members and others within and outside 
the organization through means that might not be effective at the concept stage. As the number 
of tasks increases and the impact of each task on the overall project becomes smaller, it becomes 
more important for participants in the BMI process to understand how their relatively small 
tasks influences overall performance, in order for them to experience feelings of self-esteem 
(i.e. general positive feelings about the self, Campbell & Lavallee, 1993). As more people join, 
it may be hard to understand one’s unique contributions relative to others’. This is important 
since, if team members and other participants in the BMI process are to successfully perform 
tasks, they will need to believe in their capabilities to do so (i.e. self-efficacy – the belief that 
one is able to perform a specific task, Bandura, 1997). Both of these issues, self-esteem and 
self-efficacy, deal with individual self-evaluative aspects of identity – how one evaluates the 
self – and leaders play an essential role in managing these issues (van Knippenberg et al., 2004). 
We argue that leaders may influence self-evaluations of team members and others 
involved in the BMI process through several practices related to path-goal leadership and 
transactional leadership. By specifying the relationship between individual tasks and overall 
group goals, leaders create a sense of impact and meaningfulness that is important for 
individuals’ self-esteem (Spreitzer, 1995; Thomas & Velthouse, 1990) and a team’s 
effectiveness (Kirkman & Rosen, 1999). In addition, setting high goals signals that the leader 
believes in the abilities of the team member and external participants, strengthening their sense 
of self-efficacy and of goal commitment (Locke & Latham, 2002; Klein et al., 1999). Finally, 
providing feedback and rewards about goal attainment shows people that they are taken 
seriously, enhancing their feelings of being respected (Branscombe et al., 2002; Simon & 
Stürmer, 2003; Williams & DeSteno, 2008). All of these effects will strongly enhance 
motivation to accomplish the set goals. As a consequence, team members are more likely to use 
their social networks for the team.  
 
Proposition 4b: In the development stage, leadership that provides challenging task 
goals, positive feedback about task performance, and positive rewards upon task 
accomplishments enhances self-evaluations of team members, increasing the influence of 
members’ networks on performance at this stage. 
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Motivating external stakeholders. We argued earlier that in the early stage of the BMI 
process, leaders should emphasize discrepancies between the BMI and current practices in the 
company. There is a caveat however. Solely identifying problems of the status quo risks 
creating a sense of insecurity and uncertainty about the future of the organization and 
importantly, individuals’ place in the future organization. As the project enters the development 
stage, the team grows, and it requires a greater variety of intangible and especially tangible 
resources, involving a greater number and diversity of political heavyweights, higher up in the 
organization. Bigger investments are involved, and more external parties. This forces the team 
to legitimize its existence to a broader set of constituents inside and outside the organization. 
Only emphasizing how the BMI differs from problematic current practices may be important 
in the short run, but may not be optimal as the project moves forward (Stam et al., 2014). As 
the project formalizes and increases in scope, size, and aims to reach towards higher levels in 
the organization, it becomes more important to show how the project links to the overall 
organization as well.  
Specifically, it becomes more important that leaders present a consistent identity of their 
organization in order to motivate a broader range of followers (van Knippenberg et al., 2004, 
Shamir et al., 1993) within and outside the organization. It becomes more important to show a 
connection between the old and the new. By showing how the project fits within a larger picture, 
the broader narrative of an organization’s overall strategy and identity, and how the new 
business model helps to reinvent and reinvigorate this for the future, the insecurity and the sense 
of being an outsider is diminished (Stam et al., 2014). This is especially important in 
development stage of the BMI process, as more individuals are involved in sourcing tangible 
and political resources, and these individuals need to be convinced of the benefit of the BMI 
not only in changing the current situation of the company, but also in fitting within the 
company’s overall scope.  
By emphasizing how the BMI process fits the overall agenda and identity of the 
organization, a broad variety of participants in the BMI process from different departments, 
functional units, and at all levels required, may feel more motivated to contribute to the BMI 
process and provide the required information rather than to mobilize any available dark forces 
working behind the scenes to sabotage the new initiative or, more subtly, to fail to contribute to 
its success. 
Proposition 4c: In the development stage, leadership that emphasizes continuity or 
commonality between the BMI and current practices strengthens members’ common identity 
and consequently the influence of members’ networks on performance at this stage.  
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We note here that again these communication elements are not independent from each 
other. For instance, the effects of goal setting may be critically dependent on the extent that 
people feel positive about themselves (as a result of feedback, challenge and rewards). Also, 
communicating consistency between the BMI and the organization’s goals may not only 
motivate external stakeholders, but may also motivate team members to use their networks for 
the sake of the team. A final remark concerns the relative importance of the communication 
elements discussed under the concept stage heading (vision, the collective, and discrepancies). 
Although these elements are less influential in the development stage, they are not completely 
unimportant. As such, we would argue that providing (challenging) goals, feedback, rewards, 
and consistency are additions to the earlier communication elements discussed rather than 
substitutes.  
2.4 Discussion and Conclusions 
Strategic change and competitive advantage are increasingly associated with developing 
new business models (IBM, 2013; the Boston Consulting Group, 2009). However, currently we 
have very little theory on how to manage BMI. Previous literature on BMI emphasised the 
design of business models and components of activity systems, and more recently explores the 
process of BMI. However, this emerging literature is relatively a-theoretical, and typically does 
not conceptualise the mechanisms driving BMI success. Our paper seeks to fill this theoretical 
gap, by presenting new behavioural theory on the process through which new business models 
are (successfully) developed, from concept to launch. We hope our new theoretical approach, 
anchored in, and synthesising insights of, leadership theory, social network theory, and 
innovation research, will serve as a platform inspiring new theory and empirical research in this 
emerging, currently rather fragmented field.  
We argued that BMI has distinct characteristics, with typically more uncertainty, 
complexity, and interdependence, than more conventional types of innovation, such as product 
and process innovation. Nevertheless, the validity of our model, using leadership, external 
networks of teams, and their interactions, and how this varies in terms of their influence on 
performance from one stage to the next, may be explored for other settings as well. For instance, 
in the new product development literature, Ancona and Caldwell’s (1992) qualitative study 
documented that “ambassadorial” activities of new product development teams, information 
seeking, co-ordination of activities and ‘guarding’ of the innovation process within a team were 
key to success, although these researchers did not consider the interaction of team processes 
and such activities. Although new product development teams generally do not experience the 
complexity and uncertainty that BMI teams experience, our theory might nevertheless inspire 
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new team-based theory of radical product innovation (i.e., new product development that is 
relatively uncertain) as well.  
We believe our work also contributes to social network theory. Social network theorists 
have already examined which types of networks facilitate innovation (Uzzi & Spiro, 2005) and 
even focused on teams (Reagans & McEvily, 2003). However, as Kilduff and Brass said in their 
recent (2010) overview of social network theory, “(p)erhaps the most frequent criticism of 
social network research is that it fails to take into account human agency... (italics added)... and 
to show how “intentional, creative human action serves in part to constitute those very social 
networks that so powerfully constrain actors in turn.” New theory, as developed in our paper, 
on how specific leadership styles strengthen a team’s common identity and purpose, motivating 
team members to better use their existing social networks, is perhaps one promising avenue to 
begin to fill this gap.  
Likewise, social psychologists have studied team creativity and innovation as output 
variables, but did not examine how and why a team’s internal processes (e.g., team leadership 
and identity formation) interact with external processes such as the flow of information and 
other resources through its external networks. We developed such theory for the context of 
BMI: on how social networks and leadership styles interact in terms of their influence on 
performance and why, as teams move from BMI concept to development.  
We also developed, through our dynamic stage model, theory (cf. Ilgen et al., 2005) on 
how the team itself changes in the course of the BMI endeavour and how these changes 
constitute an input to the second, development stage. It is straightforward to illustrate the path-
dependency of this process. Suppose, for instance, a small team in the concept stage, with a 
charismatic leader emphasizing the collective in vision communication, reinforcing the team’s 
sense of a common identity and purpose, motivating them to use their ties with higher ranked 
managers and with external parties, and to share and combine ideas, information and other 
resources within the team, when developing a business plan. This may lead to a high quality 
business plan which gets approved, but also forms an excellent start for the development stage, 
with a core team with a common identity and purpose, and intact networks supplemented with 
new team members (as part of the additional support), all of which may increase the likelihood 
of success in the development stage. In contrast, an ineffective leader in the concept stage with 
a poorly motivated team may deliver a weak business plan. If at all approved, this team will 
start the development phase weakly in terms of its size, networks, identity and purpose, and 
with a sub-optimal plan, all of which may contribute to failure during the development phase. 
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As this example illustrates, path dependency has real and important implications, not only 
theoretically, but for practical reasons as well.  
The dynamic part of our theory was inspired by prior theory such as Ilgen et al’s (2005) 
IMOI (Input-Mediator-Output-Input) stage model. We do think, however, that a more formal 
modelling for our setting of BMI would suggest a slightly different formulation (than IMOI), 
as in our context the dynamics imply potentially important changes in the team (“T”) itself as 
well. As the number of the team’s members, their roles and tasks, the range, pattern and content 
of their network ties change, so the functioning and abilities of the team change. For these 
reasons, we would suggest a “TIMOTI” model for our setting, capturing changes in the team 
itself as well. Future theoretical and empirical research can provide more insight.  
We believe our theory may also add to the corporate venturing literature and to the 
ambidexterity literature. Previously, researchers in corporate venturing (Galbraith, 1982; 
Burgelman, 1983a, b; Garud & Van de Ven, 1992; Bhave, 1994; Archdivili et al., 2003; 
Cornelissen & Clarke, 2010) and the ambidexterity literature (O’Reilly et al., 2009) have also 
studied how new ventures emerge in established organizations. Some studies examined the 
process of developing new ventures using rich case study analysis (Burgelman, 1983a, b; Garud 
& Van de Ven, 1992). Burgelman (1983a, b), for instance, studied where new ventures come 
from in a large corporation such as Intel, and how they get funded and ultimately legitimized 
as part of the corporate strategy. Other studies examined conditions for successfully developing 
new businesses away from a firm’s core business, such as the vision of corporate leaders or 
CEOs (Smith & Tushman, 2005; Jansen et al., 2009), or effective alliances or networks with 
external partners (Lin et al., 2007). The idea of process is at the core of the ambidexterity 
literature (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008; O’Reilly & Tushman, 
2008) although this (firm-level) research typically reduces the entire BMI-process to a single 
concept, i.e., exploration. None of these literatures however developed theory at the micro-level 
of how and why external team factors (types of social networks, with whom, and for what) and 
internal team factors (e.g., types of leadership) interact to influence BMI performance, and how 
this varies across different stages of BMI. Hence, we believe our new theory adds to these 
existing research streams as well.  
We hope our new theory will also inspire empirical work, theoretically extending and 
empirically testing the theory and propositions developed in this paper. We strongly encourage 
qualitative work as well. We think we argue on good grounds that social networks and 
leadership are important in BMI settings; however, qualitative research may reveal other, even 
more important drivers of the BMI process and performance at various stages.  
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Qualitative research is particularly important when studying non-traditional settings, 
other than the West, where most of our theories come from, including on teams, leadership and 
networks. Qualitative work on BMI in Asia, Africa, and South America would add much to our 
study (Barkema et al., 2012), particularly when examining BMI in types and settings of 
organizations that are currently underexplored by management researchers. At the “economic 
base of the pyramid,” (Prahalad, 2010), for instance, new business models are beginning to 
enable companies, social enterprises and NGOs to succeed economically while creating social 
value for clients in sectors such as mobile banking, health care, and solar energy (George et al., 
2012). Qualitative work on how new businesses evolve over time in congruence with social 
impact (and what this means for recipients) might offer important new insights to the field of 
BMI, the broader field of management, to the social psychology of teams and leadership, and 
to social network theory as well. We strongly encourage such research.  
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CHAPTER 3 
AN ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS MODEL FOR RESOURCE CONSTRAINED 
SETTINGS: THE CASE OF MJUNCTION 2 
3.1 Introduction 
As companies emerge post-crisis in the West, waking up to new competitive realities 
and new expectations and demands from society, innovative business models are increasingly 
seen as an important source of competitive advantage. Recently, low-cost business models have 
attracted considerable interest; for instance, those of companies in emerging economies, some 
of which are seen as hotbeds for low-cost innovation (such as Tata with its Nano), and of 
organisations with specific economic and social goals (Ansari, Munir, & Gregg, 2012; George, 
McGahan, & Prabhu, 2012; Prahalad & Hart, 2006). Low-cost business models are seen as 
increasingly relevant for the developed markets of the West as well, with increasing segments 
(e.g. the elderly and youths) on stagnant or declining incomes (Radjou, Prabhu, & Ahuja, 2012). 
Although – as concluded by the editors of a recent special issue (George et al., 2012) – the clear 
relevance has been widely recognised, we currently lack theory on the organizational process 
of developing these low-cost business models. George et al. (2012) suggested that longitudinal, 
qualitative research is needed to develop such new theory. Our aim with this paper is to do 
precisely that.  
Low-cost business models in India have been described as the result of “Jugaad”-
innovation, or ‘make do’ (in Hindi) with resources at hand (Radjou et al., 2012). As a theoretical 
lens for our study, we therefore used theory on ‘bricolage,’ defined as “making do by applying 
combinations of the resources at hand to new problems and opportunities” (Levi-Strauss, 1962). 
Earlier, Baker and Nelson (2005) used this lens (and qualitative research) to propose a process 
model for developing new businesses under resource-constrained conditions. However, they 
did not develop an organisational process model, in terms of which organizational factors 
contributed to the process and why. Our aim is to do exactly that.  
We also used leadership theory as a sensitizing lens. Leadership is particularly effective 
if: a task is challenging, if conditions or directions are uncertain, and/or if short-term results 
cannot be measured and monetized through financial rewards (Shamir, House, & Arthur, 1993) 
– precisely the conditions that are present when developing new business models (Bucherer, 
Eisert, & Gassmann, 2012; Stieglitz & Foss, 2015). Given the early stage of theory 
development, and that our theories – on bricolage and leadership – came from very different 
                                                 
2 This chapter was written as a paper and is co-authored with H.G. Barkema and S. Soylu. 
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settings (mainly, the US and Europe although Levi-Strauss’ (1962) bricolage theory was 
inspired by anthropological studies of non-western people) than the one studied here (India), 
we were open to other potential explanations as well.   
Interest in new business models in general rose to new heights in the 1990s, along with 
the rise of the IT sector in the US where new business models seemed to create enormous value 
(Teece, 2010). Many new developments in IT are however now happening in emerging 
economies, with India arguably on the forefront of attention in this respect (George et al., 2012). 
Emerging industries, such as the on-line auction market in India (studied here), are often highly 
resource-constrained; and resource-constrained settings are a particularly interesting arena to 
study low-cost business models (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). Capturing these aspects, we selected 
TATA as a research subject, an Indian company well-known for its innovative low-cost 
business models. More specifically, we focused on MJunction, a spin-off of Tata. MJunction 
was launched in 2001 following the burst of dot.com bubble. From a theoretical sampling 
perspective, new business development at a new Tata company, in India, in IT, right after the 
dot.com crash, seemed like an ideal (‘extreme’) case to study.  
MJunction initiated a variety of different business models in e-commerce, including 
internet-based auction markets for coal and steel (cutting out the middlemen, including the 
mafia, from distribution channels); selling electronics to consumers; selling used cars; and 
organising conferences. It quickly became one of the largest e-commerce players in India and 
as a whole very profitable. Success came quickly for some of its business units (BU, hereafter), 
within months, others however took many years. We conducted a longitudinal (2010 to 2014), 
multi-level case study of six BUs (which varied widely in terms of success; Eisenhardt, 1989) 
within this one organization to identify which organizational factors appeared to be behind 
successful processes, how they contributed, and why (Whetten, 1989).   
The main insights were theoretical. We found that ‘bricolage’ was key; however, 
surprisingly, this did not distinguish high- from low-performing business models per se. High-
performing business models combined bricolage with “exploration” and “exploitation” 
practices (March, 1991); ways of thinking that have previously been seen as incongruent (Levi-
Strauss, 1962) or paradoxical (Smith, 2014). Moreover, we found that these processes were 
driven by distinct leadership features at both the firm- and the BU-level. These organizational 
processes – combining bricolage, exploration and exploitation, and leadership – changed 
fundamentally when the firm moved from the entrepreneurial phase to a more mature phase, as 
captured by the new multi-stage, multi-level organizational process theory developed in this 
paper.  
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Below we will first present the theory used to sensitize our research questions. After 
which we will discuss our methodology, key findings, insights, and conclusions.  
3.2 Theoretical Background 
Bricolage theory 
The concept of “bricolage” was introduced by Levi-Strauss (1962) based on 
anthropological studies of a great variety of people across the globe and how they – within their 
social structures such as communities and kinship – understood, gave meaning to, and made 
use of objects in their natural and social environment. The bricoleur’s “universe of instruments 
is closed and the rules of his game are always to make do with whatever is at hand” (Levi-
Strauss, 1962: 11), put to different use depending on the situation. Resources and opportunities 
are not objectively given but socially constructed, implying differences in growth trajectories 
of organizations (Baker & Nelson, 2005). Levi-Strauss contrasted the “bricoleur” with the 
“engineer,” whose knowledge is abstract, detached, and distant from a concrete problem, 
searching externally for resources (objects, information), and adapting them to the project 
(Baker & Nelson, 2005). “The engineer is always trying to make his way out of and go beyond 
the constraints” (Levi-Strauss, 1962: 13). Although both imply “parallel modes of acquiring 
knowledge” (Levi-Strauss, 1962: 9), they are seen as “two distinct ways of scientific thought” 
(p. 10). Bricolage can surprise and sometimes generate brilliant results, equal or superior to 
engineering solutions in early stages, but advanced engineering leads to better results (Levi-
Strauss, 1962). 
The concept of bricolage has been applied to entrepreneurship under resource-poor 
conditions. Baker and Nelson’s (2005) qualitative study, set in a declining mining area in the 
US, showed entrepreneurs engaged in improvisation (Miner, Bassoff, & Moorman, 2001), 
‘making do’ with ‘resources at hand,’ refusing ‘to enact limitations and a bias toward action’, 
in terms of the ‘recombination of resources for new purposes.’ Baker and Nelson (2005: 333) 
therefore defined bricolage as “making do by applying combinations of the resources at hand 
to new problems and opportunities,” supported by multiplex relationships with clients: 
friendships turning into clients, and vice-versa. They observed, in fact, two types of bricolage. 
“Parallel bricolage”, or bricolage in its most extreme form; making use only of the available set 
of physical inputs, skills at hand, and personal networks, and “selective bricolage”; rejecting 
bricolage in at least one domain, enabling organizations to routinize and grow, unconstrained 
by the behaviors that led to their initial success. These findings led to a process model for 
entrepreneurial growth, driven by making do, resources at hand, and recombining resources, 
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with some organizational factors (e.g., friendship and multiplex ties) enhancing the process of 
bricolage (Baker & Nelson, 2005).  
While one-agent settings are typical for early-stage entrepreneurs, technological and 
organizational development trajectories may be best understood in terms of multiple, co-
creating and –learning groups. Garud and Karnoe (2003) provided a rich description of how 
Danish engineers and entrepreneurs combined resources at hand to solve a variety of problems 
and exploited new opportunities in the Danish wind turbine industry. They observed that the 
Danish ecosystem (of wind turbine producers, users, government, and testers), incrementally 
adjusting existing technologies through bricolage as part of a trajectory of co-creation and co–
learning, outperformed US producers focusing on ‘break-through R&D’. Interestingly, a later 
study (Hendry & Harborne, 2011) – broader in scope and longer in time-horizon – observed 
that although this may have been true in the 1970s when the technological trajectory started, in 
the 1980s large, formal R&D programs and learning by search actually became more important 
for success in this industry. 
Baker and Nelson (2005) concluded that “there has been scanty prior use of bricolage 
in organization studies,” a situation that has not changed much in the past decade. This work 
on Western resource-constrained settings suggests useful definitions, characteristics ('make do', 
recombining resources at hand) and boundary conditions for bricolage (early growth stages), 
and a few organizational antecedents (friendship ties; multi-agent settings facilitating co-
learning and -creating technological trajectories). Nevertheless, we appear to be in early stages 
of theory development on the role of bricolage in the process of organizational growth, 
including on what organizational factors influence the process of bricolage and firm growth, 
and why (theoretical logic), when (e.g., growth stage) and where. For example, little is known 
about resource-constrained settings such as emerging economies in Asia, despite ‘making do’ 
(or Jugaad) being described as central to low-cost business models (Radjou al., 2012).  
Leadership theory 
The process of setting up new ventures involves great risks and uncertainty (Barkema 
& Vermeulen, 1998), requiring effective leadership (Shamir et al., 1993). Leaders may 
influence followers by what they say (vision or goal communication) and by what they do (role 
modelling or rewarding; Bass, 1985; Shamir et al., 1993; Howell & Higgins, 1990) and reduce 
uncertainty by giving direction about what constitutes acceptable or desirable behavior from 
followers (Kuhnert & Lewis, 1987). Leadership plays an important role in resource-constrained 
settings: the leader's charisma is essential in realistically assessing environmental resources and 
constraints to come up with effective strategies (Conger & Kanungo, 1987). What leaders say 
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and what they do may strengthen the identity of the group (van Knippenberg, Knippenberg, De 
Cremer, & Hogg, 2004), motivating team members to contribute to the business model 
development process and its success. If a task is challenging and if conditions or directions are 
uncertain, if short-term results cannot be measured and monetized through financial rewards, 
or when faith of team members can be mobilized, leadership is particularly effective (Shamir 
et al., 1993). These are precisely the conditions that are present in the case of business model 
development, particularly in resource-constrained settings.  
Moreover, new business development requires creative ideas. Hence, a leader's support 
for creativity is essential. The delegation of authority and the use of expert knowledge enhance 
the generation and implementation of creative ideas (Krause, 2004). Transformational and 
transactional leadership styles increase the number of creative ideas (Howell & Avolio, 1993; 
Shin & Zhou, 2003; Gong, Huang & Farh, 2009). Leaders maintaining positive relationships 
with followers, support the implementation of creative ideas (Scott & Bruce, 1994). And leaders 
who strengthen psychological empowerment of followers, increase the generation of creative 
ideas at work in the long run (Zhang & Bartol, 2010).  
Beyond fostering creativity, leadership is a core function in innovation teams. Clark and 
Wheelwright (1992) argued that in those team structures that are most suitable for radical 
product innovations – heavyweight team structures and autonomous team structures – leaders 
have a central role. Others have argued that the responsibility for the implementation of creative 
ideas in firms lies squarely on the shoulders of leaders, e.g., top management teams (Jansen, 
Vera, & Crossan, 2009; Smith & Tushman, 2005). Leadership styles at the firm and BU-levels 
are significant determinants of organisational innovation and BU performance (Howell & 
Avolio, 1993; Jung, Chow & Wu, 2003). 
Furthermore, Bucherer et al. (2012) state that top management involvement in setting 
up new business models is even more important than in the case of product innovation. 
According to Doz and Kosonen (2010: 371), to develop new business models, firm-level top 
management has to make "bold and fast decisions without being bogged down in top-level ‘win-
lose’ politics". Smith, Binns and Tushman (2010) argued that the successful development of 
business models require leaders to sustain the integration and unity among BUs. In sum, 
leadership is clearly important for the success of new business model development, and for 
sensitizing our research questions on what organizational factors influence the process of 
developing (successful) business models, and why.  
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3.3 Methods 
Research Design and Setting  
We aimed to uncover which organizational factors influenced the process of developing 
new business models, and why, including the under-explored intersection of firm-levels and 
stages (Burgelman, 1983; Garud & van de Ven, 1992; Raisch, Birkinshaw, Probst, & Tushman, 
2009). Hence, we did a qualitative study. This enabled a more holistic account of a novel 
phenomenon which existing theories do not explain well (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994; Ozcan 
& Eisenhardt, 2009; Lee, 1999). It also helped to uncover the process of events and actions, in 
terms of the underlying factors and mechanisms (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Maxwell, 1996). 
We used an embedded multiple-case format3 enabling a ‘replication-logic’ (Eisenhardt, 1989) 
to build a more robust, accurate, and generalizable theory than a single-case study might have 
done (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 1994).  
We selected the IT industry (a hotbed of low-cost business model development), for 
similar reasons to Amit and Zott (2001). This industry has globalized since the 1990s however, 
and is now strongly coming up in Asia, with India as one of the countries on the forefront. In 
fact, India is as seen as a hotbed for business model innovation, in particular low-cost models 
(e.g. the TATA Nano), both for serving economic goals, as well as economic and social goals 
in combination (Prahalad & Hart, 2006; George et al., 2012). Our research setting was 
MJunction, an Indian company that created new markets, through new business models around 
e-auction platforms, in a variety of industries in B2B (steel, coal; sourcing supplies) and B2C 
(e.g., on-line retail). Two competitors, TATA Steel (private sector) and SAIL (Steel Authority 
of India, public sector), jointly gave the push in 2001 to what became India's largest e-
commerce company. After a third party (and its initial investment) pulled out. The two funded 
an equal partnership joint venture to create value by transforming the supply chain, replacing 
middlemen (in industries such as steel and coal, previously dominated in extreme cases by the 
mafia) and shops (in B2C, selling electronics and books) with transparent e-auction markets.  
MJunction first engaged a well-known Western consulting company. The proposed 
business model (copied after the West) would generate earnings from advertising and projected 
a profit after year four. After the dot.com crash, one of the three initial partners pulled out, 
                                                 
3 Although the BUs that we explored are under a single company, we argue that our research setting is multiple 
as we did cross-case analyses (cf. Eisenhardt, 1989) after we derived our first-order concepts, second-order and 
aggregate themes. 
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leaving MJunction with substantially less initial capital. Despite limited resources, MJunction’s 
management travelled to Europe and the US to learn from similar ventures, including eBay and 
two Belgian ventures that failed; one selling through e-auctions and the other sourcing supplies 
for similar companies. MJunction realised that to survive, they would have to generate profits 
much earlier than year four. Hence they designed the business model to be transaction-based. 
Less than two years after devising the initial plan, and less than a year after having to re-
evaluate, MJunction was launched. Quickly after it started with steel, it initiated a range of BUs 
in industries such as coal (CoalJunction), used cars (AutoJunction), sourcing and procurement 
(BuyJunction), online retail (Straightline), and organising conferences (MJunctionEdge). Table 
3.1 on the follow page gives a brief descriptions of these BUs. 
 
Business Unit Year/ 
Period 
of 
Launch 
Commerce 
Transaction 
Description How was it 
started? 
How is it 
connected to 
other Business 
Units? 
MetalJunction 2002 B2B e-
marketplace 
for steel 
Joint venture 
between TATA 
Steel and SAIL 
to create 
transparency in 
the steel sales 
market 
N/A 
BuyJunction 2002-
2005 
B2B e-sourcing 
and 
procuremen
t 
Realization that 
similar 
(MetalJunction) 
infrastructure 
can be used for 
procurement/ 
sourcing  
Using the same 
infrastructure 
used for the 
sell-side in 
MetalJunction 
for the buy-
side 
Coaljunction 2005 B2B e-auction 
for coal and 
coal related 
products 
Applying the 
auction model 
used for 
MetalJunction to 
the coal market 
to address 
corruption and 
create 
transparency 
and value 
The 
MetalJunction 
model applied 
to the coal 
industry 
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AutoJunction 2006 B2B, later 
B2C 
Integrated 
e-commerce 
portal for 
automobiles 
Selling 
repossessed 
vehicles to 
recover at least 
part of the value 
Same principle 
as 
MetalJunction 
but with a 
focus on 
automobiles 
Straightline 2009 B2C, later 
B2B 
Online 
shopping 
portal 
Selling 
consumer goods 
through an 
online portal 
and creating 
value by making 
use of the 
principles of 
aggregation and 
price 
transparency 
Moving the 
proven online 
infrastructure 
to the 
business-to-
consumer 
space 
MJunction 
Edge 
2009-
2010 
B2B Conferences 
and 
specialized 
industry 
publications  
Providing 
relevant and 
targeted industry 
information to 
auction 
customers 
Added value 
for the primary 
segments 
served by 
Mjunction  
Table 3.1: Description of MJunction Business Units 
We had four reasons to study MJunction as a case for low-cost business model 
development. First, MJunction operated in India, well-known as a resource-constrained country 
(George et al., 2012; Inoue, Lazzarini, & Musacchio, 2013). MJunction BUs also started in a 
new industry (e-auction), where resources are typically more constrained (Aldrich & Fiol, 
1994). In addition, MJunction was launched immediately after the dot-com crash in 2001, 
further amplifying resource constraints. Lastly, MJunction was initiated by the TATA group, 
well-known for its innovative, low-cost business models. 
An embedded multiple-case study format was appropriate as having a variety of BUs 
within one organization (MJunction) enabled more ‘valid comparisons’ (Hallen & Eisenhardt, 
2012) and reduced variation (in organizational characteristics not central to our study) while 
enhancing generalizability (Eisenhardt, 1989). This, in turn, enabled a 'replication logic' (Yin, 
1994); handling cases like series of experiments where in each case we refined our insights 
derived from previous ones (Eisenhardt, 1989; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Yin, 1994). 
Furthermore, performance variations, across BUs and across time, enabled us to portray our 
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cases as contrasting (Eisenhardt, 1989; Martin & Eisenhardt, 2010; Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012). 
BUs such as MetalJunction and CoalJunction had been profitable almost from inception, while 
BUs such as Straightline seemed to struggle for a considerable time to make profits. We also 
observed that some BUs, such as Straightline, showed interesting variation across time, for 
instance, from B2C to B2B, enabling more fine-grained analysis for theory building 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Sampling BUs within MJunction also enabled us to control for firm- and team-level 
factors such as social ties and formal incentives that prior research has associated with business 
model development (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Van de Ven, Polley, Garud, & Venkataraman, 
1999; Kanter, 1988). These controls-by-design for potentially confounding influences enabled 
us to focus on new business model development-specific factors that are more likely to yield 
new theory.  
We took a longitudinal approach, with the first author conducting a total of 40 
interviews in two major rounds, in 2010 and 2012. In the second round, we interviewed a 
number of the same respondents. Collecting both real time and retrospective longitudinal data 
helped to overcome informant bias (Leonard-Barton, 1990) and increased confidence in our 
interpretation of the evolution of business model development over time. It also gave more 
information about BU performance over time, and the factors and mechanisms driving 
performance variations, across time and across BUs (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009).  
Data Collection 
Using complementary units of analysis – BU- and firm-level – helped to collect richer 
data, and rigorous theory building (Yin, 1994; Martin & Eisenhardt, 2010). Multiple data 
sources, interviews and archival data, enabled triangulation and increased our confidence in the 
robustness and accuracy of the emerging theory (Jick, 1979; Denzin, 1989; Kumar, Stern, & 
Anderson, 1993; Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012). It also reduced the potential for retrospective bias 
by matching real-time archival data with retrospective accounts of interviewees (Leonard-
Barton, 1990). We used semi-structured interviews, enabling direct communication with staff 
members and open enquiry about situational meanings for action (Miles & Huberman, 1994; 
Hopf, 2004).  
We interviewed the heads of the six BUs and team members involved in setting up the 
BU. We also interviewed the managing director (MD), two Vice Presidents (VP), and members 
of functional departments, such as HRM and finance. Interviewing participants at multiple 
hierarchical levels and from different types of units reduced potential biases of individual 
participants by allowing claims to be confirmed or complemented from multiple sources 
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(Golden, 1992; Miller, Cardinal, & Glick, 1997; Cardinal, Sitkin, & Long, 2004; Plowman, 
Baker, Beck, Kulkarni, Solansky, & Travis, 2007; Martin & Eisenhardt, 2010).  
We used ‘theoretical saturation:’ conducting more interviews until we felt that a more 
detailed understanding would not be achieved (Eisenhardt, 1989) by virtue of additional 
interviews. Theoretical saturation was important because qualitative research aims to maximize 
the variety of the unknown phenomenon (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Towards the end of our 
second data collection round, we felt we had almost reached saturation (i.e., we conducted one 
more interview with the MD early 2014), resulting in data from 37 semi-structured interviews 
from staff in the eight BUs and from functional units, and three interviews with the MD. We 
explain more about data saturation in our data analysis-section (pp. 13-14). 
Interview Schedule. Interviews took place at the informants' work place, at MJunction 
headquarters, in Kolkata, India. At the beginning of each interview, participants gave informed 
consent and agreed to have the interview recorded. The interviewer disclosed his background 
and research aims to put participants at ease. The shortest interview lasted 35 minutes and the 
longest 96 minutes, with an average of 55 minutes.  
The interview topic guide was informed by sensitizing research questions (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994) about business model development and leadership. Following Eisenhardt 
(1989), we used a funnel-based approach, starting with general questions about initiating new 
business models followed by more specific probes. We conducted five pilot interviews. 
Revisions were made of the themes and questions in the topic guide after the pilot and the first 
round of interviews based on the emerging themes. Such revisions enabled us to probe emergent 
themes (Eisenhardt, 1989). The resulting topic guide included themes such as ‘the origin, 
stages, and process of business model development’, and ‘leadership practices’. Since the 
interviews were semi-structured, the topic guide remained flexible and open. Follow-up 
questions and probes were used during interviews as appropriate. 
Data Analysis 
We used within- and cross-case analyses, without a priori hypotheses (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). We treated each BU as a case. The units of analysis implied by 
our theory were the BUs of MJunction. During the early stages of analysis, we observed 
knowledge transfers and learning across BUs, influenced by organizational-level factors such 
as firm-leadership. Hence, we inductively included the entire organization (MJunction) as 
another unit of analysis to explain these surprising findings. After each round of interviews, 
verbatim transcription was carried out. NVivo (version 8) was used to analyse interview texts 
(Basit, 2003; Bazeley, 2007).  
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We used procedures recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994), Eisenhardt (1989), 
and Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton (2013) to analyze the data. To ensure coding accuracy, two co-
authors coded the data separately and formed independent views, which we integrated into each 
interview transcript (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012). Then, for within-
case analyses, we made contact summary sheets to indicate main themes and concepts from 
each interview (Miles & Huberman, 1994). During the initial rounds of analysis, we derived 
‘first-order concepts’ by coding interview transcripts focusing on patterns of in-vivo phrases 
indicated by interviewees (Gioia et al, 2013; Miles & Huberman, 1994). Deriving ‘first-order 
concepts` enabled us to dissect the textual data into meaningful and manageable segments such 
as quotations. We continued this until we could not derive any other distinct ones and had 
reached theoretical saturation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Then, we collated first-order concepts 
into superordinate, ‘second-order themes’ that were theoretically distinct, and revised them to 
be specific enough and non-redundant (Gioia et al., 2013). Next, we grouped our ‘second-order 
themes’ under ‘aggregate themes’ to reflect broader levels of meaning and a grounded 
theoretical framework (Gioia et al., 2013). We triangulated these data by emphasizing the codes 
and themes that were confirmed by multiple participants and by identifying themes that were 
consistent across interviews and archival data (Jick, 1979). 
As the theoretical framework emerged, we related our findings to the literature to 
highlight similarities and differences (Eisenhardt, 1989; Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009). 
Juxtaposition of contradictory and confirming evidence tends to "unfreeze" thinking, and has 
the potential to drive conclusions with less researcher bias (Eisenhardt, 1989: 546). Hence, our 
data analysis took into account disconfirming and contrary expectations, as well as points of 
consistency (Yin, 1994). We created a "thick description" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) of findings 
by extensively using narratives to enable the transfer of findings to other settings (Balogun & 
Johnson, 2004). Figure 3.1 depicts the overview of the emergent data structure and Table 3.2 
contains the supporting representative informant (first-order) quotes underlying the second-
order themes we derived in our analysis. 
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Figure 3.1: Data Structure 
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Second-Order Themes and First-
Order Categories 
Representative Informant Quotes 
Overarching Theme: 
Internal and external learning 
 
1. Mechanisms of exploration  
     A. Observing successes and  
          failures of companies in the    
          west  
A1: "Around 2001, right after the dot-com boom, the MD and I travelled 
to the US and Belgium to learn deeply about the successes and failures 
happening there." (Participant 2, Vice President of MJunction, first round) 
A2: "When we were visiting X [company name withheld] in the US, We 
understood a lot of things about processes in e-auctions, these were things 
which were earlier kind of meaningless to me. And, this knowledge really 
helped me to gear up the operations for this kind of growth." (Participant 
1, the MD of MJunction , first round) 
     B. Hiring external consultants 
           
B1: "We didn't have much resources on IT platform at the beginning. 
Initially, we hired staff from a company called X [company name 
withheld] to develop our IT platform." (Participant 5, Head of 
MetalJunction, first round) 
B2: "For MetalJunction, we appointed some people from company X 
[company name withheld] as the technology partners as well as Y 
[company name withheld], whose tool we used for the high-tech 
technological infrastructure...We basically created a team on how to go 
about it." (Participant 1, the MD of MJunction , first round) 
     C. Incubation cell C1: "Changes are happening in MJunction. For example the incubation cell 
has been formed recently... For example, imported coal initiative is in the 
incubation cell at the moment. Within the cell, there are people from 
different departments who provide input and they analyse market data. The 
senior management also came up, like who will be the person working on a 
particular project in the incubator. They also recruited somebody from 
outside who was an expert in that area." (Participant 4, Head of 
CoalJunction, second round) 
C2: "Incubation team gets both ideas which the company is pretty sure that 
they are- firstly good ideas, secondly they have good potential. So those 
decisions have already been taken before the project moves to incubation 
cell" (Participant 17, Head of MJunction Business Excellence, second 
round) 
2. Mechanisms of within-business  
    unit exploitation 
 
     D. Trial and error D1: "We thought of 'why not to take advantage of B2C sales?'. B2B was 
the base which we have, and we thought we can use our expertise in B2B 
in B2C as well. But after the initial profit loss, we realised that the 
customer in B2C is different than B2B. Then we thought of not to have the 
B2C in the same B2B portal." (Participant 12, Head of AutoJunction, first 
round) 
D2: "Today we are learning from our mistakes...There are many 
capabilities which are not there within the business unit but we need to 
build those capabilities in order to survive and sustain in this business. So 
now it is the critical task of identifying what can we build internally from 
the existing resources, what we need to bring from outside, so that mix 
needs to be created in terms of how we build the capability." (Participant 
21, Straightline staff, second round) 
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     E. Conducting market research     
         and identifying the   
         'customer pain' 
E1: "We did a market research to see the issues from the clients’ point of 
view. All companies we spoke to, we understood their pain points. A pain 
point is for instance 'I need an effective way of distributing my coal where 
nobody should complain and it should be smooth.'...We found out coal 
buyers and asked them 'what are your requirements are? What kind of 
things you want? Then we addressed all these customer issues. That’s how 
we progressed." (Participant 4, Head of CoalJunction, first round) 
E2: "The first process was obviously learning from the clients and 
understanding their pain points. Having got basically a road map of what 
those pain points were, we went about identifying our requirements in 
terms of human resources, resources, capabilities, or learnings." 
(Participant 23, MetalJunction staff, first round) 
3 Mechanisms of cross-business  
   unit exploitation 
 
     F.  Transferring staff among  
           business units 
F1: "If some new opportunity comes along then it might need people with 
a different skill set. For instance the people I have may not have the skill 
sets required to handle the new opportunity that comes along. So we need 
to transfer such people to the business units needing help." (Participant 17, 
Head of MJunction Business Excellence, first round) 
F2: "So first X [name of the employee] was with MetalJunction. Then he 
was moved to CoalJunction. Head of CoalJunction was one of my best 
resources in Metal Junction, Y [name of the head] was heading 
CoalJunction now, so this is the way you provide support. And I got new 
people in place of them in MetalJunction." (Participant 1, the MD of 
MJunction, first round) 
     G.  Creating knowledge forums G1: "We have an idea forum wherein whatever ideas you have towards 
anything. It may not be relevant to your division yet the idea can be posted 
at a certain forum. There’s a team which evaluates this, and whichever the 
genuine ideas they have found or whenever they can get experts opinion 
on that. So, those ideas are implemented and the employee is also 
rewarded for that, who has given us the idea. (Participant 12, Head of 
AutoJunction, second round) 
G2: "I am in the auction forum.  Similarly, someone from MetalJunction is 
there, someone from Straightline is there. This forum meets around once in 
a month, and then people share ideas there. I have done something good 
over there in CoalJunction, then I will give a presentation on that.  And 
then, people will see if that is useful, even not useful to them, but it may be 
useful later, they can take some lead from that." (Participant 4, Head of 
CoalJunction, second round) 
     H.  Flow of information   
           through functional  
           departments (e.g. finance,  
           HRM) 
H1: "Human Resources department of MJunction played a role in terms of 
swapping rapid information from Metaljunction to Coal business unit, the 
training which came as part of the orientation of this business unit was also 
sort of HR’s delivery." (Participant 20, MJunction Human Resources staff, 
first round)  
H2: "The good thing that happened in CoalJunction is the structured 
processes: they were strong in processes due to the constant feeding of 
support from MJunction corporate unit and funding opportunities from the 
MJunction finance department". (Participant 17, Head of MJunction 
Business Excellence, first round) 
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     I. Adopting existing business  
         models into new business  
         units 
I1: "I saw Coaljunction started as a pilot run, trying to specialise in the 
supply chain of Coal in India...There was some cross-fertilization among 
CoalJunction and MetalJunction because at the end of the day, it was B2B 
selling. We had some experience doing the B2B selling for steel." 
(Participant 20, MJunction Human Resources staff, first round) 
I2: "Within MJunction we started setting up business units. First was 
Metaljunction, then we had Buyjunction been formed and then inside 
Buyjunction we had departments being set up such as operations was a 
particular role so we had a big operations team. Business models of the 
newly created units particularly resembled the existing business units" 
(Participant 7, Head of BuyJunction, first round) 
     J. Technology transfers within  
         the firm 
J1: "While in a way the umbilical cord will not cut, because what was 
important for B2C was – I mean one of the important components for B2C 
was technology and so that you know the technology platform doesn’t 
make the same mistakes we had earlier and we learned from our 
experiences. So for each upcoming business unit development, we 
transferred the technology team and the infrastructure." (Participant 2, 
Vice President of MJunction, second round) 
J2: "The capabilities which we are currently building is domain expertise in 
terms of the categories. So that’s something which we are transferring and 
building it internally. For example our merchandiser needs to know in terms 
of what are the product launches, what are the discounts and things like 
that...Similarly we are identifying and creating that network across the 
country so that within the shortest turnaround time from order to dispatch, 
that is where our focus is on.  So we would want to build this capability so 
that we deliver this item in the shortest possible time to the end customer. 
(Participant 11, Head of Straightline, second round) 
     K. Skip-level meetings  
          (vertical idea flows among  
          business units) 
K1: "Through feedback, we have taken a few initiatives to increase the 
engagement level of our Junctionites [i.e. BUs], we have started with 
something called Skip Level meetings wherein each person gets an 
opportunity to talk to the senior most person in the organisation. Now 
through that initiative, the engagement level has increased in a lot." 
(Participant 24, Head of MJunction Human Resources, second round) 
K2: "With the initiation of skip-level meetings, people feel proud that they 
are being able to talk to the Vice Presidents and give them suggestions, 
innovative ideas, their concerns. On the other hand, the senior members 
are getting to know, in depth, all the ground realities and they find scope 
for improvements. (Participant 35, MJunction Human Resources 
Specialist, second round) 
Overarching Theme: 
Business unit and firm-level 
leadership practices 
 
4. Transformational leadership   
    of the business unit managers 
 
     L. Managing the change   
          process within the business  
          unit 
L1: "I was educating them [BU staff], leading them, assisting them in the 
change process. Leading them through the change process smoothly... I 
felt the best way to go about implementing a change is not to be pushy 
about it. Instead, being a partner, taking them through is crucial." 
(Participant 7, Head of BuyJunction, first round) 
L2: "Leading people gathered from different departments during the early 
stages was I think the biggest challenge of our BU head, as working in a 
new unit with vague practices was problematic. He [BU head] strongly led 
this change process (Participant 4, Head of CoalJunction, first round)  
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     M. Creating vision for business  
           unit staff  
M1: "In first stage the vision of the BU manager is very important, as this 
stage seems to be quite general and with a lot of uncertainty going on." 
(Participant 20, MJunction Human Resources staff, first round) 
M2: "I’m wearing different hats at the same time when I talk to different 
people...Some of it is very much grounded in today. Some of it is very 
much talking about the future, more in terms of inspiring people on what 
can be done" (Participant 5, Head of MetalJunction, first round) 
5. Operation-oriented leadership  
    of the business unit managers 
 
     N. Meeting deadlines and   
          executing thorough plans 
N1: "The communication in the development stage was to finish in a fixed 
time frame and motivate your team to finish off that job in a fixed time 
frame. There you are not strategising anything as far as the business goes 
as you already use the detailed plans made in the previous stage." 
(Participant 12, Head of AutoJunction, first round) 
N2: "We are already having really good idea of the product that what we 
are going to build. So what you need from the unit manager for the next 
stage is basically a good, proper execution of the plan." (Participant 14, 
MetalJunction staff, first round) 
     O. Operation-focus in   
          executing business unit plans 
O1: "In the initial years, the leadership was more of a tactical nature, so 
more in terms of the immediate operation-related issues in the BU." 
(Participant 16, Straightline staff, first round) 
O2: "Tweaking around with the new software was at the core of my 
leadership during the development phase. So to say, a very operation-
orientated communication with my personnel had happened." (Participant 
5, Head of MetalJunction, first round) 
6. Participative leadership of the  
    business unit managers 
 
     Ö. Empowering business unit  
          staff  
Ö1: "We wanted to empower people for speedier decision-making...Our 
organisation needed to grow...obviously the aspiration is to move fast for 
high performing individuals and move at an accelerated rate." (Participant 
35, MJunction Human Resources Specialist, second round) 
Ö2: "As the business plan reached its maturity, I delegated most of my 
authority to my colleagues in the business unit, as it was the best way of 
getting things faster." (Participant 4, Head of CoalJunction, second round) 
     P. Participative decision    
         making within business  
         units 
P1: "Earlier the MD was the supreme decision maker, but after the initial 
phases, all departments such as marketing and finance were involved in 
each step. Every department were involved in major decisions in 
AutoJunction." (Participant 12, Head of AutoJunction, first round) 
P2: "Participative decisions are crucial. If my followers take part in the 
decision making, then they will come up with brighter ideas and they will 
think out of the box. Otherwise they will say ‘okay, they are doing this, let’s 
continue with this without any problem" (Participant 4, Head of 
CoalJunction, second round) 
7.  Transformational leadership of    
     the MD 
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     Q. MD creates vision for  
          business unit managers 
Q1: "My boss [the MD], he actually made it very clear that there would be 
no confusion. He tried to minimise the uncertainty. I had a discussion I 
with him I still remember very well. I was telling him this is a new 
[business] unit, I don’t even know how would it, whether it would prosper, 
be successful or not. So he was the one who told me that we will succeed. 
He always showed me direction, the proper direction and vision to 
succeed." (Participant 7, Head of BuyJunction, first round) 
Q2: "My role is in terms of visualising. I create the vision for the BU 
leaders about what should my business look like, what should 
CoalJunction, BuyJunction for instance should look like...I look each of 
the BU very deeply. (Participant 1, the MD of MJunction, first round) 
     R. The charisma of the MD  R1: "It was the MD's charisma, his inspiration that glued the team together 
while we were struggling with the initial concept plan." (Participant 10, 
Head of MJunctionEdge, first round) 
R2: "You know our formal leader is our business unit head, yet the aura of 
the MD surrounds the every aspect of the processes." (Participant 25, 
CoalJunction staff, second round) 
8.  MD as the enabler of business  
     model development 
 
     S.  MD as the significant actor     
         of business unit strategy    
         design 
S1: "A lot of guidance, a lot of discussions with the MD took place during 
the earliest stage of the business model development for AutoJunction, as 
this business was new for the company. AutoJunction didn't have this 
knowledge, so that is why more involvement was required at the senior 
level." (Participant 12, Head of AutoJunction, first round) 
S2: "...since this market is a very unorganised market, asset selling market, 
there are very few organised sellers of asset. So first decision the MD took 
was to have a pilot team. That pilot team was four, five people which I 
talked about; so two data entry operators and three from the pre-auction; 
those the pilot team." (Participant 11, Head of Straightline, first round) 
     T.  MD as the participative  
          leader 
T1: "The MD kindly counsel with us [heads of BUs] during the revision of 
MJunction mission statement" (Participant 7, Head of BuyJunction, first 
round) 
T2: "I really appreciate the fact that the top management counts our 
opinions in company-level decisions. A good example was my 
involvement in the strategic plan of MJunction for the next 5 years." 
(Participant 11, Head of Straightline, first round) 
     U.  MD as the allocator of  
           tangible (e.g. assets) and    
           intangible resources (e.g.  
           information) 
U1: "To be frank, it was the MD who provided valuable information on 
how things could be working. So I got my initial, you know, all 
information input from the MD that I required for the preparation of these 
concepts, making presentations or whatever was required at that time." 
(Participant 11, Head of Straightline, first round)  
U2: "I’m grateful that top management has always believed in us and so 
we get a lot of help from the MD. The processes are formalised but we are 
given all the funding and the IT infrastructure what we want. That’s how 
things work out better." (Participant 14, MetalJunction staff, first round) 
     V.  MD as the mentor of  
           business model  
           development 
V1: "In these later years, my role is more in terms of guiding them [BU 
Heads]... I would interfere a little bit more in our more recent ventures, for 
example Straightline and AutoJunction. I play a more direct role for them. 
But if you look at the other business units, it’s more supporting and telling 
the guys [BU Heads] I’m here if you need my help rather than the other 
way round which says you need to tell me what you’re doing." (Participant 
1, the MD of MJunction, second round) 
V2: "The MD has much more guidance kind of a role... Now we are 
having sort of guiding meetings with the MD. We tell him during these 
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meetings 'this is what we need to do' and ask his advice on these matters." 
(Participant 7, Head of BuyJunction, second round)"  
Overarching Theme: 
Strong interpersonal relationships 
at work 
 
9. Highly sociable work   
   environment 
 
     W. Close friendships  
           between staff 
W1: "The relationship between the... you know- from MD to the junior 
level, junior-most level- there is a love for each other, there is a respect for 
each other, people like each other in MJunction." (Participant 6, MJunction 
IT department staff, first round) 
W2: “So we [peers] meet up even after office hours and we chat. We are 
very good friends... There are a lot of personal relationships between 
employees in MJunction. Many of the people in the company have worked 
for 7-8 years together. People do a lot of activities after work. We, for 
instance, even have our own tennis club in MetalJunction " (Participant 23, 
MetalJunction staff, second round)  
     X. Staff sharing common values X1: "There is a certain degree of integrity in MJunction that you will find 
which basically supersedes almost everything else. That organisational 
culture of being with likeminded people is what so far has been positive." 
(Participant 22, AutoJunction staff, second round) 
X2: "As they have worked together for long time, many people in MJunction 
know each other quite well. After you know who you can trust, you begin 
developing collective norms and values in your department. (Participant 24, 
Head of MJunction Human Resources, second round) 
10. Open communication at work  
     Y. Organisational practices and    
          policies promoting  
          interpersonal communication  
 
Y1: "We are encouraged to mix with each other in MJunction. We have our 
formal parties, we have our formal joint lunches, we have our joint 
meetings; so people get to know each other very well within a very short 
period of time. So if somebody is joining here today, within, say, a month’s 
time he will know almost everybody." (Participant 6, MJunction IT 
department staff, first round) 
Y2: "As a formal policy, all of the Vice presidents of BUs as well as many 
seniors and subordinates are required to hold meetings. In these joint 
discussions, these people in different units and positions get to know each 
other and establish rapport (Participant 4, Head of CoalJunction, second 
round) 
     Z. Non-hierarchical work  
         environment 
Z1: "Overall, in MJunction, hierarchy is not...I am not able to find the right 
word for it... hierarchy is almost, if I may say, non-existent. So there are 
organisations in India where if one needs to meet the MD, take up an 
appointment two days in advance, be there on time, maybe wear at least a 
shirt with a tie and all. That culture is not there in this firm. And my personal 
feeling is that this is what helped us to achieve whatever we have been able 
to". (Participant 6, MJunction IT department staff, first round) 
Z2: "The top driven element is that today if somebody has an idea, they can 
sit down with the business unit head or they could sit down with somebody 
from another business unit and they could easily go and say: 'Hey, listen, I 
have this idea, can you do something with it?' You could call for a meeting 
with the MD, you could actually walk in meet the senior staff in the corner 
office and tell him, 'Hey, boss, I would like to try this.'" (Participant 22, 
AutoJunction staff, second round) 
Table 3.2: Data Supporting Interpretations of First Order Concepts/Second Order Themes 
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Secondly, after determining first-order concepts, and second-order and aggregate 
themes, we did cross-case analysis and identified cross-case patterns reflecting a broader level 
of meaning (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). We used tables to compare 
patterns of relations and to identify similarities and differences among cases (BUs) (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). From the emerging themes, we formed tentative associations between 
constructs, and refined these initial associations via ‘replication logic’ (Eisenhardt, 1989), 
frequently recoding data in each case to compare and verify the occurrence of patterns.  
3.4 Findings 
Performance of the business units 
Before we discuss our findings, we will first explain how we evaluated BU performance. 
Like Martin and Eisenhardt (2010), we used 'qualitative assessments' of participants from 
different phases of our interviews to capture potential differences and changes in how staff 
members understood the goals of business models over time. In the first major interviewing 
round (in 2010), virtually all staff members understood performance in terms of short-term 
financial goals: revenues and profits. High performance was indicated by comments as: 
"[CoalJunction] is very good in terms of business processes and we deliver it through 
technology...We are contributing, I think, around 35 to 36% of the revenue of the company." 
(Head of CoalJunction) and "Today, MetalJunction is one of the two businesses which are 
contributing maximally to the company’s revenues, and BuyJunction is the third" (Head of 
BuyJunction). In contrast, low performance was indicated by comments implying that it took 
longer than expected to reach anticipated growth, revenues or become profitable: "We're trying 
to understand what is the requirement for this kind of business...We are not a mature player 
right now" (Head of AutoJunction). Also, MetalJunction, CoalJunction and BuyJunction were 
labelled as “A-businesses,” others were not. “A-businesses” were associated with high revenues 
and profits. In sum, there was complete agreement among interviewees, across all levels, 
functions, and BUs, about how performance was evaluated (in terms of revenues and profits), 
which BUs performed well (MetalJunction, Coal Junction, BuyJunction), and which ‘took 
longer’ to grow and reach this stage, i.e., the other BUs (see Table 3.2).   
However, over time, it became clear to staff members that the newer, “lower-
performing” BUs (mostly, but not exclusively in B2C) were really in very different businesses 
than the original B2B BUs and required different business models, in multiple important, 
interrelated dimensions: in terms of value propositions (e.g., selling electronics or books to 
individual consumers), revenue models (pay before delivery), technology (for selling on-line), 
organizational processes (for selling and delivery), marketing and sales (to many “anonymous” 
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individual consumers). In our second interviewing round (in 2012), at the emerging strategic 
level of the growing firm they were therefore increasingly evaluated (e.g., by the MD) in 
strategic terms, as investments in very different types of business models, with performance 
evaluated in terms of strategic goals and operational measures towards these goals, such as the 
“number of visits to websites” or “are they getting the necessary processes in place for when 
the market takes off?” Consistent with this more strategic evaluation, during our last interview, 
early 2014, BUs had been classified in terms of McKinsey’s “Horizon approach,” labelled as 
"Horizon 1," (Metal Junction and Coal Junction) indicating mature businesses making the most 
revenues and profits; "Horizon 2" (BuyJunction, MJunctionEdge) having substantial revenues, 
profits and perceived as major opportunities for growth and profits. In contrast, BUs classified 
as "Horizon 3" were seen as in early stages of development and yet to generate substantial 
revenues and profits (Straightline and AutoJunction). 
Entrepreneurial-stage: Learning processes 
Higher-performing BUs: Internal and external learning. Initially, a well-known 
Western consulting firm was invited to draw up a business plan for MJunction (for informant 
quotes, see Table 3.2). The resulting business plan for e-auction platforms reflected Western 
business models (e.g., eBay), with revenues from advertising, projected to be profitable after 
four years. However, at the planned start, in 2001, the dot.com crash happened and one of the 
three start-up partners pulled out, limiting investment funds, and MJunction decided it needed 
to be profitable much earlier, generating value for clients and revenues from the beginning. 
The initial team of MJunction (and its later leadership) started by gathering information 
from outside. The current MD and VP travelled to the US and Belgium to visit e-selling 
platforms (e.g., eBay, e-selling and e-sourcing firms in Belgium) to learn about their business 
models, such as internal processes, and causes of success and failure. They learned, for instance, 
from Belgian failures to combine e-selling (as in MetalJunction and CoalJunction later) and e-
sourcing (BuyJunction) into one company. Combining these different pieces of externally-
sourced knowledge led to the business model for MetalJunction, the first BU. MJunction also 
rented an IT-platform and hired local IT experts to adjust the platform rather than develop it in-
house, saving time and costs. As the MD noted, 
“Initially, we did not invest anything on IT. Instead, we hired a platform from a Chennai-
based company in India. It’s closed down now. During the first 7 months, we did MetalJunction 
auctions on that platform. After which we got our own technology. Rented platform gave us an 
edge as for 7 months my only expenditure was the monthly rental, which wasn't very high.” 
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Moreover, before starting to sell services in the Indian market, as many respondents 
mentioned, MJunction first explored in-depth what they called ‘customer pain:’ short but 
intensive interactions with clients to identify their problems and understand what generated 
value for them. MJunction staff also sought to learn from solutions already in the markets they 
were trying to replace. For instance, team members studied the steel market and the loans that 
had been given in the market earlier, or as the Head of IT described,   
“Gathering knowledge and information were important initially, because you have to 
understand the market. Maybe there’s something already available in the market. What are they 
offering, are you going to replace those things?” 
A process of 'trial-and-error' followed, with solutions for client problems developed 
within days or weeks rather than months, iterating quickly to more customer value. As a result, 
profitability was reached quickly, or ‘profitability from day one,’ as staff members often put it, 
for MetalJunction, the first BU. Over time, this BU expanded its offering with more features 
and services (e.g., in financing), developing more value for customers and becoming highly 
profitable. It also initiated other, high-performing BUs.  
Hence, consistent with bricolage theory (Levi-Strauss, 1962; Baker & Nelson, 2005) 
the business model was ‘cobbled together’ from a range of different knowledge components, 
experiences and objects – experience with business models in broadly the same industry abroad, 
a consulting report, IT platforms and knowledge from IT experts in India – and improved 
through trial-and-error, based on knowledge of customer pain and solutions already in the 
market. However, interestingly, there were two important differences. First, rather than strictly 
working with an existing repository of knowledge (a ‘closed universe of objects and 
knowledge,’ a key characteristic of bricolage; Levi-Strauss, 1962), MJunction first gathered 
external information about new business models. Second, to fine-tune the model, it again 
engaged in external knowledge acquisition, about customer pain and solutions already in the 
market. The combined process led to ‘profitability from day one.’  
New businesses in B2B emerged from existing BUs: MetalJunction led to CoalJunction 
and BuyJunction. Staff members would identify a new client need and quickly – within days or 
weeks, at low cost – cobble a solution together, again searching for best practices already in the 
market and ‘customer pain.’ In fact, over half of the interviewees, including the MD, mentioned 
that feedback from customers was a key initiator of new business development. This helped to 
develop solutions quickly at low costs when moving the auction platform from MetalJunction 
to CoalJunction, and to some extent to BuyJunction, a new platform for e-sourcing supplies for 
client firms. The process for developing these new BUs was as follows. After staff members of 
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an existing BU (e.g. MetalJunction) identified a new business opportunity, they might get 
dedicated time to design a business plan for a new BU (implying knowledge transfer through 
staff members to the new BU). Emerging business plans would be discussed with functional 
departments (HR, IT, Finance) sharing their learning from earlier BUs, especially in the 
beginning when functional departments were small and the same people worked with all BUs. 
After a business plan was developed, in discussion with the MD (who worked closely with all 
BUs, another source of shared knowledge), it would formally be reviewed, discussed, and 
decided on by a group at the end of the concept stage, with the heads of the BUs, functional 
heads, and the MD; another mechanism for transferring learning. After a positive decision, the 
business plan would be developed to a new BU and launched, all within a short space of time.  
Knowledge was also transferred across BUs by transferring staff at later stages (see 
Table 3.2 for quotes). For instance, an employee who started at BuyJunction then moved to 
MetalJunction as Head of Operations. Such knowledge transfers appeared to contribute to the 
performance of new BUs, as the HR director of MJunction noted, 
“The B2B business units have a commonality, because at the end of the day, one thing 
we have been masters at is transforming the supply chain using the electronic form of 
commerce. So, that’s the reason why MetalJunction grew so quickly when started in 2002. 
Although CoalJunction only started in 2005, it has benefited a lot from the mobilization of staff 
from MetalJunction...There's plenty of learning among units which have been in MJunction for 
long.” 
In sum, consistent with bricolage theory, new BUs emerged as part of an overall 
trajectory where different groups were part of – and contributed to – micro-processes of co-
learning (Garud & Karnoe, 2003). People from functional departments (HR, IT, Finance), 
existing BUs, and the MD shared knowledge together with people of new BUs as part of a joint 
learning trajectory (see quotes in Table 3.2). In fact, we identified various knowledge-transfer 
mechanisms, such as staff transfer, and group decision-making around BU milestones. 
However, MJunction did not only use a closed universe of knowledge when setting up new 
BUs; it again sourced external knowledge (about customer pain and solutions already in the 
market), contributed relatively quickly to revenues and profits.  
Low-performing BUs: Internal learning only. These BUs also started with identifying a 
business opportunity from within an existing BU; staff members would get dedicated time to 
design a business plan; plans would be discussed with functional units, and business models 
would be improved through trial and error. In some cases, in an attempt to make the BU 
profitable and to build on MJunction’s best practices, B2C BUs would incorporate B2B 
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elements. For instance, Straightline started working with companies to develop loyalty 
programs for their employees (spending ‘company points’ on buying electronics through 
Straigthline’s portal), tapping into MJunction’s knowledge about B2B.  
However, over time, staff members began to realize that knowledge could not 
productively be transferred from B2B BUs to the new BUs given the very different business 
models needed for success (not auctioning but on-line selling; advertising rather than personal 
contact; delivery to many individual consumers rather than a limited number of clients), nor 
between the very different individual B2C BUs. As the MD stated, "The difference in a B2B is 
very simple, I can go down and meet these guys because there are a finite number of guys." 
Another senior manager: "it was difficult to get information and other sources [from the CEO] 
and other businesses. The nature of the business [in Straightline] is very different [than B2B 
business units]."  Or, a senior manager in MJEdge, which hosts conferences for the steel and 
coal industries:  
“MJunctionEdge, a small business, a growing business, can really not draw anything 
from the other MJunction business units since their business is different…Other businesses will 
benefit from the conferences that MJunctionEdge conducts, because people from procurement, 
coal, and steel will attend and they will be networking. However MJunctionEdge cannot draw 
from them [although MJunctionEdge benefited from competencies and contacts in B2B].” 
These BUs did not perform well. During our last interviews, Straightline and 
AutoJunction were in Horizon 3, the category for businesses in the concept and development 
stage, generating some revenues but not profitable, although MJunctionEdge, the B2B 
conference business, had moved to Horizon 2, generating substantial revenues and increasing 
profits. 
In sum, consistent with bricolage theory, MJunction combined elements of its existing 
stock of experiences, insights, and objects (IT-platforms) and developed new business models 
through trial and error (Baker & Nelson, 2005). Low-performing BUs tried to continue the joint 
trajectory of co-creation and learning of existing BUs, functional departments, the MD, and 
new BUs (Garud & Karnoe, 2003), however – even though, as MJunction started to realize over 
time, very different business models were needed – external knowledge acquisition was not 
utilized. For instance about comparable business models; by visiting firms in the industry it was 
targeting, or engaging a consultant, as it had done when starting MetalJunction. Nor did it 
source knowledge externally when fine-tuning these business models to the Indian market (i.e., 
little or no market research about ‘customer pain’ or solutions already in the market). This led 
to surprises. As the BU head of Straightline said; they had not realized that people were not 
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ready to buy customer products online. Also, as the business models required for the new BUs 
were very different from each other (for AutoJunction for selling used cars to individual clients; 
MJunctionEdge for organising conferences for corporate clients, etc.) not much knowledge 
transfer between units was possible either. By the end of our window, 6-8 years after the start, 
these BUs still did not generate much revenues and profits by MJunction’s standards, and most 
were considered to still be in early phases of development. 
Exploitation and exploration. Our deeper analysis suggested that high- and low-
performing BUs differed significantly in terms of the type and amount of learning. More 
specifically, it strongly suggested conceptualising these differences in terms of exploration and 
exploitation (March, 1991; Raisch et al., 2009), where exploration means acquiring and 
deploying knowledge that is relatively remote from a company’s existing knowledge base (in 
terms of several interrelated dimensions; Levinthal, 1997), and exploitation means generating 
and deploying knowledge in the neighbourhood of its knowledge (March, 1991; Gavetti & 
Levinthal, 2000; Levinthal, 1997). These concepts were very salient in the successful business 
model trajectory. First, a relatively short period of exploration (as for the first BU, 
MetalJunction) focusing on quick, external learning (hiring an external consultant, learning 
from companies in the West, using external IT platforms and experts). Followed by a long 
period of exploitation (within MetalJunction, and across BUs: through CoalJunction and 
BuyJunction), using external knowledge to adjust the business model: when starting a new BU 
(by identifying customer pain and solutions already in the market), and across BUs (where we 
identified several mechanisms for internal knowledge transfer). With bricolage at the heart of 
the process: cobbling experiences, knowledge, and objects (in part externally acquired) together 
to design the initial business model and fine-tune it through trial and error. In contrast, not much 
exploration or exploitation was associated with the less successful BUs such as Straightline. 
Nevertheless the successful business model enabled MJunction to be profitable ‘from day 1’ 
and to make it overall, through successive BUs, very profitable. Table 3.3 summarises our 
findings about exploration and exploitation processes during this Entrepreneurial Phase.  
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Business 
Unit 
Commerce 
Transaction 
Perfor-
mance 
Exploration 
processes 
Exploitation 
Processes 
Representative Informant 
Quotes 
Metal-
Junction 
B2B High 
(Horizon 
category1) 
-Source of 
learning: 
external 
-Mechanisms of 
learning: hiring 
external 
consultants, 
vicarious 
learning through 
observing 
successes and 
failures of 
companies in 
the West 
-Duration of 
learning: short 
-Source of 
learning: 
external 
-Amount of 
within BU-
exploitation: 
high 
-Mechanisms 
for within-BU 
exploitation: 
market research, 
identification of 
the customer 
pain, trial and 
error 
-Amount of 
cross-BU 
exploitation: 
high 
-Mechanism for 
cross-BU 
exploitation: 
staff transfers, 
adapting 
existing model 
into new BUs, 
functional 
departments 
"When we were visiting X 
[company name withheld] in 
the US, We understood a lot of 
things about processes in e-
auctions, these were things 
which were earlier kind of 
meaningless to me. And, this 
knowledge really helped me to 
gear up the operations for this 
kind of growth." (exploration, 
observing successes and 
failures of companies in the 
West) 
"We have a great deal of 
discussion with clients to see if 
their point is actually a pain 
one. To do so, MetalJunction 
customer relations staff 
process all the client feedback 
in the form of flow charts and 
we further discuss them with 
the clients." (exploitation, 
identification of the customer 
pain) 
Coal-
Junction 
B2B High 
(Horizon 
category1) 
-No exploration 
process 
-Source of 
learning: 
external 
-Amount of 
within BU-
exploitation: 
high 
-Mechanisms 
for within-BU 
exploitation: 
market research, 
identification of 
the customer 
pain, trial and 
error 
-Amount of 
cross-BU 
exploitation: 
high 
-Mechanism for 
cross-BU 
exploitation: 
staff transfers, 
adapting 
existing model 
into new BUs, 
“We try to understand what 
their [client] requirement was 
then we also tried to 
understand what the buyers’ 
requirements were. (…) The 
clients particularly wanted 
transparency and a good, 
effective, simple way of 
distribution of the coal.  They 
were also looking at a fair 
market price (…) On the other 
hand, the buyers wanted, some 
of the examples are, they 
wanted a very easy process, a 
very simple screen. Then 
small consumers, small 
consumers said, we cannot bid 
for, big materials like 500 
tons, 1000 tons, we don’t have 
so much money, we need 
small lots. We then articulated 
our system accordingly.” 
(exploitation, identification of 
the customer pain) 
"So first X [name of the 
employee] was with 
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functional 
departments 
MetalJunction. Then he was 
moved to CoalJunction. Head 
of CoalJunction was one of 
my best resources in Metal 
Junction, Y [name of the head] 
was heading CoalJunction 
now, so this is the way you 
provide support. And I got 
new people in place of them in 
MetalJunction." (exploitation, 
staff transfers) 
Buy-
Junction 
B2B Moderate 
(Horizon 
category2) 
-No exploration 
process 
-Source of 
learning: 
external 
-Amount of 
within BU-
exploitation: 
high 
-Mechanisms 
for within-BU 
exploitation: 
market research, 
identification of 
the customer 
pain, trial and 
error 
-Amount of 
cross-BU 
exploitation: 
high 
-Mechanism for 
cross-BU 
exploitation: 
staff transfers, 
adapting 
existing model 
into new BUs, 
functional 
departments 
"What I understand and firmly 
believe in is the fact that a 
customer’s complaint or 
feedback is the only means of 
pointing out the blank spots of 
the company in the early 
stages. You need to know how 
to read them, you need to 
respect them, and you need to 
be sincerely after them to 
eliminate them.  But, almost 
all of the things which we 
have done have come up from 
these feedbacks." 
(exploitation, market research 
and identification of the 
customer pain) 
"BuyJunction emerged almost 
out of the existing platform. 
What I’ve seen a number of 
times is that; like 
MetalJunction starts and then 
an activity within 
MetalJunction becomes almost 
self-sustainable and then new 
business is developed out of 
that. It is the same thing 
happening now with 
BuyJunction that there are 
activities within Buy Junction 
which start as a support 
function but then people see 
an opportunity and it almost 
develops like a new business 
unit." (exploitation, adapting 
existing model) 
"I have been heading the 
operations of this unit 
[MetalJunction] since around 
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2007, and earlier to that, 
before 2003, I was the second 
in command in the 
BuyJunction unit. When I 
joined this company I was 
looking after the reverse 
auctions which was in the 
BuyJunction area." 
(exploitation, staff transfers) 
Straight-
line 
B2C, later 
B2B 
Low 
(Horizon 
category3) 
-No exploration 
process  
-Source of 
learning: 
internal during 
B2C, external 
during B2B  
-Amount of 
within BU-
exploitation: 
little 
-Mechanisms 
for within-BU 
exploitation: 
trial and error 
-Amount of 
cross-BU 
exploitation: 
little 
-Mechanism for 
cross-BU 
exploitation: 
absent 
"It is important that we take a 
little bit more time in 
developing a new business; do 
market research exhaustively, 
and then go ahead, because 
that is exactly what we did not 
do for straightline..." (lack of 
identification of the customer 
pain) 
“Straightline, B2C portal, they 
cannot draw from the 
expertise that we have in B2B 
and procurement, and category 
expertise from any other 
department; they will have to 
develop the expertise 
themselves for an absolutely 
new type of business, which is 
B2C. (…) Nobody else in the 
organization can help them in 
that, so small businesses 
cannot really draw much from 
the new businesses given the 
very nature of their business.” 
(absence of cross-BU 
exploitation) 
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Auto-
Junction 
B2B, later 
B2C 
Low 
(Horizon 
category3) 
-No exploration 
process  
-Source of 
learning: 
internal during 
B2B, external 
during B2C 
-Amount of 
within BU-
exploitation: 
little 
-Mechanisms 
for within-BU 
exploitation: 
trial and error 
-Amount of 
cross-BU 
exploitation: 
little 
-Mechanism for 
cross-BU 
exploitation: 
absent 
"We are not aware of, what is 
in the online marketing. We 
are trying to understand that 
what is the requirement for 
this kind of business...So daily 
there is a learning, this is the 
learning phase for us. " (lack 
of identification of the 
customer pain) 
"In AutoJunction we had to 
recruit somebody from 
outside, from the industry, 
because we were absolutely 
clueless about the auto 
industry." (absence of cross-
BU exploitation) 
MJunction-
Edge 
 Moderate 
(Horizon 
category2) 
-No exploration 
process  
-Source of 
learning: 
internal 
-Amount of 
within BU-
exploitation: 
little 
-Mechanisms 
for within BU-
exploitation: 
trial and error 
-Amount of 
cross-BU 
exploitation: 
little 
-Mechanism for 
cross-BU 
exploitation: 
absent 
"I think market research could 
have been done more 
comprehensively. Of course it 
was done to an extent, but it 
could have been done more 
comprehensively and with a 
little more time" (lack of 
market research) 
Table 3.3: Entrepreneurial Phase Exploration and Exploitation Processes in MJunction Business Units 
Friendly atmosphere at work: High and Low-performing BUs. Respondents often 
mentioned ‘maintaining strong interpersonal relationships at work’ as a key characteristic of 
MJunction. This theme emerged from our deeper analysis as well, suggesting that strong 
interpersonal relationships were maintained between people at similar levels, and between 
hierarchical levels (see Figure 3.1, and Table 3.2 for sample informant quotes). This was 
consistent with bricolage theory (Baker & Nelson, 2005), and the opposite of ‘ownership and 
control’ of information, seen as detrimental for knowledge sharing and co-learning of groups 
engaged in bricolage (Garud & Karnoe, 2003). The interrelationships were promoted by various 
mechanisms (for quotes, see Table 3.2). Having colleagues in one building, using one open 
space, a jointly developed mission statement, and having one common restaurant, promoted 
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that even new recruits quickly felt accepted as part of the MJunction family, socialised as 
“Junctionites.” Extensive voluntary CSR activities involving more than half of the staff to train 
support staff and their families in IT skills to increase their chances on the labour market, 
seemed to contribute to the process as well. Our findings indicated that close friendships 
enhanced sharing common values at work, promoting a cohesive organisational culture, 
integrity among staff, and the development of collective norms.  
We also observed that strong interpersonal relationships were sustained by 
'organisational policies and practices that promote open communication at work'. Formal parties 
and joint meetings improved communication and enabled people to get to know each other fast, 
even if they worked at different BUs. Another mechanism promoting open communication was, 
definitely for Indian standards and as broadly understood by staff, the non-hierarchical work 
environment. As respondents indicated, it was easy for subordinates to meet with higher ups 
including the MD, to discuss new ideas. All these related features, which we broadly capture 
under the aggregate theme ‘strong interpersonal relationships at work’, were strongly supported 
by the organization, including its leadership (e.g., the MD). 
Entrepreneurial-stage: Leadership  
The findings showed that firm and BU-level leadership were important for high BU 
performance as well. Table 3.4 depicts our findings about leadership practices in MJunction. 
 
Business Unit Most apparent 
entrepreneuri
al phase 
leadership 
(Firm-level) 
Most apparent 
entrepreneurial 
phase 
leadership (BU-
level) 
Most 
apparent 
mature 
stage 
leadership 
(Firm 
level) 
Most 
apparent 
mature phase 
leadership 
(BU-level) 
Representativ
e Informant 
Quotes 
MetalJunction  Very strong 
involvement 
and influence 
by the MD in 
BU 
operations. 
Centralised 
decision-
making. The 
MD is very 
influential in 
strategy 
design 
Transformationa
l leadership 
(emphasis on 
creating vision) 
Less 
involvemen
t and 
influence of 
the MD in 
BU 
operations. 
The MD 
acts as an 
'mentor' 
Operation-
oriented 
leadership in 
development 
stage, 
empowermen
t in launch 
stage 
"It works like this that 
almost everything goes to 
the MD for approval, and 
people at all levels are 
always trying to second-
guess what is the MD’s 
thought process, because 
nobody would like to 
appear as, trying for 
something which the MD 
doesn’t want in any case. 
So, I mean so nobody 
feels like, nobody wants 
to be thought of which the 
MD doesn’t want to do." 
(leadership, concept 
stage, firm-level) 
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"The next stage [launch] 
is more about, how do I 
manage things?  How do I 
manage them better?...it’s 
more of a, very 
operational, in a sense 
that leadership, that 
quality, all those things 
are at a next higher level." 
(leadership- launch stage, 
BU-level) 
BuyJunction MD provides 
support and 
guidance to 
BU leaders, 
when needed 
Transformationa
l leadership 
(emphasis on 
creating vision 
and managing 
organisational 
change) 
Less 
involvemen
t and 
influence of 
the MD in 
BU 
operations. 
The MD 
acts as an 
'mentor' 
Operation-
oriented 
leadership in 
development 
stage, 
empowermen
t in launch 
stage 
"I was educating them 
[team members] about 
this, leading them, 
assisting in the change 
process. (...) I felt the best 
way to go about 
implementing a change, 
bringing up new things is 
not to be pushy about it. 
Be a partner with them, 
take them through and I 
always believe every man 
is rational so as long as 
you’re able to show him 
the logic, this is how we 
need to do it, this is why 
we need to do it and this 
is the possible benefits of 
any particular change that 
we do, but if it makes 
sense to me, it will make 
sense to another logical 
person." (leadership-
concept stage, BU level) 
"I see myself moving 
away from being a coach, 
to more of an ambassador 
role - an ambassador role, 
being the ambassador and 
answering within the 
Indian context - I’m 
looking at India as the 
context … so I’ll be an 
ambassador as far as the 
entire company is 
concerned, reaching out 
to people, top leaders, 
consultants, networking 
and then giving an 
opportunity for my 
horizon heads and interact 
with them - moving from 
a coach to ambassador - 
but that is the second 
change that I see 
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happening within the 
country." (leadership, 
mature phase, firm-level) 
"Now we are trying 
to…give much more or 
bestow much more 
responsibility, ownership 
to our colleagues which 
earlier, were not there. So 
the colleagues internal 
accountable. They also 
know that this is their 
own thing and they have 
to do it. They have to 
perform. And unless you 
know that you’re growth 
gets impacted." 
(leadership- launch stage, 
BU-level) 
CoalJunction  MD provides 
support, 
guidance and 
mentoring to 
BU leaders, 
when needed 
Transformationa
l leadership 
(emphasis on 
creating vision 
and managing 
organisational 
change) 
Less 
involvemen
t and 
influence of 
the MD in 
BU 
operations. 
The MD 
acts as an 
'mentor' 
Operation-
oriented 
leadership in 
development 
stage, 
empowermen
t in launch 
stage 
"We are given 
tremendous 
independence, a lot of 
encouragement by the top 
management, especially 
by the MD to ensure that 
we do get into innovative 
ways of working." 
(leadership- launch stage, 
Firm-level) 
 
"Regarding leadership 
after the initial setup, 
important aspect is 
operations management. 
Within operations you 
have so many things, 
market making, pre-
auction activities with the 
customer relation 
activities, then conducting 
the auction, then post 
auction activities, so 
many activities are there." 
(leadership- development 
stage, BU-level) 
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AutoJunction  Strong 
involvement 
and influence 
by the MD in 
BU 
operations. 
Centralised 
decision-
making. The 
MD is very 
influential in 
strategy 
design 
Operation-
oriented 
leadership 
Strong 
involvemen
t and 
influence of 
the MD in 
BU 
operations. 
Centralised 
decision-
making. 
The MD is 
very 
influential 
in strategy 
design 
Operation-
oriented 
leadership in 
development 
stage, 
empowermen
t in launch 
stage 
"During the early stages, I 
wasn't reporting to any 
VP, instead, I was 
directly reporting to the 
MD. All of my 
recruitment for my BU 
was done by the MD. The 
MD for instance took all 
the job interviews." 
(leadership- 
entrepreneurial phase, 
firm-level) 
"Instead of 
revolutionizing the 
business, our unit head 
deeply focused on the 
systems and procedures, 
how we accomplish 
reporting etc." 
(leadership- concept 
stage, BU-level) 
"Because the 
communication in the 
development stage was to 
finish in a fixed time 
frame and motivate your 
team to finish off that job 
in a fixed time frame. 
There you are not 
strategising anything with 
regards to leadership as 
far as the business goes, 
you are not strategising 
anything." (leadership-
development stage, BU-
level) 
"Given that we are still 
figuring out or core 
competencies, our MD 
has still been providing us 
with his guidance and 
builds our strategy, as he 
was doing several years 
ago." (leadership- mature 
phase, firm-level) 
67 
 
Straightline & 
MJunction-
Edge 
Strong 
involvement 
and influence 
by the MD in 
BU 
operations. 
Centralised 
decision-
making. The 
MD is very 
influential in 
strategy 
design 
Operation-
oriented 
leadership 
Strong 
involvemen
t and 
influence of 
the MD in 
BU 
operations. 
Centralised 
decision-
making. 
The MD is 
very 
influential 
in strategy 
design 
Operation-
oriented 
leadership in 
development 
stage, 
empowermen
t in launch 
stage 
"When we start up, the 
message [of the head of 
the BU unit] is really 
about building our 
systems. You can think of 
revenues and the clients 
later, building your 
systems is the vital part in 
the concept stage." 
(leadership- concept 
stage, BU-level) 
"My involvement with 
these groups [Horizon 3, 
which is Straightline and 
AutoJunction as specified 
earlier] are more than 
with Horizon 1 and 
Horizon 2 businesses. So 
while Horizon 1 and 
Horizon 2 approach me 
when they require my 
help, as far as Horizon 3 
is concerned, I am 
playing a more active 
role, to find out what’s 
happening in the external 
markets, finding out are 
we looking at this new 
technology which has 
come out, are we looking 
at these new partnerships 
that we can actually get 
into, reaching out (...) I’m 
playing a more active role 
in terms of how they are 
able to evolve 
[Straightline and 
AutoJunction] and come 
out with what we call the 
‘decisive, competitive 
edge’." (leadership, 
mature phase, firm-level) 
Table 3.4: Firm and BU Level Leadership in MJunction Business Units 
BU-level leadership: High-performing BUs. Interviewees often mentioned leadership 
as important for BU success. They typically understood the formation of new BUs as having a 
concept stage, a development stage, and a launch stage (with some also identifying a scale up 
stage), each with different types of BU leadership. We found that a transformational leadership 
style, particularly the visionary features, was important in the concept stage of successful BUs. 
MJunction’s HR manager said that during the early stages of successful BUs, such as 
BuyJunction and CoalJunction, BU leaders acted proactively to overcome difficulties and 
provided a clear vision to their employees: 
“At the first stage the vision is very important [in leadership], as this stage seems to be 
quite general, with a lot of uncertainty...Since business models, resources, platforms, cannot be 
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built in time and again; so when you think of stage zero to stage one, when you have sort of 
moved ahead with the plan and you have conceptualized and it has got approved; when you 
look at it, when you look at every input you need to make it grow, that is where you need to be 
visionary.” 
As interviews revealed, visionary leadership in the concept stage coincided in high-
performing B2B BUs with a process of staff members identifying new business opportunities, 
getting dedicated time to develop a business plan, which after being evaluated and approved, 
would move to the development stage. Having worked together with only a few co-workers in 
the concept stage; leading the team now became a full-time commitment and 'operation-
oriented leadership' became common; giving orders and supervising technical requirements, 
and meeting deadlines. As a respondent from MetalJunction noted, during the development 
stage they aimed at guiding their subordinates to perform their tasks, 
“The next stage [implementation] is more about, how do I manage things?  How do I 
manage them better?  How do I tweak around with the software?  ...it’s more of a, very 
operational, in a sense that leadership, that quality, all those things are at a next higher level.” 
During the subsequent ‘launch’ stage, we observed that empowering employees, and 
participative decision-making enabled faster decision-making, in combination with flatter 
organizational structures. As a BuyJunction staff member noted, 
“Now we are trying to give much more or bestow much more responsibility, ownership 
to our colleagues which earlier were not there. So the colleagues are internally accountable. 
They also know that this is their own thing and they have to do it. They have to perform. And 
unless you know that your growth gets impacted.” 
BU-level leadership: Low-performing BUs. The concept stage of low-performing BUs 
took much longer than in high-performing BUs, as they were still figuring out their business 
models (we interviewed Straightline and Autojunction for the first time more than three years 
after the start). Findings indicated that BU leadership was more of a 'tactical' nature; operation-
oriented towards strategic goals, rather than visionary. As a Straightline employee noted, 
“When we started up, the message [of the leader] was really about building our systems 
and reporting procedures. He insisted that building our systems was the vital part in the concept 
stage and we can think of revenues and the clients later.” 
Although stages in low-performing BUs were ambiguous, we found operation-oriented 
leadership in their "not-so-clear" development stage and empowering employees for faster 
decision-making in their “not-so-clear” launch stage (Table 3.4).  
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In sum, we found clear stages and associated leadership styles for successful BUs: a 
short concept period with transformational leadership of BU leaders, in particular the visionary 
part; a development stage with an operations-oriented leadership style; a more empowering 
leadership style in the launch state. These (clear) stages and leadership styles were not found to 
the same degree – or consistently – for leaders of unsuccessful BUs.    
Firm-level leadership: High and low-performing BUs. Top management provided 
guidance and support by providing transformational leadership and allocating resources to start 
up and when BUs struggled to perform well. In high-performing BUs, after the initial expansion 
of MJunction, the visionary role was relatively short-lived as BUs moved to development and 
launch stages relatively quickly. In contrast, in struggling BUs like Straightline, the MD 
maintained the visionary leadership role, also in the absence of a clear vision at the BU-level 
about what should be done to reach competitive advantage. The MD also provided another 
aspect of transformational leadership to low-performing BUs: intellectually stimulating and 
redirecting the thinking of these BU members. As a respondent from Straightline noted,  
“The MD was very much aware of the situation which we were in because there were 
meetings [with the MD] which were frequently happening. [The MD] was also aware that these 
were the hurdles that we are facing and he also started asking 'what is your plan to grow? How 
do you want to grow?' and that is when we started exploring after number of site review 
meetings and all, we decided that we had to grow.” 
Firm-level leadership also encouraged participative decision-making. We observed 
many examples where the MD invited staff members to participate in decision-making, for 
instance, when formulating a company mission, and when deciding to have a joint open space 
or separate offices. We found that the MD’s participative leadership stimulated friendship, 
facilitated an open atmosphere at work, a free flow of information, and bottom-up 
encouragement of initiatives, in fact, both for high- and low-performing BUs. Apparently, like 
strong interpersonal relationships (Baker & Nelson, 2005), an overall trajectory of bricolage 
(Baker & Nelson, 2005; Levi-Strauss, 1962) and co-learning of groups (Garud & Karnoe, 
2003), this type of leadership did not lead to high-performing BUs per se. Only in combination 
with (external) exploration and exploitation (with underlying learning mechanisms), as in high-
performing BUs but opposed to low-performing BUs, was it associated with high performance. 
Major organizational change: Moving from entrepreneurial to mature phase   
During our subsequent interview rounds, MJ had rapidly become a very different 
organization, leaving an entrepreneurial phase focusing on short-term profitability and entering 
a next phase we called the "mature phase." A need for strategy emerged at the firm-level rather 
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than day-to-day improvisations to expand individual businesses. MJunction was reaching its 
limits for growth in India and identified important strategic decisions, such as whether to 
internationalize, in which business, through internal growth or acquisitions. These decisions 
required a broader, firm-level perspective, taking into account what the increase in size and 
formalized processes implied for its innovativeness and open culture that had driven success up 
to this point.  
This more strategic view – away from short-term profitability – also influenced how 
B2C BUs were seen. There was still the view that these BUs had not been successful due to a 
lack of market research. A manager with a financial background in a successful BU said "An 
unfortunate problem is that I think there [in Straightline] was not enough due diligence 
exercised or market study that had been conducted when we thought of going into this business, 
of starting this business." However, reflecting the new way of thinking, the MD saw 
AutoJunction and Straightline as 'strategic investments,' positioning the company for the future, 
“B2C online retailing has not yet happened here [India] but it’s going to happen here as 
well…So Straightline really enables us to position ourselves that whenever this happens, we 
will be there with strong capability to take advantage of this opportunity….So what is critical 
as far as Straightline is concerned is making sure we have good suppliers from whom we can 
get quality products and services.” 
In sum, with B2C BUs such as Straightline and AutoJunction now being understood as 
requiring very different business models, MJunction experimented with adding new elements 
such as logistics and a gifting service for Straigthline and a community around its portal for 
AutoJunction. This type of development, in a less resource-scarce environment, was internally 
oriented in exploring new business models. Interestingly, this step-by-step process was in line 
with the relatively long development process others have found for more munificent settings 
(Europe, US); often of 6-8 years (Sosna, Trevinyo-Rodriguez, & Velamuri, 2010; Biggadyke, 
1979).  In contrast, it was very different from how MJunction originally developed its first 
successful business model (MetalJunction), with a relatively short period of external 
exploration, combined with a relatively long period of external and internal exploitation within 
and across BUs, enabling more revenues and profits for the increasingly profitable firm.   
The growth of MJunction to 200, 300, 400 and more staff members prompted a major, 
qualitative organizational change, from informal procedures and putting people in the right 
place at the BU-level, to formal processes and structures at the firm-level. MJunction had from 
the beginning emphasized quality management, through the MD and others of the initial group 
who came from implementing SAP systems within TATA. It was now time to implement 
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company-wide processes. A formal, company-level strategic planning process was introduced. 
As the MD noted,  
“We’re coming out with a strategic planning process which is also something new. (…)  
Earlier, strategy was designed maybe sitting in my room, but today we have a process which 
runs it.” 
A new firm-level structure, the executive board, emerged, which included the former 
second line in command as well. As part of these organizational changes, the processes of 
exploration and exploitation for initiating and growing new business models changed as well. 
Table 3.5 summarises exploration and exploitation processes with respect to the entrepreneurial 
and matures phases. 
 Firm-
level or 
BU-level 
process? 
Formal or 
Informal? 
Mechanisms of 
knowledge transfer 
Representative Informant Quotes 
Entrepreneurial 
Stage: 
Exploration 
BU-level Informal -Hiring external 
consultants, vicarious 
learning through 
observing successes 
and failures of 
companies in the 
West (in 
MetalJunction only) 
"For MetalJunction, we appointed 
some people from company X 
[company name withheld] as the 
technology partners as well as Y 
[company name withheld], whose tool 
we used for the high-tech 
technological infrastructure...We 
basically created a team on how to go 
about it." (hiring external consultants, 
MetalJunction) 
Entrepreneurial 
Stage: 
Exploitation 
BU-level Informal -Market research, 
identification of  the 
customer pain, staff 
transfers, adapting 
existing model into 
new BUs, functional 
departments (in high 
performing BUs)  
-Trial and error (in 
both high and low-
performing BUs) 
"So first X [name of the employee] 
was with MetalJunction. Then he was 
moved to CoalJunction. Head of 
CoalJunction was one of my best 
resources in Metal Junction, Y [name 
of the head] was heading CoalJunction 
now, so this is the way you provide 
support. And I got new people in place 
of them in MetalJunction." (internal 
staff transfer, high-performing BUs) 
Mature Stage: 
Exploration 
Firm-
level 
Formal -Incubation cell "That’s [the incubator] where new 
ideas get allocated and obviously the 
function is very new- it’s only two or 
three months, but the idea is that the 
business units with established lines of 
business might not have the mental 
banquet available to them to focus on 
new initiatives and build them because 
there is some conflict between running 
the established and running with the 
new." (exploration, mature stage, 
incubation cell) 
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Mature Stage: 
Exploitation 
Firm-
level 
Formal -Knowledge forums, 
skip-level meetings, 
technology transfers 
within the firm, trial 
and error (in both 
high and low-
performing BUs) 
"So when they discuss in the forum, a 
business development manager will 
say what he has done in his own 
department, which client and how he 
has convinced and how he has got the 
business and what is the potential. 
Now that information may be 
important for the other guy who is in a 
different department...So that is how 
people each learn from what is 
happening in that area and then that 
can be used. In fact we have 
implemented a few things which we 
have learned from MetalJunction and 
BuyJunction in the knowledge forums. 
Small things maybe, operational 
things, but this is how they do it so let 
us also do it because we can do it, it is 
replicable in that market. So those are 
the learnings." (exploitation, mature 
stage, knowledge forums) 
Table 3.5: Exploration and Exploitation Processes with Respect to Firm Stages 
Changing patterns of exploration. One company-wide change was introducing an 
incubator for new businesses. As the Head of Strategy and Business Excellence (a new role) 
said, the incubator is where new ideas get allocated, to aid BUs that may not have the scope to 
focus on new initiatives. BU heads now had their own key performance indicators that hindered 
them to focus on new opportunities. The incubator enabled a renewed focus on new 
opportunities and aided the development of new ideas for these opportunities.  
Changing patterns of exploitation. New forms of exploitation emerged as well. Various 
firm-level mechanisms were established, replacing people-based transfers towards new BUs as 
a source of knowledge transfer by formal processes for two-way, horizontal learning between 
BUs, such as knowledge forums. As the Head of CoalJunction noted, a good example is the 
forum on auctions where staff from different BUs share ideas about e-auctions. Each knowledge 
forum had a 'champion' coordinating information flows, and supporting incremental 
improvements in BUs. 
Second, a bottom-up learning mechanism was introduced, suggested by an external 
consultant. As the Head of HRM said, by organising 'skip-level meetings', MJunction tried to 
retain its entrepreneurial strengths by involving every employee in decision-making as it grew 
larger. A third example of (horizontal) firm-level exploitation concerned technology transfer 
within the firm, for instance of the capability to build communities around websites. This 
capability was seen as vital for MJunctionEdge; ten years after its inception physical 
conferences were less in demand. It came to MJunction through an external hire – the new head 
of MJunctionEdge – who had worked for MJunction earlier. This person hired others with 
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capabilities in online community building, for instance, in AutoJunction, where growing 
communities around websites were also important. This knowledge had potential for creating 
value for B2B as well. As the head of IT of MJunction said, ‘since the B2C market is more 
developed in building communities than B2B, there is going to be synergies. Learning is 
actually from B2C to B2B rather than the other way round. In part through IT- that’s involved- 
but also through MJunctionEdge, that is developing this capability around community 
building.’ In other words, the knowledge externally acquired, partly in the previous phase in 
B2C, was now ‘exploited’ at the company-level by leveraging it to B2B BUs.  
Changing patterns of firm-level leadership. During our last interview round, firm 
leadership had evolved as well. As MJunction moved to a mature phase, the visionary 
leadership of the MD (in terms of overseeing the processes and guiding the heads of BUs) 
became less significant for successful BUs (now classified as Horizon 1 and 2). However, as 
the MD noted, his visionary leadership role remained significant for low-performing BUs,  
“My involvement with Horizon 3 [Straightline and AutoJunction as specified earlier] 
are more than with Horizon 1 and 2 businesses. As far as Horizon 3 is concerned, I am playing 
a more active role in terms of how they are able to evolve and come out with what we call the 
‘decisive, competitive edge’.” 
However, that role was coming to an end. While the MD was still guiding Straightline 
and Autojunction in the ‘incubator’ during our final round, soon someone would be hired for 
this role. As the MD noted, he was moving to a more external role, 
“I see myself moving away from being a coach to more of being the ambassador (...) so 
as far as the entire company is concerned, I’ll be reaching out to people, top leaders, consultants, 
networking and then giving an opportunity for my BU heads and interact with them.” 
It seemed that BU heads had developed the skills to lead and mentor their cohorts with 
vision and that the MD was no longer needed to support as in the past. Instead, he was moving 
to external networking with industry leaders, consultants and others to ensure further growth 
for MJunction as a mature company in India and abroad. 
3.4 An Organizational Process Model for Resource Constrained Settings 
We aimed to uncover a theoretical logic for the organizational process of developing 
successful business models in resource-constrained settings. Our findings showed that bricolage 
was at the heart of it, with as key elements external exploration and exploitation. We also 
uncovered organizational determinants of these processes, and how and why they differed 
greatly across the entrepreneurial phase and the mature phase (see Figure 3.2 for the 
organizational process model). We will first discuss the entrepreneurial phase.  
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The entrepreneurial phase  
A successful process for business model development contains both external 
exploration and external exploitation (March, 1991). In the case of MJunction, an initial team 
started with external exploration by visiting successful and failed businesses abroad and 
through a business plan from a consulting firm. The resulting experiences and insights were 
quickly ‘cobbled together’ with experiences, insights (from local IT experts), and objects 
(hiring a local IT-platform) from the Indian market to form an initial business model. The quick 
and creative (Amabile, 1996) cobbling together of different, low-cost elements to form a 
solution (business model) is consistent with the traditional notion of bricolage (Levi-Strauss, 
1962). The difference however is that internal experiences, insights and objects are combined 
with a quick, intensive search for external ones. This process was supported by transformational 
leadership, providing a clear vision, encouraging followers to explore new ways of doing things, 
and inspiring them with the leader's charisma (Bass, 1985; Bass & Riggio, 2006), at the firm- 
and BU-level. Transformational leadership, initiated in MJunction by the MD when developing 
the first BU, reinforced transformational leadership at the BU-level.  
Figure 3.2: An Organizational Process Model for Resource-Constrained Settings 
75 
 
The process continues with external exploitation in the local market by investigating 
customer pain and solutions already in the market. This facilitated a process of trial and error 
and incremental improvement of the value proposition and business model within days or weeks 
rather than months, in close interaction with clients (with whom relations are friendly). 
Improving a (quickly cobbled together) solution through trial-and-error is again consistent with 
bricolage, except for the active search for – and inclusion of – external insights and experiences. 
The type of BU-level leadership facilitating this process is stage-dependent. Transformational 
leadership is essential at the concept stage, to create a clear vision for BU staff members to 
guide the process (Bass & Riggio, 2006). Operation-oriented leadership focusing on practical, 
bureaucratic, and supervisory aspects of the procedures is needed at the development stage, 
when it is key to reach goals and milestones on budget and on time. Participative leadership 
with an emphasis on empowerment is essential (Srivastava, Barthol, & Locke, 2006) at the 
launch stage. This process led to a business model that was ‘profitable from day one.’  
Performance was increased further through continued external exploitation. Additional 
business opportunities were recognized in adjacent markets, leading to new BUs. Market 
research was again carried out (investigating customer pain), and the business model and value 
propositions were again quickly fine-tuned to the new market through trial-and-error. Again 
supported by BU-leadership of the new BUs: transformational at the concept stage, operational 
at the development stage, and participative at the launch stage. In sum, a ‘cascading business 
model,’ improving performance further. 
Performance was further enhanced through ‘internal exploitation:’ ‘making do’ with the 
firm’s existing stock of knowledge (from initial BUs, functional departments, the MD) and 
objects (e.g., MJunction’s IT platform) for a new BU. With various mechanisms, such as 
employees or organizational structures and processes (Fourné, Jansen, & Mom, 2014; Walsh & 
Ungson, 1991) supporting internal knowledge transfer, a core source of gaining competitive 
advantage (Argote & Ingram, 2000). In the case of MJunction, significant knowledge transfers 
across BUs happened through staff transfer and brainstorming around the development and 
milestones of new BUs (with heads of other BUs, functional departments, the MD). The 
information sharing between individuals and units was supported by close interpersonal 
relationships (or multiplex ties). In turn, supported by a range of management practices, for 
instance, in MJunction by having one open space, jointly developing a mission statement, 
extensive joint CSR activities, and the MD’s transformational leadership style. These 
knowledge transfers enabled further economies of scale, scope and learning, contributing to 
revenues and profits.  
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That external exploration and exploitation is necessary for high performance in 
resource-constrained settings, in addition to bricolage, stage-dependent leadership styles, and 
friendship, was suggested by our findings. Low-performing BUs also engaged in bricolage: the 
cobbling together of available experiences, insights, and objects from within MJunction, and 
also engaged in trial-and-error to develop business models and had friendly relationships. These 
same conditions were found earlier for entrepreneurial bricolage by Baker and Nelson (2005) 
to develop novel products and services: ‘make do,’ ‘for new purpose,’ ‘based on resources at 
hand,’ and close interpersonal relationships. However, what was not present in the low-
performing units was the external exploration and exploitation.  In sum, external exploration 
and external exploitation combined with bricolage, supported by close interpersonal 
relationships and leadership (at the firm-level: transformational firm-leadership; at the BU-
level: transformational leadership at the concept stage, operation-oriented leadership at the 
development stage, and participative leadership at the launch stage), facilitate the development 
of high-performing (and quickly profitable) business models in resource-constrained settings 
(see Figure 3.2). 
The mature phase 
At some point there emerged a clear need for strategic decisions, such as whether to 
expand abroad through startups or acquisitions, requiring the introduction of a management 
board. Discrete changes emerged, where informal, BU-level processes were replaced by formal, 
firm-level processes and structures, leading to a very different (in terms of structures, processes, 
leadership) organization (Greiner, 1998). As this second phase was fundamentally different – 
qualitatively rather than quantitatively – we call this change process organizational 
metamorphosis, connoting qualitative and fundamental change. A metamorphosis is “the 
process of transformation from an immature form to an adult form in two or more distinct 
stages” (Oxford Dictionary, 2014), for instance, from egg, to pupa, caterpillar, and butterfly. 
Although this definition is usually applied to insects or amphibians, it fits the type of 
organizational change we observed well. However, the main reason for discussing it here is 
that, as part of it, the processes of exploration and exploitation, and their organizational 
antecedents, changed as well.  
 Exploration and exploitation. In this second, more ‘mature’ phase, bricolage was 
abandoned, consistent with the idea of ‘selective bricolage’ (Baker & Nelson, 2005). Formal 
structures and processes such as measuring staff performance in BUs at the operational, short-
term level, started to crowd out long-term initiatives such as setting up new BUs, leading to a 
separate unit for exploration, an incubator. In the case of Mjunction, it meant that ‘old’ 
77 
 
initiatives such as AutoJunction and Straightline, still seen as in early stages of development, 
moved to the incubator. The MD’s transformational leadership role continued for the incubator, 
although he was later replaced by an incubator manager. Exploitation was now through formal, 
firm-level processes, for instance, vertically (skip-over) within the expanding hierarchies of the 
larger BUs, and horizontally, in communities of practice (Brown & Duguid, 1991) and 
knowledge forums across BUs. Still supported by close interpersonal relationships in the 
(relatively young) firm, although the role of the MD changed for the high-performing BUs to 
mentoring.  
Interestingly, exploration and exploitation in this phase appear to be similar, in terms of 
underlying organizational structures and processes, to what has been observed earlier in non-
resource-constrained settings of Western firms (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004, Mahmou-Jouini, 
Charue-Duboc, & Fourcade, 2007; Jansen, Tempelaar, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2009). We 
believe this second phase of our model is nevertheless very interesting, for two reasons. First, 
our study found what has been found earlier for Western settings, now for resource-constrained 
settings as well, extending the external validity of these insights. However, interestingly, these 
similar structures and processes in the mature phase emerged after a process that seemed 
initially (i.e. in the entrepreneurial phase) tailored to a resource-constrained setting. This 
process generated the profits and created ‘a munificent island in a sea of resource-constrained 
conditions:’ a platform for the same organizational processes and structures found earlier for 
more munificent settings in the West. In other words, the organizational structures and 
processes of the second phase showed the validity of earlier research in this domain; however, 
as a result of a process specifically found for resource-constrained settings. Second, and 
relatedly, we present the second phase as part of a multi-phase process model for developing 
high performing business models, which also contains the initial phase and the organizational 
change leading to the second phase. In sum, we help to understand – and provide new theory 
for  -- how and why this second development stage happens (and has external validity), as part 
of novel, multi-stage, multi-level organizational process theory for developing high-
performance business models and firms for resource-constrained settings.  
3.5 Discussion 
Our paper addressed an intriguing puzzle for management researchers (George et al., 
2012): what explains success in low-cost business models? What organizational factors 
contribute to it, and why (i.e., theoretical logic; Whetten, 1989)? Our longitudinal, qualitative 
study of MJunction in a resource-constrained setting (the emerging IT industry in India) 
suggested new multi-level, multi-stage organizational process theory. External exploration and 
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external exploitation, led to experiences, insights, and objects (e.g., IT-platform) that were 
quickly cobbled together to a new business model, which was improved through trial-and error 
(“bricolage”) in the local market. This process was supported by transformational leadership at 
the firm level and BU-level in the concept stage; operation-oriented leadership at the 
development stage, and participative leadership at the launch stage, making the organization as 
a whole very profitable quite quickly. This created munificent conditions to move to the next 
(mature) stage, with firm-level, formal processes for exploration (in an incubator) and 
exploitation (horizontal and vertical knowledge-sharing mechanisms), supported by firm-level 
leadership in more of a mentoring capacity. Low-cost business models have attracted 
considerable interest in research (George at al., 2012) and practice (Radjou et al., 2012; 
Prahalad & Hart, 2006), and we hope our new conceptualization will inspire future research 
and theory in this domain. 
Implications for other research areas 
Bricolage theory. The finding that bricolage is important, is consistent with compelling 
descriptions of low-cost business development in India by authors with in-depth knowledge of 
underlying world-views and the setting more broadly (Prahalad & Hart, 2006; Radjou et al., 
2012). Different experiences, insights and objects (e.g., IT-platforms) were cobbled together 
(Levi-Strauss, 1962) and improved quickly through trial and error, supported by friendly 
relationships with clients (Baker & Nelson, 2005). An internal trajectory emerged, where 
different groups (business and functional units) co-created and co-learned (Garud & Karnoe, 
2003) as new business models were introduced and developed further during the entrepreneurial 
phase (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Hendry & Harborne, 2011).  
However, under certain conditions – as Lanzara (1999) and Ciborra (2002) found in the 
context of developing information systems – bricolage may also lead to an improvised 
meandering, path-dependent trajectory, with serendipitous combinations of existing programs 
and pasted-up solutions, as well as mutually reinforcing patterns across different domains and 
a community of practice that cements firms into parallel bricolage and stalled growth. We found 
that successful business model development combined two roles that bricolage theory has seen 
as juxtaposed: of the ‘bricoleur,’ and of the ‘engineer’ (Levi-Strauss, 1962): of abstract planning 
and going beyond the ‘existing stock of knowledge,’ through external exploration (e.g., visits 
of foreign, similar business models) and external exploitation (getting information from clients, 
and about solutions already in the market), and by sourcing objects externally (e.g., IT 
platforms). It was the combination of both ways of thinking, or rather, integrative thinking; 
“(t)he ability to face constructively the tension of opposing ideas and, instead of choosing one 
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at the expense of the other, generate a creative resolution of the tension in the form of a new 
idea that contains elements of the opposing ideas but is superior to each”; (Martin, 2007) that 
enabled high performance.  
In sum, we found – and our theory implies – that bricolage (Levi-Strauss, 1962; Baker 
& Nelson, 2005) was creatively combined (Amabile, 1996) with external exploration and 
exploitation as part of the process of developing new, successful low-cost business models. In 
addition, our new theory identifies how and why distinct organizational factors (e.g., leadership) 
at both the firm- and BU-level contribute to this process, and these processes and organizational 
factors change as the firm moves to the more mature phase. 
Leadership-theory. We believe our study also contributes to the theory on leadership in 
the context of exploration and exploitation (Smith, 2014). In her model of dynamic decision-
making, Smith (2014) usefully described 'differentiating' and 'integrating' leadership practices. 
We identified, in addition, stage- and level-dependent functions of leadership. For BU-level 
stages, we observed transformational leadership at the concept stage; operationally-oriented 
leadership at the development stage, and participative leadership at the launch stage of new 
successful business models. Firm-level leadership included the roles of creating vision and 
allocating resources at the entrepreneurial phase of the firm, and mentoring at the mature phase. 
We found that firm-level leadership (leadership of the MD) was transformational (i.e., 
visionary) during the entrepreneurial phase. This promoted having one, open space for staff (a 
decision jointly taken by the staff, as part of participative leadership); various ways of 
socializing new workers into the firm to motivate them and facilitating information exchange 
(Blume, Ford, Baldwin, & Huang, 2010), e.g., through CSR activities. This, in turn, seemed to 
substitute for information and other resources which in more mature firms come from social 
networks (Ancona & Caldwell, 1990), such as vertical ties (‘ambassadors’) and horizontal ties 
with other units and functional departments. 
We believe our study also contributes to Smith’s (2014) dynamic decision model by 
examining the impact of leadership on firm and BU performance. Heads of high-performing 
BUs demonstrated transformational leadership in the concept stage, unlike heads of low-
performing BUs who mostly relied on operation-oriented leadership. However, we did not 
observe a ‘direct effect’ of firm-level leadership on performance; firm-level leadership practices 
were observed in both high and low-performing business models. For the entrepreneurial phase, 
firm-level leadership was only associated with high-performance in combination with 
(Levinthal, 1997) external exploration and exploitation. 
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Exploration-exploitation theory. We believe our study also adds to the literature on 
exploration and exploitation, or ‘ambidexterity’ (Duncan, 1976; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; 
Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). This literature studies whether such different tasks as exploration 
and exploitation can productively be carried out within one organization, and how and why. A 
large literature has emerged exploring whether exploration and exploitation (March, 1991) are 
orthogonal to each other or part of a continuum (Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006), effects on 
firm performance (He & Wong, 2004), and how the two can be pursued simultaneously 
(“ambidexterity”), for instance, through isolation (Fang, Lee, & Schilling, 2010).  
In a recent special issue (of Organization Science), Raisch et al. (2009) identified four 
major theoretical puzzles for this literature: 1) Should organizations achieve ambidexterity 
through integration (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen, Simsek, & Cao, 2012) or separation 
into different units (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; Simsek, Heavey, Veiga, & Souder, 2009)? 2) Does 
ambidexterity occur at the individual or organizational level? 3) Should organizations take a 
static or dynamic view on ambidexterity? 4) Can ambidexterity arise internally, or do firms 
have to externalize processes? Future research resolving these issues should be, qualitative, 
longitudinal, multi-level, and study success as a dependent variable, although research in each 
of these categories was rare (Raisch et al, 2009).  
Smith (2014) recently introduced a model of dynamic decision making which explains 
the strategic paradox of exploring and exploiting simultaneously. We believe our study, which 
has the methodological characteristics suggested by Raisch and colleagues, adds to Smith’s 
interesting work.  Our new dynamic, multi-level process theory explains how the paradox is 
resolved, in the context of high-performing, low-cost business models, by separating 
exploration and exploitation across individuals, time (first exploration, than exploitation), and 
units (when initiating a new business model in a BU, first exploration; later in the same or 
related BUs, exploitation). Our process theory also explains how the form of separation depends 
on the growth stage of firm. Hence, we believe we extend Smith’s (2014) work on not only 
resolving the paradox, but also by showing how and why exploration and exploitation can be 
potentially reinforcing and contribute to performance (see also Zimmerman, Raisch, & 
Birkinshaw, 2015), and which organizational factors (e.g., leadership) contribute to the process, 
and how and why this differs across organizational levels and stages. Our theory also implies 
that in successful business models not everything is done internally: external exploration and 
exploitation were key elements of successful development trajectories.  
Interestingly, our theory also suggests a solution to an even more difficult paradox, 
suggested by Levi Strauss (1962). He argues that being a ‘bricoleur’ and an ‘engineer’ 
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(implying abstract thinking and external information gathering, in our context, for instance, as 
in external exploration and exploitation), are two very different ways of thinking, that are 
difficult to combine (Levi-Strauss, 1962). Again, our process theory suggests a solution at the 
organizational level rather than an individual solution, enabling separation across individuals, 
time, and units, not just resolving the ‘double paradox’ (of combining bricolage with a very 
different, abstract way of thinking, in itself combining two very different ways of thinking: 
exploration and exploitation), but also implying higher performance for organizations 
combining the roles of bricoleur and engineer successfully in low-cost business model 
development trajectories.  
Low-cost business model innovation. The term ‘business model’ gained salience in the 
1990s with the rise of the IT sector in the US, a hotbed of experimentation, where innovative 
business models seemed to create much economic value (Amit & Zott, 2001; Zott, Amit, Massa, 
2011; Teece, 2010). As with earlier management trends and fashions if not fads, this led to 
many enthusiastic writings, before more neutral, research-oriented writings appeared 
(Abrahamson, 1996; Abrahamson & Fairchild, 1999). Initial writers emphasized that individual 
components of business models (e.g., a value proposition, a revenue model, distribution 
channels; Morris, Schindehutte, & Allen, 2005; Johnson, Christensen, & Kagermann, 2008) are 
interrelated in terms of their influence on performance (Zott et al., 2011). More recently, the 
attention has shifted towards process-oriented work and case studies of business model 
innovation (Sosna, et al., 2010; Svejenova, Planellas, & Vives, 2010; Yunus, Moingeon, & 
Lehmann-Ortega, 2010; Sabatier, Mangematin, & Rouselle, 2010; Matzler, Bailom, von den 
Eichen, & Kohler, 2013). Sosna et al. (2010) interestingly identified learning as important and 
exploration and exploration for a Spanish company. However, the “extant literature does not 
point to any unique drivers of business model innovation” (Rasmussen & Foss, 2015), and 
“lacks theoretical grounding which would allow us to understand its underlying mechanisms 
better and move the still shaky conceptual frameworks of business model development and 
innovation to more solid theoretical ground” (Sosna et al., 2010). We hope our organizational 
process theory will inspire new theory in this domain.  
We hope our new process theory, from findings on one of the most innovative 
companies in India (Tata), will also inspire process theory on other low-cost business models, 
with both economic and social goals, for instance, when serving the poor (Prahalad & Hart, 
2006; Mair, Marti, & Ventresca, 2012). Although Prahalad and Hart’s narrative was 
compelling, it was largely descriptive, and lacked theory on the organizational process for 
developing (successful) new business models. Initiatives at the ‘base of the pyramid’ often fail 
82 
 
and rarely scale up (the “missing middle”). Our process model should not be blindly generalized 
to these settings, but suggests for instance that a failure to understand –or successfully manage 
–the ‘organisational metamorphosis’ from the entrepreneurial to the mature stage may lead to 
failure to scale up, potentially explaining the ‘missing middle’. More research is obviously 
needed.  
Finally, Radjou et al. (2012) recently argued that low-cost business model innovation, 
or ‘Jugaad’-innovation, is increasingly relevant for the West as well, with its increasingly 
diverse social groups (in ethnicity, age) and fragmented markets. Many of these groups 
increasingly have – or are predicted to have – low incomes in the 21st century (growing groups 
of young unemployed, employed on zero hour contracts, elderly with small pensions, various 
ethnic low-income groups; Piketty, 2014) for which low-cost business models may enable high-
value, low cost products and services. Hence low-cost business model innovation – and the 
need to understand it – appears to be increasingly relevant for the West as well (Fourné et al., 
2014). We hope our new theory will also inspire research and practice here. 
Theories emerge from specific social, economic, and institutional contexts; whether 
they come from a munificent environment such as North America in the 1990s, which propelled 
the rise of the term ‘business model,’ or from a resource-constrained setting such as India in the 
early 21st century. Future research may help to understand how and why our new theory is 
contingent on social, economic, and institutional factors, eventually leading to more ‘global’ 
process theory (Whetten, 1989; Barkema et al., 2015) on low-cost business model innovation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
GRASSROOTS BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATION:  
CHANGING THE IDENTITY OF A GOVERNMENT INSTITUTION 4 
4.1 Introduction 
The Netherlands is known for its struggle with water; water management is naturally a 
crucial task with over 25% of the country under sea level. Tasked with keeping people’s feet 
dry are twenty five semi-independent water boards operating in different regions of the country, 
managing water purification and flood prevention. In 2007, these water boards were at a 
crossroads. Clean water and no flooding had become taken for granted; the water boards faced 
pressure to overcome a perception of sedentariness, to prove their value. Their very existence 
was under threat. It was, quite literally, innovate or die. Sprouting from a contest to exemplify 
the vision, ‘Think Differently, Act Differently’, a group of employees challenged entrenched 
thinking and assumptions and launched a project dubbed the Energy Factory. Utilizing waste 
water purification processes to generate and harness heat and electrical energy; surplus energy 
being sold to citizens and external parties; the project amounted to a significant departure from 
their existing business model.  
The Energy Factory project changed the face of one of the oldest public-sector 
institutions in the Netherlands by introducing a new business model into an organization which 
never even considered themselves to be a ‘business’. It is this business model innovation (BMI) 
that we chose to study. In so doing, we uncovered the significance of the change introduced to 
this archetypical government institution, we uncovered a story of identity change.    
The Energy Factory is a prototypical example of business model innovation. Before the 
Energy Factory, water boards worked behind closed doors and relied purely on subsidies and 
taxes. They focused on performing their duties behind the scenes and as efficiently as possible 
(arguable having no discernible business model as, in their eyes, they were not a business at 
all). The post-Energy Factory water boards operate in cooperation with their ‘customers’ (i.e. 
citizens and other organizations) and with a very different mind-set and purpose, they now  have 
a direct line to citizens with a valued product and a clear value creation model leading the way 
in shifting perceptions from being a sedentary institution to being a valuable organization. 
Concisely put, it signifies a move from ‘managing’ water to creating and capturing value 
(Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002). Extant literature mainly focuses on the composition of 
business models (Morris, Allen & Schindehutte, 2005) and, more recently, the interdependence 
                                                 
4 This chapter was written as a paper and is co-authored with D. A. Stam. 
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between elements contributing to the whole (Johnson et al., 2008; Tikkanen, Lamberg, 
Parvinen, Kallunki, 2005; Morris et al., 2005; Pateli & Giaglis, 2005). It is only in the past few 
years focus has shifted toward a more process oriented perspective, studying the underlying 
processes and antecedents of business model innovation (Sosna et al., 2010; Svejenova et al., 
2010; Yunus et al., 2010; Sabatier et al., 2010; Matzler et al., 2013), but research in this area is 
currently still sparse. It is this domain of BMI research in which we seek to make a contribution, 
studying the underlying processes of BMI. Specifically, we set out to explore how BMI 
develops and is driven forward in organization, how the members of an organization play a role 
in changing the business model and how that presents itself. Essentially, the human element in 
BMI, an area previously unexplored in BMI literature.  
During our research in this domain however, we exposed unanticipated aspect of BMI. 
While we started with BMI as an outcome and the unit of analysis in this study, while looking 
at the pattern of change from an analytic perspective, it also revealed itself as an antecedent for 
identity change. The Energy Factory case is an example of the role BMI plays in an organization 
and how it functions as a vehicle for a much larger identity change. 
BMI has been loosely defined as innovation concerning how a business works 
(Magretta, 2002) and business models are said to provide employees with a concrete framework 
or logic (Teece, 2010) for decision making. Different from product or process innovation, BMI 
is a more holistic concept, encompassing multiple elements of the business and providing much 
more of a heuristic or guiding function for employees (Teece, 2010). Whereas a product 
innovation, for instance, is released into the market and employees may move on to something 
new the next day, the business model (or the innovation thereof) is or becomes a central element 
in the future operation of the business behind a product, process, or service. It is how value is 
created, captured and conveyed to customers. We propose therefore that a business model 
essentially concerns “central, distinctive, and continuous characteristics of an entity” (Albert & 
Whetten, 1985; Ashforth, Rogers & Corley, 2011), i.e. an identity. We thus contend that looking 
at BMI through a social identity lens will further the understanding of the processes underlying 
BMI. Investigating BMI through an identity lens could potentially reveal previously unexplored 
aspects in these underlying processes and therefore further the emerging process focused theory 
on BMI, as well as open up new directions for this burgeoning research domain.   
The Energy Factory started as an idea for a new business model with a small group of 
individuals, spread over 4 water boards, believing in the project. Confronting disbelief from 
colleagues and embracing the spirit of the vision created by the Union of Water Boards, they 
created a promotional booklet and went on to share the story with other water boards.  Growing 
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from 4, to 11, to eventually 15 water boards (although others are involved unofficially), the 
Energy Factory spread across the sector. This process of bottom up identity formation is an 
important topic of research in the organizational identity literature (Humphreys & Brown, 2002; 
Cornelissen, Haslam & Balmer, 2007). Theorists on organizational identity have recently 
focused their attention on how embedded identities are formed over different levels of identity. 
Ashforth, Rogers, and Corley (2011) for instance provide a theory of how identities on different 
levels (the intrasubjective, the intersubjective, and the generic subjective) relate to each other. 
Missing in this picture are the specific mechanisms through which identities may cross levels. 
Starting as a project with a select few individuals and proceeding to spread a new way of 
thinking and working to the entire organization, the Energy Factory provides a suitable vantage 
point from which to investigate the subtleties involved in identity changes enacted across levels 
(Ashforth et al., 2011).  
We use a case study approach to investigate the Energy Factory. This allows us to delve 
into not only the change itself, but the between level dynamics which emerged as the story 
unfolded. We address the question of how a business model develops among employees to 
become the new way of doing things and why there may be resistance at particular points. We 
first provide some context for our work by presenting background theory and defining relevant 
concepts in the identity and BMI literature. We then tell the story of Energy Factory and 
highlight several relevant theoretical aspects. Lastly, we conclude by discussing the 
implications of this study.  
4.2 Theoretical Background 
Business Model Innovation 
A business model is the combination of a value proposition, a revenue or profit model, 
key processes and resources, a distribution channel, and partners, where each component needs 
to be put in place with their combined functioning in mind (Magretta, 2002; Morris et al., 2005; 
Mitchell & Coles, 2004; Tikkanen et al., 2005; Chesbrough, 2007; Fiet & Patel, 2008; Johnson 
et al., 2008; Zott et al., 2011; Baden-Fuller & Morgan, 2010; Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 
2010; Chesbrough; 2010; Teece, 2010; George & Bock, 2011). Unfortunately, the exact number 
and nature of the elements involved is cause of much academic debate (Magretta, 2002; Morris 
et al., 2005; Mitchell & Coles, 2004; Tikkanen et al., 2005; Chesbrough, 2007; Fiet & Patel, 
2008; Johnson et al., 2008; Zott et al., 2011; Baden-Fuller & Morgan, 2010; Casadesus-
Masanell & Ricart, 2010; Chesbrough; 2010;  Teece, 2010; George & Bock, 2011). What is 
clear, however, is that a business model comprises of the totality of these elements as well as 
the interaction between them. Consequently, scholars have defined business models as the way 
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in which companies capture value (Chesbrough, 2007; Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002); in 
behavioural terms, ‘the way things are done’. 
BMI, in essence, is a change in the mix of these elements, i.e. a change which 
necessitates the re-evaluation and adjustment of the entire model. BMI thus involves a change 
of (multiple) elements of the business model and/or a change in the interaction between 
elements and could be seen as a change in the way a company captures value. From a 
behavioural perspective, BMI therefore involves “changing the way things are done”. An 
example of such BMI is MJunction’s move to web-based B2B auctions selling of steel and raw 
materials. In this case the company changed the sales channel, key partners, and revenue model 
by cutting out the middle man in the traditional sale of steel and coal. Another example would 
be low-cost airlines that, compared to the service quality emphasizing business models of 
competitors, provided a different value proposition, worked with different key stakeholders 
(cheap airports), used a different revenue model (charging for food and upgrades) etc.  
Prior research has usually seen BMI from a strategic or innovation lens, thinking about 
it as if it were a strategic tool or a performance outcome. As a consequence, extant research is 
sparse on the dynamics and the processes underlying business models, or more importantly, 
BMI (Johnson et al., 2008; Morris et al., 2005). Furthermore, BMI is often treated as an end-
state, evidenced by the focus of research on the composition of business models (Morris et al., 
2005). We contend that in order to take the next step in BMI research, the underlying process 
and behavioural aspects of BMI should be considered. More process oriented research on BMI 
has emerged in recent years (Sosna et al., 2010; Svejenova et al., 2010; Yunus et al., 2010; 
Sabatier et al., 2010; Matzler et al., 2013) although one aspect that remains unexplored is the 
human element. The role people play in the process and interact with the BMI.  
Magretta (2002) characterized it as the story of the organization, others as the way things 
are done or the processes which create and capture value. In any of these characterizations lies 
a core element, namely the embedded or institutionalised aspects of an organization. In line 
with this, we argue that BMI has clear consequences for entrenched thinking and the identity 
of individual organizational members, organizational groups, and the organization as a whole. 
We posit that by viewing BMI through the lens of social identity theory and as a business 
process with a wider purpose, we reveal the nature of the BMI process in a different light. In so 
doing, we provide a novel perspective on the process of BMI and a foundation on which future 
research can build toward a theory of what successful BMI is or requires, especially from an 
employee perspective. Current literature on BMI does not provide much by way of guidance in 
taking this perspective, although practice shows its applicability and value. The late 90’s 
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turnaround of Apple was essentially a story of identity change; a company selling computers 
changed its value proposition, and with it various other elements of its business model to match. 
Apple moved from selling products, to selling experiences. Making their products part of the 
consumer’s identity and more importantly, embedding the identity of the company into its 
products. Still today you see their business model shine through in how they choose to sell their 
products, the Apple Store is an icon of the Apple business model. Steve Jobs himself said: “You 
can’t talk about profit; you have to talk about emotional experiences.” The path walked by 
Apple employees in building the new business model is what drove the success of the effort. 
The new business model was the new identity and vice versa. Apple provides an apt example 
of how important the identity of an organization is to its success and how intimately the business 
model relates to organizational identity. 
Organizational Identity 
Identity has been defined in many ways, a product of several disciplines and research 
domains converging on the topic from different perspectives. We follow Albert and Whetten 
(1985) however and define identity as the “central, distinctive, and continuous characteristics 
of an entity” (Ashforth et al., 2011). In this definition, we also prescribe to the suggestion made 
by Ashforth, Rogers, and Corley (2011) that ‘continuous’ is a more appropriate descriptor than 
‘enduring’, as originally contained in Albert and Whetten’s (1985) definition. Research of late 
(Corley et al., 2006; Gioia et al. 2000) and the subject matter of this article suggests that not 
only is identity change at the collective possible, but it is a likely outcome, especially when 
considering a multi-level perspective.  
Identity is an immensely important aspect of organizational life (Ashforth, Harrison & 
Corley, 2008). Organizations spend millions telling stakeholders who they are and reaffirming 
the perceptions of their characteristics, something as simple as a logo costing in the hundreds 
of millions for some organizations (e.g. Accenture, Pepsi, BP). It comes as no surprise then that 
identity research comprises a large cache of research and remains to be a popular topic in both 
research and practice. The majority of extant research however focuses on a single level of 
analysis, i.e. individual, group, or organization. A topic that deserves additional attention is the 
formation of identities, specifically the formation of collective identities and the dynamics at 
play as these identities develop from the individual, to the group, to the organization level 
(Ashfort et al., 2011).  
In order to understand why identity change and its dynamics, especially across levels, 
are of such importance, it is necessary to look at the function of identity. At the individual level, 
identity provides a sense of self on a personal level (Postmes & Jetten, 2006) and situates a 
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person in their environment on a social level (Tajfel, 1978; Ashforth; 2001). At the group level, 
identity defines in-groups and distinguishes them from out-groups (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). 
Finally, at the organization level, identity provides coherence and can serve to coordinate action 
among organizational members or disparate groups (Barney, 1998). Based on the function of 
identity at these different levels, which is remarkably similar, i.e. to define, distinguish, and 
situate, the importance is clear. Without identity, organizations could not exist, nor could 
organization for that matter (Haslam & Ellemers, 2005).  
Identity at each of these levels has received attention in research; however it is the cross-
level mechanisms which drive the formation of an identity and contain inherent potential 
revealing the underlying aspects of identity in organizational theory. The process of moving 
from individual, to group, to organization level identity. Ashfort, Rogers, and Corley (2011) 
explore the relations between the different levels of identity. Based on Wiley’s (1988) 
classification of levels, they discuss how collective identities form at three levels: individual 
(intrasubjective), group (intersubjective), and organization (generic subjective). The 
intrasubjective refers to how individual members of the organization construe the 
organizational identity, whereas the intersubjective refers to how groups of organizational 
members (or all members) share construal of the organization’s identity. Finally the generic 
subjective signifies the actual practices and regulations that enact the organization’s identity. 
These levels translate more practically to “I think” for intrasubjective, “we think” for 
intersubjective, and “it is” for generic subjective.  
Figure 4.1 shows an adapted version of the model presented by Ashforth and colleagues 
(2011) showing the nested nature of identities and the development of identity over different 
levels as well as the iterative path followed by identity as it builds to the generic subjective. 
The arrows (numbered 1 through 5), ‘signify the enactment of a given construction and the 
ensuing sensemaking’ (Ashforth et al, 2011: 1146). First, the equilibrium is disturbed by a 
stimulus which threatens the current subjective identity. This leads to a re-evaluation of the 
identity from an individual perspective, ‘I think’ (1). From the intrasubjective, identity is 
propagated by involving multiple individuals, building upon individual level identities to arrive 
at the intersubjective (2). Moving between the intra- and intersubjective is an iterative process 
(3&2) as groups settle on a mutually agreed-upon shared identity which does not critically 
violate identities at the individual level. Finally, as the group shares a common mental model, 
the identity starts bleeding into the fabric of the organization, into the practices, policies, and 
processes, becoming bigger than any group or individual (4). This too is a process of revision 
(5&4) until finally the new equilibrium settles in the generic subjective.  
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Figure 4.1: The Construction of Identity at Each Extra-Individual Level of Analysis 
(Adapted from Ashforth, Rogers & Corley, 2011) 
 
Following the characterization of business models as ‘the way things are done’ -  
representing the institutionalised aspects of an organization’s operations, how the different parts 
of the business interact, and to some extent the behavioural standards - the model above (as 
well as providing an intriguing and very useful representation of how identities develop over 
time) importantly also provides insight into how BMI may: a) be successfully managed by 
monitoring the identity change accompanying it as it moves through the various levels of 
identity, providing insight into interventions or changes needed at particular times and b) how 
BMI may impact the overall identity of the company. Nonetheless, it also leaves open several 
questions. First, while Ashforth and colleagues (2011) identify interaction as a mechanism 
through which identity propagates, the specific vehicles for this interaction and what the starting 
point of this interaction is, remains vague. Second, Ashforth and colleagues (2011) discuss how 
identities are embedded and how content remains isomorphic across levels. What they do not 
discuss, yet what is highly important in organizations, is how changes in identity occur. We 
believe that in these aspects sits immense potential for BMI. Since, as in the case of the Apple 
example, BMI and identity change often go hand in hand, it is imperative to know what part 
BMI plays in propagating identity change and where this starts (or ends). In order to exploit 
this and increase chances of BMI success by for instance merely ensuring implementation (if 
you do not start, you cannot finish), we also need to shed more light on how identity change 
occurs and what mechanisms are involved in between levels. In sum, we need to start answering 
the question: How does identity change move from one stage to the next and what part does 
BMI play in this process?  
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4.3 Methods 
The water board have been operating similarly for centuries, thus The Energy Factory 
setting provides a unique opportunity to explore a business model coming into being in an 
environment in which BMI is arguable entirely new. The impetus for studying the Energy 
Factory was crystal clear purely from how it was presented as a project. Previous initiatives 
pursued by the water boards; or the majority of government institutions for that matter; were 
kept under wraps and happened behind the scenes. The Energy Factory project on the other 
hand was taken all the way to the doorsteps of citizens, representing a significant departure 
from the status quo already.  What we did not realise however was the extent of this departure 
and the far reaching consequences of a single project.  
These consequences, coupled with the methods of presentation and public interest 
nature of this project, results in Eisenhardt’s (1989) criteria of an extreme situation with the 
process of interest being “transparently observable” being met with ease. We opted for a case-
study format due to the exploratory nature of the study and our interest in the underlying how 
(Yin, 2003) of BMI and identity change. Our aim is theory elaboration (Maitlis, 2005), building 
on and extending the work done by Ashforth, Rogers, and Corley (2011). The underlying 
processes involved in cross-level identity building deserve further explication. While Ashforth 
and colleagues (2011) start the conversation on these mechanisms, we believe there is more 
richness to uncover and therefore choose to use their model as a starting point to further theory 
in this domain, partly by further exploring these processes empirically but also in a previously 
unexplored setting. In terms of methodology, we chose to mirror the process followed by 
Plowman, Baker, Beck, Kulkarni, Solansky & Travis (2007) to a large extent. This is partly due 
to some parallels in our research outcomes and partly due to notable quality of their approach 
(recognized among other things by them winning the Academy of Management Journal Best 
Paper Award). They in turn followed a method as described by Miles and Huberman (1994) 
and used by Dutton and Dukerich (1991), hence we felt it was well established in the qualitative 
research domain.  
Data Sources 
We collected data via three avenues: (1) interviews with employees/former employees 
of the water boards; ranging from individuals at officially participating water boards directly 
involved in the Energy Factory project to employees with no tangible connection to the project 
(to test the reach of the identity change), (2) secondary data (e.g. internal communication, 
project reports, web sites) about the Energy Factory project and its results, (3) short textual 
accounts from employees interviewed with their perspective on the unfolding of the Energy 
91 
 
Factory project, adding to the narrative and allowing for the extraction of themes that may not 
have come through clearly in the interview. Gathering data from various participants at multiple 
hierarchical levels and from several different water boards reduced potential biases of any 
individual participants by confirming claims through several sources (Miller, Cardinal, & 
Glick, 1997; Cardinal, Sitkin, & Long, 2004; Plowman, Baker, Beck, Kulkarni, Solansky & 
Travis, 2007; Martin & Eisenhardt, 2010).  Furthermore, collecting data from multiple sources, 
originating from different times in the process, mitigates potential retrospective bias by 
matching real-time archival data with the accounts of the interviewees (Santos & Eisenhardt, 
2009) and allowed us to triangulate which strengthens our conviction regarding the accuracy of 
the findings (Jick, 1979; Kumar, Stern, & Anderson, 1993; Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012).  
   Informants. We first conducted an extensive interview with one of the initiators, recognized 
by others as one of the two main drivers of the project. The purpose being to get a 
comprehensive picture of the project and those involved. Following this discussion we 
compiled a list of potential respondents comprising the people intimately involved in the Energy 
Factory project. Based on the tips received from interviewing respondents on this list, we put 
together a list of additional respondents who were said to have a substantial connection to or 
first-hand knowledge of the project. Realising the importance of the vision as the initiator of 
the change early in the research process, we also interviewed someone involved in drafting the 
vision and launching the competition which led to the Energy Factory.  The remaining 
respondents were approached from personal networks and somewhat at random in the offices 
of the water boards to get a complete story from all angles (i.e. to gauge the extent or reach of 
the change in the organization) and satisfy the condition of theoretical saturation (Eisenhardt, 
1989). We kept interviewing different individuals until we were satisfied that we had reached 
theoretical saturation and that we would not gain additional understanding of the phenomenon 
of interest by interviewing additional respondents.  
 Our respondents corresponded to the three levels of identity; the intrasubjective, the 
intersubjective, and the generic subjective; essentially providing us with three pseudo data sets. 
We interviewed the 2 individuals behind the winning idea which spawned the Energy Factory 
project. We interviewed the group which formed around the project and those who joined to 
form the Energy Factory team. Finally, we interviewed people in the organization entirely 
removed from the project, but were eventually touched by the identity change and therefore 
with a more distal view on its origins so as to gain a comprehensive picture of the change that 
occurred in the water board and the extent of said change. This theory-driven data collection 
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provided us with a complete perspective on the identity change, from individual to organization 
level.  
We conducted 14 interviews in different locations, with interviews lasting an average 
of 50 minutes each; these were recorded, and later transcribed. In addition to the interviews, we 
spent approximately 30 hours at the water boards observing people and exploring the office 
environments as additional input into understanding the identity that now ruled. Interviews were 
conducted by two researchers, one designated as the interviewer and the other taking notes and 
keeping track of potential clarification questions. Following each interview, the researchers 
compared and discussed impressions.   
Due to the nature of the research direction, we were careful not to reveal too much 
regarding the purpose of our study prior to the interview so as not to lead respondents to 
speaking without predispositions (besides their own pre-existing ones). We were however clear 
regarding our methods and the academic intentions of our study (Miles and Huberman, 1994), 
putting respondents at ease and encouraging them to speak freely.  
The stories provided by respondents are essentially retrospective accounts of the development 
process of the Energy Factory and the surrounding change. Retrospective accounts have 
inherent limitations which, using the recommendations by Miller, Cardinal and Glick (1997) as 
guide, we have addressed by undertaking the following actions: we verified individual reports 
by confirming facts with multiple knowledgeable respondents (Williams, Cote & Buckley, 
1989; Bagozzi & Phillips, 1982; Phillips, 1981; Seidler, 1974); we triangulated findings using 
several secondary data sources (as described below); we encouraged respondents to decline 
answering or to leave out information they did not recall (i.e. free reporting) (Cohen & Java, 
1995, Lipton, 1977),  we asked respondents to summarise their story in writing following the 
interview, providing us with an additional check; we ensured respondents of the confidentiality 
of the information they shared with us, undertook several actions to maximize the comfort of 
respondents and minimize inconvenience related to data collection (Huber & Power, 1985); e.g. 
met them at the most convenient location at a time of their choosing, explained the usefulness 
of our study and the context clearly.   
   Interview questions. Interviews followed a very simple structure with three sections: initial 
contact or exposure to the Energy Factory concept, development from concept to full-fledged 
project, realisation of the Energy Factory and consequences. The questions were deliberately 
open-ended and non-specific in terms of topic so as to obtain the story of the Energy Factory 
project from the respondent’s perspective and in a narrative form. Interviews can be classified 
as semi-structured although we chose to embed little to no sensitizing theory or pre-conceived 
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questions related to the research topic in the structure. Our aim was to collect data with no pre-
determined direction, being as deductive as possible in our approach. To this end, we asked as 
few questions as possible (i.e. a single question for every section was sufficient in some cases) 
and let the respondent answer the question in the narrative form. Following each section, 
clarification questions were asked where necessary, being mindful of keeping to the narrative 
format and building a bridge to the next section; additional probing question usually revolved 
around the transition between different stages of the project or change. At the end of each 
interview, respondents were asked to share any other information they deemed relevant.  
   Secondary sources and other data. Internal documents, reports, web sites, videos, interview 
observation notes, and textual accounts from respondents comprised the secondary data 
reviewed. This data set gave us a verified longitudinal source of data. Among these data sources 
were the original report outlining the vision from which the Energy Factory emerged, the 
booklet used to convince the upper echelons and other water boards of the project’s feasibility 
and value, and the project’s own website (the first non-central website created for a project by 
the water boards). A full list of these resources is shown in Table 4.1.  
Secondary Data Sources & Other Data 
Source Description 
Energy Factory: 
Water Boards 
Inside Out 
Booklet used to present the Energy Factory project on “road show”. 
Short Stories Short textual accounts from respondents describing their perspective and process as regards the Energy Factory project.  
WaterWays.org 
The website of an organization dedicated to projects surrounding 
water management in the Netherlands. Specifically the background 
information on the WaterWays vision and the Energy Factory were 
used. 
Courage: Think 
Different, Act 
Different 
A report on the vision of WaterWays describing the need for change 
and the direction of change in the way Water Boards operate.  
Energiefabriek.com The website of the Energy Factory, the first non-central website used by the water boards.  
Youtube.com 
Various short videos created as promotion for the Energy Factory, 
also interviewing citizens of the Netherlands regarding their 
perspective on the project.  
Table 4.1: List of Secondary & Other Data Sources 
Data Analysis  
The Energy Factory concept is, by design, a story. To stay as close as possible to the 
empirical reality and thus bring readers on the same journey and make sure we did not stray 
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from reality, we sought to tell a story as well. The closer we stay to reality, the more relevant 
our findings in this case. 
Using themes as our guide, we aimed to recount the story of how the Energy Factory, a 
BMI, resulted in changing the identity of the water boards. Our analysis followed procedures 
described by Miles and Huberman (1994) and used by Dutton and Dukerich (1991) as well as 
Plowman, Baker, Beck, Kularni, Solansky and Travis (2007).  
   Step 1: Using a contact summary sheet. A contact summary sheet was created for each 
interview (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The sheet was an amalgamation of quotes from interview 
transcripts, relevant points from field notes, and identified themes. All contact summary sheets 
were checked twice to ensure all relevant quotes, notes, and themes were included. We defined 
a theme as a recurring topic of discussion which speaks to the central ideas of the interview 
(Dutton & Dukerich, 1991).   
   Step 2: Creating a complete theme list. Based on the contact summary sheets, a complete 
theme list was generated by amalgamating all of the identified themes recorded (Dutton & 
Dukerich, 1991). Themes were checked for uniqueness and amalgamated when overlapping; 
the result was a list of 26 unique themes. The list of themes represented recurring topics across 
or within interviews, which were identified by us as central to understanding the Energy Factory 
story or by multiple respondents as being a central element in the process underwent by the 
water boards in the Energy Factory story. After arriving at the complete theme list, interviews 
were rechecked to verify that the underlying themes were still valid in all cases and we had not 
over-simplified or over-summarised the theme list, resulting in some quotes becoming 
misrepresented as a result of merging or adjusting themes. Examples of identified themes are 
‘accelerating change’, ‘way of thinking’, ‘way of working’, ‘tipping point’, ‘vision 
presentation’ and ‘enabling the vision’.  
We then proceeded to further consolidating the list by grouping similar or related themes under 
major headings representing conceptually coherent constructs: interaction, vision, identity, 
enactment of change, barriers/differences. 
 We decided to eliminate barriers/differences as a theme due to the relatively small amount of 
data representing this theme and the nature of its impact, or rather lack thereof (Dutton & 
Dukerich, 1991). What were identified as barriers/difference by interviewees were not relevant 
in retrospect as they were merely an underlying legacy from the ‘old’ identity. A complete 
theme list as well as the final consolidated list of constructs is depicted on the following page 
in Table 4.2.  
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Construct  Themes 
Identity  way of working – way of thinking – external pressure 
Interaction  conceptual– ground level –  mid-level movement – levels of change – 
tangible vision – tipping point – vision impact – vision perception – vision 
realisation 
Enactment 
of Change 
 accelerating change – fundamental change – catalyst – enabler – enabling 
the vision – process  
Vision  vision – buy-in – vision presentation – contagion – value of vision 
Table 4.2: Constructs with underlying themes 
   Step 3: Construction of a timeline. Based on our initial interview with one of the initiators of 
the Energy Factory, we put together a timeline of the project. The timeline was continually 
adjusted and revised based on new data from interviews and secondary data obtained in 
researching the Energy Factory. The final timeline is shown in Table 4.3.  
Timeline of Change at Water Boards 
Period Topic Event/Action 
1255  The first water board is established. 
Pre 2007  Water boards are tasked with managing the water supply and 
flood control.  
2007 Initiating 
Change 
Cabinet discusses necessity of water boards and considers the 
possibility of shutting them down  
Union of Water Boards devises plan to increase visibility and 
perception of value of water boards 
Waterways program started: 50 individuals identified to drive 
change 
Vision: Think Different, Act Different presented as impetus for 
change and to provide direction 
Water boards described as “dusty” and “old-fashioned” 
Innovation Challenge launched: devise a concept which brings 
the water boards closer to citizens so as to change their image and 
show their value, exemplifying the vision: Think Different, Act 
Different 
2008 Challenging 
Identity 
88 ideas submitted 
Winning Idea: Energy Factory 
Resistance from within water boards, disbelief regarding realism 
of project and discontent with changing the way things are done 
Team assembled: 4 water boards with similar ideas 
Informational booklet created and promoted on ‘road show’ 
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2009 BMI – 
Implementing 
Identity 
7 additional water boards join the Energy Factory 
The Energy Factory as focal point draws positive attention due to 
the visible difference in approach from how the water boards 
usually operate 
2010  Another 4 water boards join the Energy Factory 
Realisation gets underway 
2013  First official Energy Factory is completed 
Raw Materials Factory comes to life in the organization 
Water boards described as “value adding”, “innovative”, and 
“open” 
Table 4.3: Timeline of Change at Water Boards 
   Step 4: Narrative Analysis. After constructing a timeline for change that occurred at the water 
boards, we used the timeline as the foundation for constructing a narrative account of the case. 
Creating a complete narrative served several purposes. First, it provided a point of reference for 
us as authors to refer to in discussions. Additionally, it organized the data into a coherent whole, 
drawing together the rich descriptive data into an organized story (Langley, 1999) based on the 
theme analysis and archival data (Miles & Huberman, 1994). It was at this point that we could 
clearly identify the pattern of change from an analytic perspective, which broadened our focus 
to include identity. Whereas we went into the study with an interest in BMI, the narrative 
analysis revealed a much larger change, namely a change in identity.    
   Step 5: Coding interview data. Atlas Ti, a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis package, 
was used for the analysis of interview transcripts; this smoothed the coding process, as 
compared to manual coding, which is decreasingly used due to its time-consumption (Basit, 
2003; Bazeley, 2007). The coding process essentially involved going through every sentence 
of the interview transcripts and coding sentences or extracts under the relevant themes. Coding 
was verified by coding interview transcripts from scratch a second time a few weeks later and 
checking overall correlation. Codes that were not repeated or were different in the second round 
of coding were checked with the original coding and discarded if there was no agreement 
between the two rounds. This was in addition to the two initial rounds of quotes extraction 
during the creation of contact summary sheets. Therefore, data was reviewed in totality four 
times. The last coding round also laid focus on the relevance of all codes as well as 
inclusiveness. Table 4.4 displays the themes under which codes were grouped as well as 
examples of quotes falling under each theme.  
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Themes with Supporting Quotes 
 
Theme Quotes from 
Interviews 
Representative Quotes 
Interaction 182 [...] that works on different levels. The first is that it is a sort of 
concept or label through which people recognize: that is the shift 
we are going to make. Thus everyone feels the tension in the 
system, but now everyone all of a sudden sees: we can also produce 
something, it is not all just a problem, all these impurities and 
materials that we have to remove, but we can also use it to our 
advantage. 
 
While the real value of the concept is contained much more in the 
impact it has on others. So, what might lead to recognition or own 
interpretations or to other new images, for example the Raw 
Materials Factory. That is the larger change process that is 
occurring, giving space and direction.  
 
Thus, that [thinking] has come to life more broadly [among people] 
and they also all found Sharepoint and the civil engineers were also 
taken to meetings by the realisation club, so that did cause for some 
contagion and grows the whole group. 
 
Vision 106 The Energy Factory project was of course about the Energy 
Factory, but importantly also about a new, different way of looking 
at things and cooperating in different ways.  
 
We dream of a water board which is a modern authority, visible in 
society and contributing to addressing important societal 
challenges. Where water safety and water management are 
naturally in good hands, but where we also contribute to other 
societal ambitions. Where we cooperate with other parties on the 
basis of equality. Where outside-in thinking is the norm and where 
we show society the added value we deliver. 
 
What is different is that there is less tunnel vision, everyone doing 
their own thing; but much more working with an integrated vision, 
where we are all going, knowing each other, knowing where 
expertise is located and applying that expertise at the right moment. 
That is, in my opinion, the core of what is different now… 
 
Identity 134 We were very task oriented; we were established as government 
institution for these and these tasks and we just do them well. You 
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can do them behind closed curtains because these things just have 
to happen. While now we look much more at what kind of value we 
add to society because we exist for society, never forget that. You 
can, with a water purification plant, do a fine job, namely purify 
water, but you can also, with the same sewage water purification 
plant, create value in the form of energy. In another form, producing 
materials with the Raw Materials Factory, that is of course the same 
notion, in other words, adding value by utilizing what we already 
have in hand. You also increasingly see, at least I do, the moral 
obligation to deliver this value for citizens.   
 
[...] and [the Energy Factory] also gives a sense of unity between 
the water boards, you come together and you cooperate, I think it 
has been very good, and the continuation you now see with the Raw 
Materials Factory. 
 
[The vision] is much more about the way of working and the way 
of taking initiative that is important and not necessarily the Energy 
Factory itself. 
 
Thus they essentially start to change from an inward focused , 
technically oriented system much more toward a facilitating, 
outward focused support system 
 
Now the image is much more: we are a component in a much larger 
societal whole and we can be of added value for that environment. 
 
I find in general that the water boards are in a much better position 
than 8 years ago. There is much more external consideration, more 
cooperation with partners. People are open to innovations, also 
from other sectors. People are aware of the role played in a value 
chain and not purely focused on their own patch and their own task 
and doing your own thing. In that sense the Union of Water Boards’ 
plan with the Energy Factory as example, has achieved a significant 
amount.  
 
I think that had the Energy Factory not been there, if they had not 
won a prize with it, then these things would have got off the ground 
anyway. Societal pressure is so high to conserve energy and raw 
materials… it strengthened it, it put it in a broader perspective… I 
think societal developments and the way of thinking about energy 
inside the Energy Factory bolster each other.  
 
99 
 
Enactment 130 What you saw, it was not only the story being presented, but also 
the way in which… 
 
What I find extremely important in the story of the Energy Factory 
is, the content is important, but it is also about the way in which 
your bring it. 
 
The success of the Energy Factory was initially in the image and in 
the different approach, the different way of working, but it would 
never have been as successful had we not had the technical 
realisation side as well. You should not sell hot air; it should be 
about something real.  
 
[...] it was not that with the Energy Factory a trick was done and 
afterwards everyone forgot about it, but that they want to further 
build upon that with the Raw Materials Factory and further 
improve; also very clearly: ‘We should it together with everyone 
now’. The result being that all water boards put their hands in the 
air and said: ‘We will do it together from day one’. That, for me, 
exemplifies that there has been a shift. 
Table 4.4: Quotes Supporting Themes 
4.4 The Energy Factory Story 
Initiating Change    
Identity. The water boards have a rich history in the Netherlands. The first boards were 
formed in the 13th century and the later development of water boards played a deciding role in 
the structure of the present day system of government. In the earlier days of the water boards, 
local water boards were chaired by nobility; still today, one can view the lavish gifts and fine 
art pieces given to or commissioned by the water boards in some of their offices. The identity 
of the water boards; i.e. that which was central, distinctive and continuous; was similar to that 
of many government institutions. They operated ‘during office hours’, often behind the scenes, 
and managed their tasks without ‘rocking the boat’ too much. The stuffy, grey-suited, 
government employee archetype with full future job security (i.e. taken for granted future 
existence of the organization) sums up the identity of the water boards. Their history bestowed 
them with an image of trustworthiness and reliability, but on the other hand also with an air of 
stiffness and stuffiness. What was a positive connotation of reliability before, took a negative 
turn at the start of the century.  
Societal pressure for sustainability and government transparency in spending behaviour 
in the early 2000’s, coupled with a lack of visibility and a consequent perception of 
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sedentariness brought into question the necessity of the water boards. There were talks at the 
ministry level considering the possibility of disposing of water boards altogether. Facing this 
external pressure and a threat to their very existence, the Union of Water Boards – an oversight 
authority – devised a plan to change the perception the ministry and the public had of them, and 
improve the position and visibility of the water boards in society. Respondents described 
society’s perceptions of the pre-Energy Factory water boards as “old-fashioned” and “dusty”. 
The average person was barely even aware of the water boards. When the water boards were 
first established, their existence was undeniably important. Floods were an all too real threat 
and sanitation a foremost concern or challenge a few centuries ago. Modern lifestyles, a myriad 
seemingly more important everyday concerns, coupled with the, at least perceived, low threat 
of flooding and sanitation being a taken for granted luxury in a developed economy such as the 
Netherlands has made the water boards evaporate from the average person’s thoughts.  A short 
video made by the water boards, asking people on the street who they are and what they do, 
showed the status quo as people being either completely unaware or highly uninformed about 
the existence, tasks, or duties of the water boards.  
The external stimulus, i.e. threat to existence, jolted the water boards out of their 
comfortable, taken for granted state and into an uncertain, unsustainable one. Something had to 
change. The external pressure in the case of the water boards necessitated a shift in identity, 
i.e. who they are and what they do. The slow and steady movement into the modern age, holding 
on to values and views from the past was no longer good enough. This weakened the 
constraining effects of the established identity, allowing for more freedom or exploration (arrow 
1, Figure 4.1); as one respondent neatly put it:  
“[...] on the one hand you need autonomous pressure on the system, thus there has to be 
a requirement to think more fundamentally about change. That is recognised by individuals who 
get the freedom to experiment.” 
   Vision. Such individuals were not however left to their own devices to experiment without 
constraints. The Union of Water Boards’ plan essentially delineated the area or general direction 
in which experimentation was to take place. They selected 50 individuals (dubbed the ‘Club of 
50’), 2 from every water board, to initiate steps in a new direction and to accelerate the 
necessary change from within. These individuals were identified as ‘innovators’ and ‘the next 
generation of water board employees’. The club of 50 were asked to draw up a document in 
support of the plan devised by the Union of Water Boards, which “sketches the contours of the 
change trajectory and brings the necessary innovation to its feet”.  
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The document drawn up by the 50 chosen individuals was presented in the form of a 
vision, an ideal future state of the organization (Conger, 1989), entitled ‘Courage: Think 
Differently, Act Differently’. It presented five areas of change, which embodied the essence of 
what needed to be done differently within the water boards: connecting with stakeholders, 
creating value beyond functional tasks, centralisation and cooperation, image management, and 
as overarching element, culture. Each element presented its own challenges, also shortly 
outlined in the document, to focus attention on what were considered to be the most obvious 
and important hurdles to the success of the vision. The central idea was to bring the water boards 
to the 21st century; the vision was stated as:  
“We dream of a water board which is a modern authority, visible in society and 
contributing to addressing important societal challenges. Where water safety and water 
management are naturally in good hands, but where we also contribute to other societal 
ambitions. Where we cooperate with other parties on the basis of equality; where 
outside-in thinking is the norm and where we show society the added value we deliver.” 
In more simple terms, respondents described it as: “[…] to position water boards in society and 
to connect them with the state, other government authorities, and with the people” or “[…] 
water boards a little bit out of the dusty image”.  
Enactment. The Club of 50 in place, the Union of Water Boards decided to issue a 
challenge to act as catalyst and to enable the vision. Led by the Club of 50, all the water boards 
were challenged to submit innovative ideas which exemplify the vision and takes steps toward 
bringing the water boards to the forefront of the minds of citizens. Water boards across the 
country worked to craft their ideas, the value of the vision being immediately apparent as people 
started to think about change and change perspective, something that was not the norm at the 
water boards. In total, 88 ideas were submitted, multiple by many of the individual water 
boards. By emphasizing what needed to change, i.e. discrepancies in the status quo, the vision 
drawn up by the 50 individuals (considered by the Union of Water Boards to be prototypical 
leaders or front-runners in times of change) served to provide the needed motivation to water 
board employees (arrow 1 in Figure 4.1) to break free of the constraints of the present state.   
Summary. In the first part of this story the water board, an age-old organization with a 
rigid identity and culture that has remained similar over centuries is awoken by an exogenous 
shock, a threat to their survival, which started a process of identity renewal: They formulated 
an alternative identity in very broad terms to save their organization and aimed to involve the 
organization through an innovation contest. Although not affecting the identity of the 
organization yet, the formulation of the new vision did achieve one thing: It challenged the 
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current organization identity of the water boards and consequently allowed individuals to dream 
about a new world: “Everyone started to dream, people saw the Water Boards becoming the 
new green energy provider of the Netherlands. People had freedom, they began to dream.” 
Challenging Identity    
Interaction. Along with the movement into the intra-subjective based on the formulated 
vision and the innovation contest came an important element in the identity transition of the 
water boards, dialogue between individuals in the form of storytelling. Following the 
introduction of the vision and the subsequent submission of ideas, the value of the vision was 
immediately apparent as employees of the water boards started connecting the vision or future 
state with the status quo, creating the necessary continuity to make the transition successful.  
This was apparent in interviews when respondents made light of the significant change they 
were undergoing and did more than just show support for the vision, but accepted it as if it were 
part of the organization already; “… it is obvious because all the building blocks were already 
there, only it is not so obvious that it happens automatically” and:  
“I was of course immediately enthused about it, because it is the whole story ‘in 
one word’. That is the cleverness of it. It immediately implies something that may have 
partly been there already, but also partly not; and you can immediately go along with 
it… So all the elements were already there, but by giving them visibility, you accelerate 
it.” 
The process of creating and communicating the vision with 50 employees, coupled with 
the storytelling triggered by the vision, put in motion the transition from ‘I think’ to ‘we think’ 
(arrow 2 in Figure 4.1) as well as a feedback loop as people modify their stories based on 
responses from their colleagues. The interaction between the vision and people as well as 
between people sparked a momentum; “… the real value of that concept sits more in the impact 
it has on others. So, what might lead to recognition [of a concept] in some, or to different 
interpretations or new images as was later seen with the Raw Materials Factory. That is really 
the principal change-process that is occurring, giving space and direction”. As Boal and Schultz 
(2007) argue: “Engaging in dialogue and exchanging stories are two mechanisms by which 
cognitive consensuality is achieved, producing an organizational identity and shared life story”. 
Furthermore, the innovation challenge generated additional interaction at the group level, 
solidifying the shift from the intra- to the intersubjective, i.e. promoting ‘we think’. One of the 
project leaders said: “… that world just broke open and became much more of a network club… 
[the question became] how will we share all this documentation and make the business cases… 
we created a Sharepoint environment in which everything was uploaded…” 
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Identity. The challenge was won by the Energy Factory concept. The Energy Factory 
truly filled the brief on thinking and acting differently, using the water that flowed through the 
filtration systems of the water boards and converting the kinetic energy in the system into 
electrical energy, which could subsequently be used to power the water boards’ operations but 
also be sold to citizens. In essence, a plan centred on innovation, changing not only how the 
water boards are perceived, but changing what they do and, consequently, who they are. Upon 
presenting the Energy Factory (submitted by Water Board Aa and Maas) as the winning 
concept, among the 88 submitted, a barrage of discontent and disbelief was launched from 
colleagues. The Energy Factory represented something different, a new way of doing things; 
this was therefore a natural response to such an identity threat. The idea was written off by 
many saying; “if that was possible, we would have realised and implemented it years ago” and 
“how is this better than our concept, we worked out a technically sound case and this is merely 
a nice story”. Coincidentally however, 3 other water boards had submitted ideas along the same 
line, albeit with a much more technical focus. Teaming up, the 4 water boards who submitted 
similar ideas went to work on spreading their vision and convincing colleagues of the potential 
inherent in the Energy Factory. The strength of the Energy Factory, it was soon realised, was 
in its approach. The approach taken by the Energy Factory was unlike any the water boards had 
taken before, instead of focusing on the technical, they brought an impactful story to life, a story 
that could be understood by those who were technically trained and layman alike. A director in 
the organization summarized it by saying: “It is a story that has more to do with positioning 
than with content.” 
The newly formed Energy Factory team created an informative booklet entitled “Energy 
Factory: Water Boards Inside Out”. The booklet followed suite to the original notion of the 
Energy Factory in that it did not place overbearing emphasis on the technical and brought the 
story, along with the potential and underlying thinking, to life. Members of the team went on 
what was referred to as a “road show” to spread the word, presenting the booklet to other water 
boards and convince them to join the project, at one point even involving a comedian to generate 
enthusiasm around the concept. The campaign was successful; the process resulted in the 
Energy Factory now comprising 15 water boards in total. Additionally, of the water boards that 
did not join, the majority were not opposed to the Energy Factory or what it stood for. Their 
reasoning was more practical, involving resource constraints. One respondent laid out the 
reasoning:  
“Together we embrace the [Energy Factory] concept, but at the moment it costs too 
much in terms of effort for us to be a member [of the project] and everything that goes 
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with membership… the arrangement is that you need to commit so many hours and pay 
a contribution. For a small water board, the contribution may be a relatively large 
amount, but also the time one must put into it, some people cannot afford.” 
The process was not without its difficulties however. One of the originators told us; 
“You did see when we went from four to the eventual fifteen water boards; that you had a 
temporary relapse in the way of working, because you are in such a flow with the four of you 
and then you have to take ten water boards along from the basics.” The story they told on their 
‘roadshow’ was decisive in convincing colleagues to mobilize toward changing, and 
importantly, following the change already in motion. Utilizing stories, strategic leadership 
structures interactions and fosters the necessary continuity between the past, the present, and 
the future of an organization and of its members (Boal & Schultz, 2007). This also aids in 
providing perspective on change, which can help to reduce the resistance to it and smooth the 
transition (not to mention helping the organization survive when change is crucial) (Kolb, 
2003). These stories still need a practical outlet however, especially in a practically oriented 
organization such as the water boards.  
 Summary. Thus in this second part of the story, the identity of the organization truly 
gets challenged. The challenge starts with an innovation contest that attracts the attention of 
several individuals (although certainly a minority) who submit their proposals for review. The 
challenge itself causes a stir: employees discuss the challenge and its implications informally. 
This already starts a process of identity shift by causing people to share the mere idea that the 
organization’s identity is malleable. The daunting project that wins the contest, the Energy 
Factory – more than a simple innovation: a large scale BMI - however, is not met with cheers 
alone: implementing identity change is more difficult than ‘simply’ spreading the word. 
BMI - Implementing Identity 
  Enactment. Essentially, before the Energy Factory, the revenue model of the water 
boards consisted of taxes, they did not really have partners (especially considering that water 
boards often did not even cooperate with each other), and their key resources and processes 
were focused on water management and flood control. In the wake of the Energy Factory, their 
business model is becoming different, at least part of it. The Energy Factory, and some projects 
stemming from it, have taken on a more complex revenue model, receiving revenue from selling 
energy, or other resources, to partners and the general public. They now have an expanding 
partner network, including other water boards, but also commercial organizations and local 
councils for instance. Key resources and processes are now more focused on adding value as 
opposed to managing resources or risks, most importantly, changing their value proposition 
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from defensive, i.e. managing, preventing, linear to more proactive, i.e. connecting, adding 
value, cyclical. Along these lines, the new business model came with a new way of thinking, a 
new way of looking at things. Table 4.5 illustrates the effect of the BMI at the water boards.  
Employee Views on Business Model Innovation 
The success of the Energy Factory was initially in the image and a different approach, 
different way of operation, but it would have never amounted to as much as it did had we not 
had the technical realisation side. You cannot sell hot air; it needs to have some substance.  
 
Eventually, nothing has been built in terms of an Energy Factory, or in a very limited 
sense, with us; but the fact that a realistic concept came forth, which was also embraced by 
management and the board, that resulted in it resonating positively. Only writing a nice story 
and winning an innovation challenge and then nothing happening, that does not produce 
much. The fact that you then saw things changing…  
 
I think that the Energy Factory became the symbol of the Union of Water Boards’ plan. I 
think that currently more people know the Energy Factory than the Union of Water Boards 
plan. That is not bad though, because it became something tangible and the Union of Water 
Boards vision, that is a lot of nice words which you cannot deny, but to show that is actually 
means and what is meant by a different way of working; that you have to experience and do 
to infect others to also go do it.  
 
They think about new organizational models, some begin to say: ‘we should do this in a 
closed corporation structure’. You see that they think much more strategically about their 
place in the broader transition landscape. 
 
[…] the Energy Factory and the Raw Materials Factory, that is truly a new concept, a different 
way of thinking, towards closing the system. So, thinking is much more cyclical, there is 
much more thinking in terms of production, not just handling, but you are really going to 
produce something, you are going to produce value. 
 
Table 4.5: Supporting Quotes – Employee Views on Business Model Innovation 
The water boards, and more specifically, the water board employees are however “real 
doers”, as one respondent put it. The words in the vision thus only inspired up to a certain point. 
When it came to enacting the new vision, modelling the new identity in the form of a concrete 
change, BMI drove the perceivable and by employee accounts, “memorable” and “real” change, 
the tipping point was evident in the stories which emerged around this theme. One of the two 
project leaders sketched the progression for us:  
“… I am inspired by the vision. Although I think, water boards are real ‘doers’ 
and you saw that in the entire trajectory of the Waterways vision; particularly those 
things that became very concrete, those had an effect. They tipped the balance 
somewhere, and there where it remained a lot of talking; a few were inspired; but I do 
not think it would have reached the breadth that it did if it became tangible and that is 
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what happened with the Energy Factory. Through that you got a lot more layers of the 
organization into the momentum, more than only those involved in the project of or only 
management…”  
A business model is essentially a heuristic mechanism from which employees draw to 
do what they do; and in an organization such as the water boards with technically trained and 
practically motivated people with a functional task, what they do is who they are.   
Identity. In the wake of the Energy Factory, many employees described the atmosphere 
as more open, the upper echelons as more receptive to ideas, and the water boards as 
cooperating on a number of areas. Projects bearing the label Energy Factory, but not officially 
being part of the project, have also emerged. Table 4.6 shows how employees see the change 
in the water boards following the Energy Factory. 
Employee Views on Post-Energy Factory Water Boards 
Now everyone is busy with the Energy- or Raw Materials Factory as image. Thus, every person 
in water purification is busy thinking about: how will we market our waste streams and how will 
we add value in society.  
 
You see it in people, but you also see it in projects and processes. The consideration of, what do 
you do with the raw material demand, the energy demand; that has become self-evident so 
quickly. Thus in that sense: this is included in every potential project. So one could say; in the 
way of working that raw material demand has become foundational as well. You see at the 
organizational level that this has become part of normal operations. 
[...] the thinking in general I find a water board wide phenomenon. What you see, for example on 
the water systems side where they are clearing the waterway trenches and such and the disposal 
of the grass costs a lot. There they have set up a project with a mushroom grower, who it turns 
out, can utilize that grass very effectively as compost. Usually he had to purchase compost or a 
fertilizer-like substance, and now he can use our grass, he just comes to collect it and we do not 
have to pay to dispose of it and we also do not need to receive payment for it as it already saves 
us a great deal of money in terms the usual disposal cost. He no longer has to purchase it; all he 
must do is collect it. 
“[…] one could say the Energy Factory has become much more of an inspiration than a mandatory 
network […]. You indeed see investment decisions being made outside the Energy Factory 
network to build fermentation tanks or introduce new techniques.” 
[...] thus even in the real rigid regime players like board members and a sort of police department 
such as communication and finance and such, there is much more freedom in thinking about what 
is possible. They also now get that if you dream every so often and dare to look a bit further, 
because what if, that the yield can be quite substantial. 
 
[...] the entire thinking of the system has really changed and also the regime has shifted along. In 
2008 managers and the board were very much against things I suggested, simple things like a 
website for the Energy Factory. I was confronted with the communication department who said: 
‘Come on, we already have an Aa and Maas site and we handle everything centrally and none of 
this additional site, own logo business, and what does all this even cost etc. It was really difficult, 
even just talking about getting permission from the board. Then I wrote a whole piece about why 
this would be so useful. It was quite a mild mannered piece. It is difficult to imagine that now, 
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but it was back and forth and struggle, struggle, struggle and then they said alright, it was about 
1500 euro or something. 
 
Table 4.6: Supporting Quotes – Employee Views on Post-Energy Factory Water Boards  
Observing the change in the organization, both in terms of perceptions, decisions and 
processes, indicates a tentative shift toward the generic subjective (arrow 4 in Figure 4.1). We 
say tentative as respondents used words such as “thinking” and “consideration” often, 
indicating the feedback to the ‘we think’ mind set (arrow 5 in Figure 4.1).  
Concomitantly, value creation opportunities are being identified in other areas, e.g. 
Grass Factory, changing the way the water boards have looked at certain problems in the past. 
The Grass Factory follows the same thinking as the Energy Factory in that it is plays on value 
creation with existing practices and processes performed by the water board. In this case, the 
management of waterways, which includes keeping the grass in canals and trenches under 
control, provides an opportunity to provide farmers with grass for feed and other purposes. One 
respondent described the mowing of the water ways and the different outlook they have now:  
“[…] you see a waterway trench as a nuisance because the grass has to be cut and that 
is all a nuisance, but if you see it as a Grass Factory then you are confronted with a 
wholly different image […] then you are actually looking for grass that will grow faster 
so you can cut it more often.”  
External parties have approached the water boards to join forces or to at least explore 
the possibility to do so. The water boards, in cooperation with external parties, are taking 
advantage of contextual conditions which allow for the more sustainable, value-adding, and 
efficient use of energy produced by water purification. In one instance, a partnership has been 
formed between the water boards and a fried foods company as their facilities are next to each 
other and this allows for the most efficient use of water board energy.  
Most visibly, a new large-scale project has been launched, involving all 25 water boards, 
the Raw Materials Factory. Besides extracting energy from purification processes, minerals and 
other useful chemicals or materials can also be extracted from waste water, essentially 
extracting value from water where energy would otherwise be spent just getting rid of it. 
Additionally, when speaking to respondents, some of who had no tangible connection to the 
project itself; they recognized the changes that occurred in the way of thinking and working at 
the water boards, even though they could sometimes not explicitly relate them to the Energy 
Factory. Respondents often sketched their views with short non-specific statements, shown in 
Table 4.7.  
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Views on Change in Water Boards 
Thus I see the shift in thinking and also in attitude and behaviour.  
 
What I find an even better development... that you see that [the Energy Factory] brought an 
effect or a broadening with it. The concept, the way of working, the way of looking at things. 
 
What I want to get across is: there has been a definite shift in mind set inside the water boards; 
that we look at things differently. The first time we started with four, now expanded to fifteen 
and now with the Raw Materials Factory everyone is a member at once. 
 
But there is something fundamental happening; and it goes further than just a new concept 
being implemented or introduced.  
 
[…] the Energy Factory, that was from my perspective a foundational project. If you were to 
ask me: name a project before, I would not be able to. 
 
The transition goes further than the Energy Factory alone, but it does provide a very fitting 
metaphor. 
 
What you saw was not only the story being presented, but also the way in which. You had a 
stand at a climate congress and you had footsteps leading to your stand saying: ‘This is where 
things happen’. You hung stickers in the bathroom: ‘Energy is being produced here’. It is a 
completely different approach than how the water boards usually do things.  
 
Table 4.7: Supporting Quotes – Views on Change in Water Boards 
This gave us a clear signal that the Energy Factory and the change that it powered has 
begun to become larger than itself and any individual, it is becoming the new equilibrium, the 
generic subjective ‘it is’.  
Summary. In the final part of this tale the Energy Factory project slowly comes to 
fruition. Through elaborate networking and lobbying the project team builds a good basis for 
its implementation on the soil that was already prepared by a vision and a contest. With enough 
support the project is finally launched and appears a great success, awakening and validating a 
dormant new identity by implementing a BMI: that of a value adding, innovative public 
organization.     
4.5 Discussion 
We initiated this study to explore the dynamics of BMI; what we were confronted with 
was identity change across levels and the role BMI played in facilitating said identity change. 
This paper therefore explores the development of identity across levels and the dynamic 
mechanisms involved in the process. It offers a new perspective on identity enactment across 
multiple levels and the mechanisms involved, unique insights into the BMI process and its 
effect on organizational members, and a view on visions which goes beyond the current 
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literature. We elaborate on the theory by Ashforth, Rogers and Corley (2011) by exploring the 
construction of identities empirically and by offering insight into the specific mechanisms 
(signified by arrows 1 through 5 in Figure 4.1) to which they refer as “the enactment of a given 
construction and the ensuing sensemaking” (Ashforth et al., 2011). Below we build a set of 
testable proposition based on the analysis of the water board story.  
Starting Identity Changes 
Status Quo. The first part of the water board story starts like that of many other 
organizations (especially traditional governmental ones): with a clear identity that is firmly 
embedded in the fabric of the organization. More than that, the water boards had an additional 
hurdle in that their identity was also embedded in the community within which they operate.  
Before jumping to the question of how identities can actually be changed, it may be prudent to 
look at how identities remain stable over time (and especially so long a time). Importantly, such 
stability in itself can be considered a miracle at work (Gioia, Schultz & Corley, 2000). Looking 
at the water board case, we found strong evidence that the enacted identity, the generic 
subjective identity, was quite clear to the internal and external environment. We also found 
evidence however that the various units of which the organization was comprised, varied in 
their perception of what was the organization, and that individuals certainly had many divergent 
ideas of what was the essence of the water boards. This is in line with the discussion by Ashforth 
and colleagues (2011) on isomorphism across levels of identity: that the various levels of 
identity differ in the extent to which their content varies.   
How then, could it be possible that identities become stable if individuals hold various 
identities and within units, individuals share different identities? The water board case suggests 
two elements that are important to understand the stability of identities: The nature of the 
different cross-level identity effects, and the strength of the different cross-level identity effects.  
In the water board organization; individuals, groups, and units, had been lobbying and 
networking for changes to the very fabric of the organization. None had been successful so far 
however. Individuals were constrained by inflexible managers and units by rigid rules and 
regulations. This indicates first that the influence attempts of the intrasubjective (individuals) 
and the intersubjective (groups and units) on the levels above them (what we refer to as of now 
as upward cross-level identity effects) were aimed at changing the current identity of the 
organization, while the influence attempts of the generic subjective (rules and regulations) and 
the intersubjective (management of teams and units) on the levels below them (what we refer 
to as of now as downward cross-level effects) were aimed at preserving the current identity of 
the organization. Moreover, they indicate that the downward effect generally overruled or 
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contained the upward effect, and phenomenon that may be driven by the fact that content at 
higher levels of identity is more homogeneous than content at lower levels of identity (as also 
implied by Ashforth and colleagues (2011) in discussing isomorphism across levels of identity). 
Organizational members may be more likely to remain with what is clearly known than what is 
not only new, but also rather unclear. 
Proposition 1a: Upward cross-level identity effects, from the intrasubjective to the 
intersubjective and the generic subjective, serve to change the organizational identity. 
 Proposition 1b: Downward cross-level identity effects, from the generic subjective to 
the intersubjective and the intrasubjective, serve to preserve the organizational identity. 
This demonstrates clearly that identities are difficult to ‘dislodge’. Downward cross-
level effects of clear identities constrain any attempt for identity change and the longer this 
situation remains, the clearer high level identities become, and the more protected from change 
the organizational identity becomes. The water board case however also shows that no identity 
is completely safe from change.  
Impetus for change. In trying to understand how a stable identity may change over time, 
the effect of a fundamental, often exogenous, shock (or crisis) is discussed (Corley & Gioia, 
2004; Meyer, Bartunek, & Lacey, 2002) and, importantly, the effect on said identity is posited 
as direct (Meyer, Bartunek, & Lacey, 2002). The water board case, however, shows a more 
subtle picture. That is, the exogenous shock that the water board faced, the threat of being 
merged with another, bigger, public organization, had its effects on the organization but it did 
not change it directly. Individuals were certainly affected and started toying around with ideas 
for change (intrasubjective) as a response to the possibility of vast changes to their organization, 
and to some extent these change ideas became shared by a group of (influential) organizational 
members (intersubjective). The identity threat by itself however did not change the reality of 
the organizational identity (the generic subjective) directly at all; as one interviewee described:  
“… a long period in which pressure builds, pressure from outside, the ruling regime tries 
to improve efficiency, but at increasing cost with diminishing returns. That often leads to 
problems, internal tensions. The front-runners develop alternatives. At a certain moment the 
developments align and give way to potential tipping points…What it actually does is give the 
underlying developments a boost and direction, the real system change only then gets going”.  
This suggests that exogenous shocks affect levels of identity differently. As shown in 
Figure 4.2, the higher degree of variation in content in the intersubjective means that the 
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exogenous shock has a much more noticeable and disruptive effect on the intersubjective. In 
the case of the generic subjective however, there is hardly anything to latch onto and the shock 
is much like a drop in the ocean. 
Proposition 2: Exogenous shocks affect the intrasubjective more than the intersubjective 
and the intersubjective more than the generic subjective. 
The strongest effect of this shock was the formulation of a new vision, and potential 
alternative identity for the water boards. Interestingly, the effects of the vision were important, 
i.e.  It caused organizational members to talk about identity and to be more open to change, but 
it too did not directly change the identity of the organization. A reason for this may be that a 
vision of an alternative identity is first and foremost just that: a vision, and not reality. Indeed, 
this is at the basis of the critique that Stam and colleagues gave on the field of vision 
communication (Stam et al., 2014) when they suggested that what research on visions should 
emphasize more than anything else is vision pursuit (making the vision reality). 
Does this mean that vision had nothing to do with identity change in the water board 
case? On the contrary: vision was the main reason that various individuals were able to 
“experiment” and make their ideas for their company reality (cf. vision pursuit; Stam et al., 
2014). However, such individual ideas were not the vision, although they were in line with the 
vision, but often already existed in the company for some time (as the differentiated content of 
the intrasubjective). Vision, however, allowed these “rogues” to enact their ideas by making 
them legitimate.  Vision essentially built a bridge between the intersubjective and generic 
subjective, allowing existing ideas to circumvent the constricting grasp of higher levels of 
identity on lower levels of identity. As the Energy Factory project leader said:  
“While the real value of that concept sits much more in the impact it has on others. Hence, what 
may lead to recognition or to personal interpretations or other new ideas… that is actually that 
larger change process occurring, being given opportunity and direction.”  
Proposition 3: Offering a strong alternative identity serves to weaken downward cross-
level identity effects. 
Cross-level dynamics 
Identity is a shared construct on an organizational level and therefore needs to be 
founded on some consensus. The new vision introduced into the organization provided common 
ground for a shared reality to emerge. Meindl’s (1990) social contagion hypothesis contends 
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that shared leadership perceptions emerge from social interaction and the same holds true here. 
The interaction between individuals and groups within the organization displaced the existing 
story and allowed a new one to emerge. Without interaction, the story does not perpetuate and, 
importantly, does not evolve to become a collection of individual stories which are shared by 
those who helped built it.  
The threat to identity (essentially a threat to the future as organizational members knew 
it) created a certain level of unease or uncertainty in the organization. To mitigate such feelings 
individuals often attempt to regain consistency and create continuity (Ibarra & Barbulescu, 
2010; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001) between the status quo and the future state outlined by the 
vision. This is often done through mechanisms such as storytelling (Ibarra & Barbulescu, 2010; 
Kolb, 2003). Storytelling serves a socialization function. Stories are the link between the past, 
the present, and the future; creating the continuity necessary for organizational agents to not be 
paralyzed by radical changes (Boal & Schultz, 2007). The water board case shows how the 
stories which emerged helped to give an outlet to existing alternative ideas in the organization, 
but were just that however; stories travelling through the organizational ranks, moving from 
intrasubjective ideas to intersubjective stories. A respondent explained that only with the 
emergence of the Energy Factory was there momentum behind ‘making the change’: “…then 
the ball started rolling, because then we received many requests to come and tell the story…” 
Proposition 4: Interaction is a mechanism through which the intrasubjective can 
influence the intersubjective, but not the generic subjective. 
To move from being mere stories around the proverbial water cooler, and to solidify the 
new perspective into the practices of the organization that enact its identity, i.e. the ‘it is’ 
(Ashforth et al., 2011) a practical channel is needed. The water board case shows how the 
coming to fruition of the Energy Factory concept moved the new vision (from the Club of 50) 
and resulting emerging stories (the innovation challenge ideas) to embedding a new way of 
doing things. Especially, in practically oriented organizations, such as the water boards, a 
practical outlet is needed to secure the legitimacy of the vision and ensuing stories and shift the 
identity towards a transitional tipping point where the ‘new way of doing things’ becomes 
merely ‘the way we do things’. One interviewee summed it up as: 
 “The  success of the Energy Factory was initially contained in the image and the 
different approach, the different way of working, but it would have never amounted to so much 
had we not also had the technical realisation side. You cannot sell hot air…” 
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BMI provides the bridge between what is still intangible stories to the tangible practices. 
Going back to the ‘roots’ of business models; without the enactment of the new revenue model, 
partner network, key processes and resources and the other elements that make up the business 
model it would be remiss to call something business model innovation. Furthermore, without 
said enactment, the support behind an “idea” will eventually wither and die. As the water board 
employee so eloquently put it: “You cannot sell hot air.” Different from for instance policies or 
product innovation, BMI is a more fundamental change and creates momentum among people 
because it is embedded in their day to day, in what they do. If the new approach is inherent in 
people’s operating environment (assuming conditions are conducive to this), the chance that is 
becomes the ‘new way of doing things’ is much higher.  
Proposition 5: Business model innovation is a mechanism through which the 
intersubjective can influence the generic subjective. 
BMI success 
BMI has been typified as the ‘way things are done’ (Magretta, 2002) and therefore sits 
quite close to the organization’s identity as the enactment of said identity (especially in smaller, 
single business model organizations but also in larger, multi-business model ones where the 
identity is embedded into each business model). As organizational members work to create 
continuity and consistency between the status quo and the future, so too do they try and 
harmonize the practical with the intangible. The Energy Factory would arguably have been 
significantly less successful, had someone managed to get it off the ground at all, with the ‘old’ 
water board identity still in place. In the ‘old situation’ even simple projects met a wall of 
resistance: “…the regime has moved along, in 2008 I was met with resistance from management 
regarding simple things like a website…” Now however, it is a very different world:  
“… the Energy Factory thinking, it was essentially about value creation using our 
existing assets, and that we had never done. We were very task-oriented, we were called into 
being as a body for this and that task and we do these tasks to the best of our ability. You can 
do these tasks just fine behind the scenes because that just has to happen. While now we look 
much more into what value we are adding to society, because you are there for society, never 
forget that. You can, with the water treatment plant, perform the task just fine, namely clean 
the water. You can also however, with the same sewage water treatment plant create some 
additional value and one form (of value) is energy. But another form is raw material production 
with the Raw Materials Factory, this is of course the same idea, namely the creation of value 
with what we have in hand.” 
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 Proposition 6: BMI is more likely to be successful when it is tied to an identity (change) 
on the intrasubjective and the intersubjective level of identity.  
We summarise our propositions on cross-level dynamics of identity change in Figure 
4.2, keeping true to our original purpose of theory elaboration and returning to a modified and 
extended version of the model originally drawn by Ashforth, Rogers, and Corley (2011).  We 
specify the mechanisms denoted by the arrows in Figure 4.1 and provide a more comprehensive 
view on the cross-level dynamics of identity change. 
We have reversed the model to put the generic subject at the core, following the logic 
that this is where the most core elements of an identity are contained, where it is least vulnerable 
to outside influence, and most importantly, where there is the least ‘room’ for variation. Moving 
outward, there is more variation in subsequent levels and these are more susceptible to external 
forces (arrows 4). We specify interaction and BMI as two cross-level mechanisms bridging the 
levels of identity and driving identity change forward (arrows 1 and 2). Furthermore, we specify 
the forces of change and preservation that are constantly in play as well as a moderating effect 
of a strong alternative identity on the downward cross-level identity effects.  
4.6 Conclusion 
Having set off on this journey with the intention of uncovering the inner workings of 
BMI set against the backdrop of a ‘blank canvas’, i.e. a government agency which before did 
not have a business model by virtue of their mandate in society. We uncovered a larger theme 
Figure 4.2: The Construction of an Identity 
Generic Subjective
“It is”
Intrasubjective
“I think”
Intersubjective
“We think”
Preservation/Conformity (P1a)
Change/Variation (P1b)
1. Interaction (P4)
2. BMI (P6)
3. Alternative identity (P3)
4. Exogenous Shock (P2)
1
2
4 4 4
3
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centred on the part a business model, and more importantly the innovation of a business model, 
can play in the identity of an organisation. Our propositions on BMI and cross-level identity 
dynamics furthers the work of Ashforth, Rogers, and Corley (2011) in the domain of how 
identities develop across extra-individual levels of analysis. In addition, we also provide a 
starting point for further research into the dynamics of BMI, the part BMI plays in the process 
of identity change, but also the part identity plays in BMI. We encourage future research to 
continue pursuing this avenue in different settings and with different methods, extending BMI 
literature beyond mere composition and process and further into the behavioural domain, but 
also providing fresh perspectives on identity research. 
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SUMMARY 
The modern mobile phone has more processing power than the super-computer which 
put Apollo 11 on the moon (Kaksu, 2014). A staggering fact about the information age in which 
we are firmly embedded. In the current reality, consumers have an increasingly vast number of 
choices, yielding progressively less satisfaction, and firms are overwhelmed with an ever 
expanding list of strategic choices, yielding progressively less value (Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 
2004). Ever more, firms are forced to turn to innovative ways of doing business in order to 
satisfy customers and remain competitive. Consistent innovation is rapidly turning into an 
essential factor in every successful business; in fact, it has been developing toward this for quite 
some time (Magretta, 2002; Coles & Mitchell, 2003; Chapman, 2006). Companies need to 
innovate to stay current and remain competitive.  
When one speaks of innovation; images of new, technologically advanced or novel 
solutions for everyday needs are conjured up. While this is an entirely valid representation, it 
does not encompass the concept of innovation as a whole. Commercial focus thus far has been 
primarily on technological innovation, hence the association (Chesbrough, 2007; Moss Kanter, 
2006). However, in the new age, having the most technologically advanced and up-to-date 
product offerings no longer suffices to satisfy growing consumer desires. Organizations have 
to split their focus to include business model innovation in the new business sphere 
(Chesbrough, 2007; Moser et al., 2007; Chapman, 2006; Chapman & Pohle, 2006; Boulton et 
al., 2000).  
The majority of extant research revolves around investigating the elements of a business 
model; what a business model consists of; and what exactly is implied by the term business 
model innovation (Morris et al., 2005; Coles & Mitchell, 2004; Tikkanen et al., 2005; 
Chesbrough, 2007). Research up to this point gave the dynamism of business model innovation 
relatively little consideration and essentially examined a rather static end-state, as opposed to 
the process leading to business model innovation, in focusing on its elemental composition.  
Research of late is moving more in the direction of process orientation (e.g. Sosna, 
Trevinyo-Rodriguez & Velamuri, 2010), starting to explicate the complexities involved in 
making business model innovation happen. Being in the early stages, this research is still quite 
practical in nature and lacks a certain degree of theoretical depth (Sosna et al., 2010; Rasmussen 
& Foss, 2014). The call for more research into the drivers and mechanisms of business model 
innovation still rings out (Morris et al., 2005; Chesbrough, 2007; Amit & Zott, 2008; Sosna et 
al. 2010; Rasmussen & Foss, 2014). It is this call I hoped to answer in writing this dissertation.  
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In the domain of business models, it is my opinion that the crux of success lies in the 
totality of business model innovation. It is as much about the end-state business model as it is 
about the path to implementation, and that in the most holistic sense: the model, the people, and 
the environment. I tried to mirror this perspective in the choices made in writing this 
dissertation, attempting to pull apart the process and look through the keyhole at the inner 
workings of business model innovation. Each chapter is another step closer to capturing the 
totality mentioned but also further away from the business model itself. Starting close to current 
thinking with a theoretical exploration of the business model innovation process, and ending 
with a new perspective, in an empirical investigation of the effect of the process on arguably 
the most fundamental part of an organisation, its people.   
Business Model Innovation: Team Networks and Leadership – Chapter 2 extends 
current literature, which provides insight into what contributes to BMI success, and how; by 
providing more insight into the why (Whetten, 1989) of BMI. We use leadership and network 
literature as the theoretical backdrop to explore BMI in the context of two stages, a concept 
stage and a development stage, with different requirements and characteristics in each. 
We believe we offer a novel theoretical approach by conceptualizing BMI as a 
behavioural process: a team-based, path-dependent process emphasizing the roles of team 
networks, leadership, and how these interact at various stages to influence performance. 
Moreover, we engage in ‘multidisciplinary theory building’ by integrating two major 
contemporary theoretical lenses, social networks and leadership, to explain a currently “under-
theorized” strategic issue. We offer new theory on the links between social network theory and 
social psychology, to conceptualise how a team’s internal processes interact with its external 
processes to affect BMI outcomes.  
We argued that BMI has distinct characteristics, with typically more uncertainty, 
complexity, and interdependence, than more conventional types of innovation, such as product 
and process innovation. Nevertheless, the validity of our model, using leadership, external 
networks of teams, and their interactions, and how this varies in terms of their influence on 
performance from one stage to the next, may be explored for other settings as well. 
An Organizational Process Model for Resource Constrained Settings: The Case of 
MJunction – Chapter 3 addresses an intriguing puzzle for management researchers (George et 
al., 2012): what explains success in low-cost business models? What organizational factors 
contribute to it, and why (i.e., theoretical logic; Whetten, 1989)? Our longitudinal, qualitative 
study of MJunction in a resource-constrained setting (the emerging IT industry in India) 
suggested new multi-level, multi-stage organizational process theory. External exploration and 
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external exploitation, led to experiences, insights, and objects (e.g., IT-platform) that were 
quickly cobbled together to a new business model, which was improved through trial-and error 
(“bricolage”) in the local market. This process was supported by transformational leadership at 
the firm level and BU-level in the concept stage; operation-oriented leadership at the 
development stage, and participative leadership at the launch stage, making the organization as 
a whole very profitable quite quickly. This created munificent conditions to move to the next 
(mature) stage, with firm-level, formal processes for exploration (in an incubator) and 
exploitation (horizontal and vertical knowledge-sharing mechanisms), supported by firm-level 
leadership in more of a mentoring capacity. Low-cost business models have attracted 
considerable interest in research (George at al., 2012) and practice (Radjou et al., 2012; 
Prahalad & Hart, 2006), and we hope our new conceptualization will inspire future research 
and theory in this domain. 
Grassroots Business Model Innovation: Changing the Identity of a Government 
Institution – We initiated this study to explore the dynamics of BMI; what we were confronted 
with was identity change across levels and the role BMI played in facilitating said identity 
change. This paper therefore explores the development of identity across levels and the dynamic 
mechanisms involved in the process. It offers a new perspective on identity enactment across 
multiple levels and the mechanisms involved, unique insights into the BMI process and its 
effect on organizational members, and a view on visions which goes beyond the current 
literature. We build a set of testable proposition based on the analysis of story of the Energy 
Factory.  
Having set off on the journey with the intention of further uncovering the inner workings 
of BMI set against the backdrop of a ‘blank canvas’, i.e. a government agency which before did 
not have a business model by virtue of their mandate in society. We uncovered a larger theme 
centred on the part a business model, and more importantly the innovation of a business model, 
can play in the identity of an organisation. We elaborate on the theory by Ashforth, Rogers and 
Corley (2011) by exploring the construction of identities empirically and by offering insight 
into the specific mechanisms to which they refer as “the enactment of a given construction and 
the ensuing sensemaking” (Ashforth et al., 2011). In addition, we provide a starting point for 
further research into the dynamics of BMI, the part BMI plays in the process of identity change, 
and also the part identity plays in BMI. We encourage future research to continue pursuing this 
avenue in different settings and with different methods, extending BMI literature beyond mere 
composition and process and further into the behavioural domain. 
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Concluding Remark – I set out to take a look through the keyhole at the inner workings of 
business model innovation in this dissertation. In my research I discovered that business model 
innovation is a phenomenon not conducive to being classified into any one framework or 
theory. We must use other scientific theories and domains to contextualise business model 
innovation and so make sense of this interesting, albeit practical, process. At the start of this 
journey, I wanted to answer the question: What drives business model innovation to success? I 
believe I have, at least partly, answered this question in my discovery that business model 
innovation is a fluid concept driven mainly by people and behaviours, which in turn also 
augments said behaviour, driving other processes (one of which could potentially be more 
business model innovation). I have highlighted the importance of leadership in driving this 
process as well as its outcomes, e.g. learning, identity change. I hope I have piqued the interest 
of others to follow up on the findings of this dissertation and shine a light on the many remaining 
mysteries inherent in business model innovation.  
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SAMENVATTING 
De moderne mobiele telefoon heeft meer rekenkracht dan de super-computer die Apollo 
11 op de maan heeft gezet (Kaksu, 2014). Een onvoorstelbaar feit over het digitale tijdperk 
waarin wij ons momenteel bevinden. In de huidige realiteit, hebben consumenten in een 
toenemendere mate keuzes, met als resultaat minder tevredenheid, en bedrijven worden 
overweldigd met een steeds groeiende lijst van strategische keuzes, die minder waarde oplevert 
(Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004). Bedrijven worden gedwongen zich te wenden tot innovatieve 
manieren van zakendoen om klanten tevreden te stellen en de concurrentie voor te blijven. 
Consistente innovatie is snel een essentiële factor aan het worden in elke succesvolle 
onderneming; de ontwikkeling in deze richting is zelfs al geruime tijd gaande (Magretta, 2002; 
Coles & Mitchell, 2003; Chapman, 2006). Innovatie is een geen pre om concurrerend te blijven, 
maar een eis. 
Als men het over innovatie heeft wordt beelden van technologisch geavanceerde en 
nieuwe oplossingen voor dagelijkse behoeften opgeroepen. Hoewel dit een volledig geldig 
representatie van innovatie is, omvat het niet het begrip innovatie als geheel. Commerciële 
focus tot nu toe is in de eerste plaats op technologische innovatie, vandaar het verband. 
(Chesbrough, 2007; Moss Kanter, 2006). Het meest technologisch geavanceerde en up-to-date 
product aanbod volstaat niet langer om de groeiende consument verlangens te bevredigen. 
Organisaties moeten hun aandacht verdelen om business model innovatie op te nemen in de 
nieuwe realiteit  (Chesbrough, 2007; Moser et al., 2007; Chapman, 2006; Chapman & Pohle, 
2006; Boulton et al., 2000).  
De meerderheid van de bestaande literatuur draait rond het onderzoeken van de 
elementen van een business model; wat een business model uit bestaat en wat er precies wordt 
geïmpliceerd door de term business model innovatie (Morris et al, 2005; Coles & Mitchell, 
2004; Tikkanen et al, 2005; Chesbrough, 2007). Onderzoek tot op dit punt heeft de dynamiek 
van business model innovatie relatief weinig aandacht gegeven en, door gericht te blijven op 
de elementaire samenstelling, in essentie een nogal statisch eind-staat onderzocht. Dit in 
tegenstelling tot het proces dat leidt tot business model innovatie.  
Onderzoek gaat tegenwoordig meer bewegen in de richting van proces (bijv Sosna, 
Trevinyo-Rodriguez & Velamuri, 2010), de initiële stappen tot het expliciteren van de 
complexiteit inherent bij business model innovatie. Het onderzoek is nog in het beginfase dus 
is het vrij praktisch van aard en mist een zekere theoretische diepgang (Sosna et al, 2010;. 
Rasmussen & Foss, 2014). De roep om meer onderzoek naar de drijfveren en de mechanismen 
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van business model innovatie klinkt nog steeds (Morris et al, 2005; Chesbrough, 2007; Amit en 
Zott, 2008; Sosna et al 2010; Rasmussen & Foss, 2014). Het is deze oproep die ik hoop te 
beantwoorden in het schrijven van dit proefschrift.  
Op het gebied van business modellen, is het mijn mening dat de kern van succes in de 
totaliteit van business model innovatie ligt. Het is net zo veel over de eind-staat business model 
als over de weg naar implementatie, en dat in de meest holistische zin: het model, de mensen 
en alles in de omgeving eromheen. In het schrijven van dit proefschrift heb ik geprobeerd 
naadloos bij deze perspectief aan te sluiten en een poging te doen tot een kijkje door het 
sleutelgat naar de innerlijke werking van business model innovatie. Elk hoofdstuk is een stap 
dichter bij het vastleggen van de genoemde totaliteit maar ook verder weg van het business 
model zelf. Beginnend in de buurt van het huidige denken met een theoretische verkenning van 
de business model innovatie proces, en eindigend met een nieuw perspectief, in een empirisch 
onderzoek naar het effect van het proces op misschien wel het meest fundamentele deel van de 
organisatie, haar mensen. 
Business Model Innovation: Team Networks and Leadership – Hoofdstuk 2 breidt uit 
op huidige literatuur, die inzicht geven in wat bijdraagt aan BMI succes en hoe; door meer 
inzicht in het waarom (Whetten, 1989) van BMI. We gebruiken leiderschaps- en netwerk 
literatuur als de theoretische achtergrond voor het onderzoeken van BMI in de context van twee 
fasen, een conceptfase en ontwikkelingsfase, met verschillende eisen en kenmerken in elk. 
Wij geloven dat wij een nieuwe theoretische benadering tot het conceptualiseren van BMI 
bieden, een conceptualisering als een gedragsproces: een team-gebaseerde, pad-afhankelijk 
proces die nadruk zet op de rol van het team netwerken, leiderschap, en hoe deze interageren in 
verschillende stadia om de prestaties te beïnvloeden. Bovendien engageren wij in 
'multidisciplinaire theorievorming' door twee belangrijke hedendaagse theoretische lenzen, 
sociale netwerken en leiderschap, te integreren en een momenteel "onder-getheoretiseerde" 
strategische kwestie uit te leggen. Wij bieden nieuwe theorie over het verband tussen sociale 
netwerk theorie en de sociale psychologie door te conceptualiseren hoe de interne processen 
van een team samenhangen met de externe processen die BMI succes beïnvloeden.  
We argumenteren dat BMI verschillende kenmerken heeft, met over het algemeen meer 
onzekerheid, complexiteit en onderlinge afhankelijkheid, dan de meer conventionele vormen 
van innovatie, zoals product- en procesinnovatie. Desalniettemin is de validiteit van ons model, 
met behulp van leiderschap, externe netwerken van de teams en hun interacties, en hoe dit 
verschilt in termen van hun invloed op de prestaties van de ene fase naar de volgende, mogelijk 
te onderzoeken in andere settingen. 
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An Organizational Process Model for Resource Constrained Settings: The Case of 
MJunction – Hoofdstuk 3 richt zich op een intrigerende puzzel voor management onderzoekers 
(George et al, 2012). Wat zijn succesfactoren in ‘low-cost’ business modellen? Welke 
organisatorische factoren dragen bij tot succes, en waarom (d.w.z. theoretische logica; Whetten, 
1989)? Onze longitudinaal, kwalitatief onderzoek van MJunction in een middel-beperkte 
omgeving (de opkomende IT-industrie in India) suggereerde nieuwe multi-niveau, multi-fase 
organisatieproces theorie. Externe exploratie en externe exploitatie leidde tot ervaringen, 
inzichten, en objecten (bijvoorbeeld een IT-platform), die samen snel aan elkaar werden 
geflanst tot een nieuw business model, dat werd verbeterd door middel van trial en error 
("bricolage") in de lokale markt. Dit proces werd ondersteund door transformationeel 
leiderschap op bedrijfsniveau en BU-niveau in de conceptfase; operatie-gerichte leiderschap in 
de ontwikkelingsfase, en participatief leiderschap bij de lanceringsfase, waardoor de organisatie 
als geheel vrij snel zeer winstgevend werd. Hierdoor ontstond milddadige omstandigheden om 
naar het volgende (volwassen) fase, met organisatie niveau formele procedures voor exploratie 
(in een incubator) en exploitatie (horizontale en verticale mechanismen voor kennisdeling), 
ondersteund door organisatie niveau leiderschap in meer van een mentor capaciteit. ‘Low-cost’ 
business modellen hebben veel belangstelling voor onderzoek aangetrokken (George et al, 
2012.) in de praktijk (Radjou et al, 2012; Prahalad & Hart, 2006), en we hopen dat onze nieuwe 
conceptualisering toekomstig onderzoek en theorie in deze domein zal inspireren. 
Grassroots Business Model Innovation: Changing the Identity of a Government 
Institution – We initieerden dit onderzoek om de dynamiek van de BMI te verkennen; we 
werden echter geconfronteerd met identiteit verandering tussen meerdere niveaus en de rol die 
BMI speelt in het faciliteren van deze identiteit verandering. Dit hoofdstuk onderzoekt ook de 
ontwikkeling van identiteit tussen niveaus en de dynamische mechanismen betrokken bij het 
proces. Het biedt een nieuw perspectief op identiteit uitvoeren over meerdere niveaus en de 
betrokken mechanismen, unieke inzichten in het BMI-proces en het effect ervan op de 
organisatieleden, en inzichten in visie die verder gaat dan de huidige literatuur. We bouwen een 
aantal toetsbare proposities gebaseerd op de analyse  
van het verhaal van de Energiefabriek. 
Wij begon onze onderzoek met de intentie om de innerlijke werking van BMI bloot te leggen, 
met als achtergrond een 'witte doek', dat wil zeggen een overheidsinstelling die eerder niet 
beschikte over een ‘business model’ vanwege hun mandaat in de samenleving. We ontdekte 
een overkoepelende thema gecentreerd op het aandeel dat een business model, en belangrijker 
nog de innovatie van een business model, kan spelen in de identiteit van een organisatie. We 
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breid uit op de theorie van Ashforth, Rogers en Corley (2011) door de constructie van 
identiteiten empirisch te exploreren en door het bieden van inzicht in de specifieke 
mechanismen waarbij zij refereren naar "de vaststelling van een bepaalde constructie en de 
daaruit voortvloeiende zingeving” (Ashforth et al., 2011). Daarnaast bieden we een 
uitgangspunt voor verder onderzoek naar de dynamiek van BMI, het deel dat BMI speelt in 
het proces van het veranderen van identiteit, en ook het deel die identiteit speelt in BMI. We 
moedigen toekomstig onderzoek aan om te blijven voortzetten op deze weg door in 
verschillende organisaties en met verschillende methoden BMI literatuur verder uit te breiden 
dan alleen de samenstelling en het proces, maar juist verder in de domein van 
gedragsprocessen te gaan. 
Concluding Remark – Ik ben aan dit proefschrift begonnen om een blik door het sleutelgat naar 
de innerlijke werking van business model innovatie te nemen. In mijn onderzoek ontdekte ik 
dat business model innovatie een fenomeen is dat niet in één kader of theorie kunnen worden 
ingedeeld. We moeten andere wetenschappelijke theorieën en domeinen gebruiken om business 
model innovatie te contextualiseren en dus zin van dit interessante, zij praktisch, proces te 
maken. Aan het begin van dit ‘avontuur’ wilde ik de vraag beantwoorden: Wat drijft business 
model innovatie tot succes? Ik geloof dat ik, althans gedeeltelijk, deze vraag heeft beantwoord 
in mijn ontdekking dat business model innovatie een vloeiend concept is, vooral gedreven door 
mensen en gedrag, die op hun beurt ook dat gedrag verandert, die fungeert als aandrijver van 
andere processen (waarvan er één meer business model innovatie zou kunnen zijn). Ik heb het 
belang van leiderschap benadrukt in het managen van dit proces alsmede de resultaten, 
bijvoorbeeld leren, identiteit veranderen. Ik hoop dat ik het voldoende belangstelling gewekt 
heb bij anderen om voor opvolging van de bevindingen van dit proefschrift te zorgen en een 
licht te schijnen op de vele resterende mysteries die inherent zijn aan business model innovatie. 
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PROPOSITIONS 
1. A business model is more complex than the sum of its parts. 
2. The most important input for business model innovation is information, complete external information and 
diverse internal information; that is what drives successful business model innovation. 
3. Leadership is a deciding factor in the process of business model innovation. 
4. Business model innovation is at least as much behavioural as it is processual. 
5. The assessment of success of business model innovation is dependent on it being exposed to the outside 
world, without exposure it is nothing more than a concept.  
6. Our understanding of management science is far surpassed by its complexity. 
7. A person can hear but not listen, but it is impossible to listen without hearing. 
8. “Simplicity is a great virtue but it requires hard work to achieve it and education to appreciate it. And to 
make matters worse: complexity sells better.”  
(Edsger W. Dijkstra, 1972 Turing Award winner, 1930-2002) 
9. Objectivity is judgement in the absence of bias. As humans, we are shaped by our experiences and any 
judgement is a reflection of those experiences, hence objectivity is unattainable. 
10. Theories are designed to fail; it takes a multitude of cases to prove a theory, but a single case to refute it.  
11.  “Tell me how you measure me, and I will tell you how I will behave.”  
(Eliyahu Goldratt, Physicist, Author and Management Guru, 1947-2011) 
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In the 21st century, consumers have an increasingly vast number of choices, yielding progressively less 
satisfaction, and fi rms have an ever expanding list of strategic choices, yielding progressively less value. 
Firms are forced to turn to innovative ways of doing business in order to satisfy customers and remain 
competitive. 
When one speaks of innovation; images of new, technologically advanced or novel solutions for everyday 
needs are summoned. While this is entirely valid, it does not wholly encompass the concept of innovation. 
Having the most technologically advanced and up-to-date product o erings no longer su  ces to satisfy 
growing consumer desires. Organizations have to split their focus to include business model innovation 
in the new business sphere and the crux of their success lies in recognizing the totality of business model 
innovation. It is as much about the end-state business model as it is about the path to implementation, 
and that in a holistic sense: the model, the people, and the environment. 
This dissertation mirrors this perspective, attempting to pull apart the process and look through the 
keyhole at the inner workings of business model innovation. Each chapter is another step closer to 
capturing the totality mentioned but also further away from the business model itself. Starting close to 
current thinking - with a theoretical exploration of the business model innovation process - and ending 
with a new perspective, in an empirical investigation of the e ect of the process on arguably the most 
fundamental part of an organisation, its people.
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onderzoekschool) in the 
fi eld of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are the 
Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE). ERIM was founded 
in 1999 and is o  cially accredited by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The 
research under taken by ERIM is focused on the management of the fi rm in its environment, its intra- and 
interfi rm relations, and its business processes in their interdependent connections.
The objective of ERIM is to carry out fi rst rate research in management, and to o er an advanced doctoral 
programme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three hundred senior researchers and PhD 
candidates are active in the di erent research programmes. From a variety of academic backgrounds and 
expertises, the ERIM community is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of creating 
new business knowledge.
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